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PREFACE
This paper shall describe and analyze United States'
policy towards Korea from 1834, when American attention

was first attracted to that country because of possible
trade opportunities, to 1954, which saw the completion
of the Geneva Conference on Korea.

Throughout this

p_eriod American policy was neither static, nor was it
ever well defined.

During this span··of' one hundred and

twenty years American policy in Korea falls logically
into two main periods:
1)

the initial period from 1834 to 1943 during

which time America's primary concern was the establish
ment and maintenance of the "Open Door" policy;

and ii) the second period from 1943 to 1954 when

the American Government attempted to establish an

independent Korea,--this latter period may be subdivided
into three phases:
(a) the period o! military occupation which was
intended to establish a trusteeship over Korea, 19431947;

1954.

(b) the emergence of two �oreaa, 1948-1950; and

(c) the Korean War and post-war diplomacy, 1950-

11

,

i) 1834-1943
From 1834 until 1881 the United States tried to
open Korea to foreign trade.

Af_ter accomplishing

their �oal in 1882 by obtaining·a commercial agree
\

ment, American policy-makers followed a. course of
action which has been described as the "Open Door"
policy.

Throughout this period Korean nationalists

tried to ·enlist Washington's aid in the, establish�ent
of a modern·nation, but the State Dep�rtment believed
that it should not interfere in Korea's internal
situ.ation as long as American citizens a.'nd their,
property were properly treated.

'1 .

Washington was con

stantly reprimandin� its representatives in the

Korean capital for taking too great an interest in
the affairs of the Korean people.
While Americans residing in Korea gained the·
respect of the native population, and received
numerous commercial contracts, the possible expansion
of American influence was hampered by Washington's
directives restricting the actions _of .its field
representatives.

There was constant bickering be

tween the State Department, which came to believe
that Korea was unimportant to American interests in
the Far East,·and me�bers of its legation in Seoul,

who believed that American prestige could be' enhanced
by a policy of assisting the Koreans to modernize
iii

their country.

This bickering came to an end in 1905

when the American legation was closed and the United
States acquiesced in Japanese domination of Korea.
�

\

The United States then recognized Japan's dominant

position in Korea during the latter part o! the Russo
Japanese war and took a favorable view of Tokyo's
annexation of Korea in 1910.

For the next thirty-three

years the American Government ·treated Korea as a pro
vince of the Japanese Empire.

But Japan's policy of

expansion in the Orient, which was to bring her to war

with the United States, caused Washington to decide in
1943, that an independent Korea conformed more to
American needs and aspirations.
ii) 1943-1954
During these eleven years the United States, in
various ways sought to create an independent Korea.
(a) 1943-1947:

The main developments of this

period were the Allied attempt to establish a trustee
ship; the division of Korea at the ,ath parallel; the·
American-Soviet occupation; and the Korea's negative
response to trusteeship.

During these four years the

foundations were established for the "cold war", and
Korea became an ideological battlefield.

Since neither

the Americans nor the Russians retreated in their attempts
to eotablish a unified Korea under a government loyal
to their respective viewpoints, the peninsula remained
iv

divided.

In accordance with Washington's changing

attitude towards the Soviet Union, it waa decided that
the American policy concerning Korea might 'be strength
ened through collective security.

(b) 1948-1950:

With the realization that the

American occupation had failed•to :establish a stable
society in the south; that Korea was .indefensibl�;

that Communist influence was growing throughout. the

. peninsula; and that the Soviets would never accept a
.
unified Korea under a government lo7al to Washington;
the Americans decided to leave Korea.

And with the

aid of the United Nations, Washington.was able to create
in the American zone of occupation, the Republic of
Korea; a vocal· enemy of Communism.

Despite continuing

American financial support the courae of the new nation
was marked by continuing economic and political instabil
ity.

(c) 1950-1953:

During this period the United

States fought a war in order to defend the Republic of
Korea from Communist domination.

Having failed to

unify th� peninsula forcibly. because of Communist Chinese
interference; and ·rearing that the war would spread to
other areas of the �lobe, the U*ited States accepted
··

the military atalema�e and a return to the statue 4uo
� bellum.
During the latter period of American-Korean re
lations, Washington has had to contend with a new
V

factor, that of aggressive Korean nationalism.

Al

though Korean national aspirations had little, if
any, effect on State Department decisions during the

first period of American interest in that country

the situation has been markedly different since 1945.
Because of the growing Communist threat to American
interests in Asia the South Koreans have been able
to obtain increasing American assistance and as South
Korea received_more American assistance. Korean
nationalism has tended to become more and more aggressive.
This extremist character of Korean nationalism has had
a definite influence on American policy, particularly
after the advent of the Korean War.

-
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OHAPrER I
THE OPEN DOOR POLICY, 1867-1945
The Opening of Korea
In the nineteenth century Korea, The Hermit Kingdom,
was still regarded as part or the Chinese Empire, although
the peninsula had secured internal independence early
in the seventeenth century.1 For many years Korea had
remained isolated !rom the outside world, but during
the third quarter of the nineteenth century she began
to attract the attention of nations interested 'in
economic and political expansion.

At f'irst, Japan,

Russia, and France attempted to open Korea through
diplomatic channels, but when the Koreans refused to
recognize the representatives of these states, more·
aggressive tactics were adopted.

It was at this time

that the United States first became seriously interested in Korea because of reports that American seamen, who for one reason or another had fallen under
Korean jurisdiction, were being subjected to various
indignities and maltreatment,
1Kenneth Scott Latourette, A Short Histor of the
y
Far East (New Yor�:- · The Macmillan Oo,, 1952� t P• 41?.
1
l

2
Although Americans first acknowledged the existence
of Korea in 18,4 the first overt expression of this

interest came in 186? when Commodore Robert

,\

w.

Shufeldt

of the United States Navy was sent to investigate the

disappearance ot the American schooner General Sherman,

and to inquire about the possibility of initiating trade

between Korea and the United States.
to make contact with Korean officials.

He was instructed
But nobody ac

knowledged the presence of his ship ott the Korean
coast, he returned home.2 Four years later growing

American interest in the Far East encouraged the State
Department to make another attempt. to obtain trading
rights in Korea, this time by force.

But the Chinese

government learned of the new plan and informed the
Korean monarch, Kojong, who strengthened his country's
defenses and stood ready to repulse the warlike advances

�

2samuel Flagg Bemis, American Foreign Policy and
Diplomacy (New York: Henry Holt and Co., Inc., 1959).
p. 346. American interest had been aroused when a
State Department official travelling in the Far East
in 1834, expressed the belief that trade talks should
be initiated between the United States and Japan, and
Korea. Such a resolution was proposed in the House o!
Representatives a decade later but it was defeated,
and Shufeldt was not despatched•to investigate the fate ot
the General Sherman until 1867, when Secretary of State
William H. Seward lieard that France intended to eatab
list a protectorate over Korea. U.S. Department of
State. A Historical Summar� of United States--Korean
Relations. Publication ?44, Far Eastern Series 115
(Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office,
1951), p. 3. It was later discovered that the crew of
the General Sherman had !ired over the heads of a Korean
investigating party which consequently became very in
hospitable. �•, P• ·45.

of the upstart barbarians from the new world.�

In the spring o! 1871, an 'American task force ot

six ships, commanded by Admiral.John Rodgers,.and bear

ing the American ambassador to �hina, Frederick F. Low,

appeared o!! the coast of the Hermit Kingdom.

'
r

It pro-,:

ceeded inland, along the Salee River,-towarda the

capital city ot Seoul where it was fired upon by Korean
. .

· shore batteries. 4

The return tire played havoc with

the Korean defenses,. destroying five of the Korean

forts and killing the entire complement o! 'guards ·at
one of them.

Since nobody came to talk to the Americans

--the Koreans were afraid to approach the death-dealing
invaders--Rodgera returned to O);lina ,.in aeoordance with
his orders.5

After this unhappy venture American interest re

mained dormant for several years, until it was aroused
in the late 18?0's by Japanese commercial activities
in Korea.

During the 18?0' e Japan had sought. u.nsuccess-

fully to obtain trading privileges in Korea, but it .was

not until 18?6 when Japan threatened an attack on Seoul
-3clarence Norwood Weems (ed.), Hulbert's History
of Korea (New York:; Hillary aouse·Publlshers, Ltd.,
- .
. .
1962), P• �l}�
4

. Ibid., 212.

5Ibid., p, 214. ,,Julius· w. Pratt• A Historf ot ..
UnitedStatea Foreign Policy (Hew York: Prent ce-Hall,
1955), P• 361.
I,

4

that the Korean government obliged the Japanese with
the treaty of Kanghwa.6 This Japanese breakthrough

encouraged the United States to seek a similar arrange. :ment.
American overtures to Korea in 1880 used a familiar
agent but a new tactic.

Commodore Shufeldt sought to

obtain a favorable -response from the Korean government
by approaching it with the assistance

or

Peking otficials.

This maneuver was momentarily stymied when Peking de
manded American acceptance of Chinese suzerainty over
the Hermit Kingdom as the price for their aid.
this obtuseness was offset by the actions

or

But

,
the
Chinese

Governor-General, Li ·Hung Chang• who encouraged the
Koreans to accept trade with the Occidentals in order
to counter-balance the growing Japanese influence in
Seoul. ?

The almost immediate.result of this policy

was the so-called Shufeldt Treaty between the United
States and Korea which was signed on May 22, 1882.

6Hugh Borton, Japan's.Modern Century (New York:
· The Ronald Press Co., 1955), P• 163. In April, 18?8,
a Senator from California proposed that a committee
be established to open talks with the Koreans using
the Japanese as intermediaries, ·but this plan was not
adopted at that time. U.S., Department of State,!
Historical Summary of United States--Korean Relations,
p. 4.
7Fred

The treaty•s main emphasis was on commeroe and the

Article one ot
"there shall be perpetual ··

American rigbt to extraterritoriality.

.�
1

•

the treaty provided thats

. .

••

peace and friendship betwee_n . the President of the .

United States and 'the King or'ohosen [Korea] and th•

citizens and subjects of their respective governflnts."8

The agreement also recognized .that "1.t other Powers· deal
UI+justly or oppressively with either Government, the:
other will exert their good offices, •.•.• to bring about an amicable arrangement. · • • • n9

Following the

signing, the United_ States and Korea exchanged repl,'e
sentativea in 188�..

A retired general, Lucius B.

Foote, was despatched.to Seoul and Washington
received
'
,

,

Min Yung-ik, who headed the Korean group which came to
witness the ratifying of the treaty.lo
Foote, Rebellion, and Failure
Washington's main concern in Korea stemmed .t�om

American interests in trade possibilities, while Korean
acceptance of the Shufeldt ireaty was motivated mor�-

8Donald G •. Tewksbury (comp.•), Sour6e Materials
on Korean Politics and Ideologies (New York, In�titute
of Pacific Relations, 1950), PP• �-4.
Rela-

'i

6
by

-the desire or -Korean nationalists to escape

their Chinese

influence.

tutelage

This trust

Washington's negative
/:

intervention.

from

w1 th, the · aid . ot, American
for

America resulted

attitude toward

, .

from, ,

agression and

Unlike the other nations involved

1

in

.· the Far •Ea.st, the United Sta tee. bad not .yet claimed · .
any

The- s-igning of

territory.

the

treaty

1

-increased : ,

the influence o! the pro-Japanese liberals who were

able to replace the pro-Ohinese'oonservatives in the
Seoul government.

"

'

,

'

Washington's attitude toward Korea was clearly

stated in the instructions received by.General

Foote

from Secretary o! State Frederick T, Frelinghuysen •.

The State Department wanted no part.or the Sino

Korean conflict, and explained that. "we hav� no desire
to interfere unless

action

should be

taken

prejudicial

to the rights of the United States." 11 "As far as we

are concerned
.• . •

•n

12

Corea is an independent sovereign power,

The instructions continued,

11George M. McCune and John A. Harrison (eds.),
Korean--American Relations: The Initial Period , 1883I 886 ( Berke l ey and Los Ange1e�1· Un1vers ityo f Call· :
fornia Presa, 1951 ),. P• 25" ·
· 12william

A. Williams (·ed.), The Shaping ot
. American Di lomacy (Chicagos Rand McNally & Company,
· 1960), p. 3?5.

,

?l
1st.

,,
4th.

Briefly then your mission is
To exchange.the ratifications or the Treat7.
• •

•

'

'

To cultivate friendly relations with the
Government ·and people of Corea••••
To report fully as to the relations ot Corea,
China and Japan that appropriate steps Jll8.7
be taken to secure tor our citizens the
privileges granted to the Ohinese in the
Commercial Regulations.
To inform the Department fully as to all
matters of political importance or or
interest to those engaged in commerce. .• • • 1,

.·This note, with its emphasis on.commercial relations
and non-involvement in Korean politics, became the

guiding principle behind Amer1oan--Korean relations

for the next twenty-one years.

The basis !or subsequent dealings between washing

�on and Seoul were further claritied in� letter.from

King KojQng in which he. acknowledged the responsibilitie_s

or the Shufeldt Treaty. But the Korean monarch's view

on the dimensions of his s9vereignty was lees distinct.
He wrote that, "The Ohou Hsein country [Korea] is a . ·

dependency or Chin�, but. the management other govex-n•·
mental affairs, home and foreign, has always been

rested in the sovereign." 14

Although the American State Department was not

noted for the high caliber.of its personnel during this
l;Illi •, P• ?76'•.
14Mo0une and Harrison, P•· 25.

I

'

.

8

period, Foote .proved to be an able representative who

effectively.advanced further Am�rican trade and American

popularity in Korea.• Arriving in Seoul on May l�, 1883,

.Foote witnessed the opening.of the ports of Inchon and

· Won-san to American trade, as_ stipulated in the Shu!eldt
·treaty. 1 ? In the following year the aoope or this trade
.
was enlarged by the signing of a more extensive oommer
c_ial

agreement. 16 A short time later the United States

Department or Agriculture set up the "American Farm"
about ten miles east of Seoul.

American agricultural

methods.1 7

or

It was a showcase

Nor did Foote ignore

the American investor, securing American participation·
1n·mining ventures, railroad construction, streetcar

systems, an electric power plant• and a public telephone
system.18.
Foote•s ability was recognized by King Kojong who•

sought the American•s advice on several important questions

concerning treaty revisions with the Enelish and the ···
Germans even though he knew Foote•s instructione .for-

bade him to become involved in Korea's internal political
·

15Weems, P• 232.
16Kyung Cho Chung, Korea Tomorrow · (New Yorks

MacMillan. Company, 1956), P•

17weem�, P• 232.

18chung, p. 168 • . .,

l67.•

•

�

I

.'i

.

r

' '

'

•

.

,,

•

' ',l.

,·

•

The

9
af!aira.19 The American representative upheld the

letter of his instructions and r.efused to advise Ko.jong.,

\

but he did forward the royal plea to Washington.

Kojong•s overture to the State Department not only

asked for advice on n�got_iation · of the aforementioned
•

,.

J>

�.

---

treaties, but also asked for assi-atance in establish
ing a modern foreign service and in �etorming the

army.20

Foote proved to be the exception to the rule that
the State Department was a group of incompetents.21

Though his individual actions enhanced American pres
tige he did not always accomplish this by following

his instructions from Washington, and in many instances

gave Kojong a distorted view o! American policy in

Korea,

,.

Such an incident occurred when Kojong•s chie!

adviser, a·retired German officer named von Mollendort22

accused the United States of hav1ng.only•tinancial in

terests in Korea.

Foote aeemingly torgot his instructions

19Mc0une and Harrison, P• 32,
20Ibid., P• 53.
21There were few, if any, ?ar Eastern specialists
in Washington. A typical blunder made by the Stat�
Department was when it.misplaced the Korean monarch's
request for military advisors.
22Anclrew o. Nahm, "Korea's Response to International
Rivalries in the Nineteenth Oentury. 11 A paper read at
the Michigan,Aoademy.of Arts and_Soienoes Convention
at East Lansing, !4.1.ohigan, March 2?, 1964. (Mollendort•s
surname could not be located.)

-

10
and replied:

,,

1

Mr. Minister, I des.ire to aay a fevt words.
The Treaty between the United States and Corea,
was ratified by my. Government when Great Britain
and Germany declined to ratify a similar treaty.
It was accepted with no thought of commercial
gain. My country cares .very little for your·
commerce, Sir. The treaty was rati!ied because
the United States thought·it might·be ot some
service, to Corea, in entering. upon her new
relations with the World••• <;

The American representative's exchange with

Mollendorf attracted ' the attention ot

a

group of young

Korean nationalists, who sought Foote's assistance in
their plan to oust the conservative pro-Chinese advisors of King Kojong.24 Foote. however. was disin
clined to engage in so blatant a violation of his

instructions.

Rebuffed by the Americana. the nationalists

turned to the much weaker Japanese who plotted with them
the overthrow of.the conservatives• (and their financial

and political benefactor) the Chinese President. Yuan
Shih-kai.25 But the revolt failed• and the pro-Chinese

clique moved to reduce the increasing non-Chinese
·
·' influence at Kojong' a court. 26
2'Mc0une and Harrison, • 360
P
24Nahm, op. cit.

2'luan became the first president of the Republic
of China in 19120
26weema,
PP• 236-240.

11

Although American diplomatic influence suffered

a temporary set back because of the unsuccessful

Japanese sponsored rebellion, American citizens con-

1,

tinued to be active in Korean society.

In 1884 9 an

American, Dr. Horace N. Allen founded a hospital, while
some of his countrymen representing the Presbyterian

and Methodist churches established themselves in Seoul. 27Foote became increasingly frustrated in his position

and resigned in 1885.

He ma.de his decision because o!

Washington's continuing stress on noninterference in

Korea's internal political matters and, the lowering

of his status from Minister Plenipotentiary to Resident

Minister.

Foote felt that the American government had

failed to recognize its responsibilities to the Korean

people, and evidently he would not continue to work
for such a shortsighted master.

His duties were tempo

rarily taken over by the Naval Attache at the Seoul

c.

Foulk who became Charge/ d'
Affairs until replaced by a new minister.28
legation, Ensign George

27Ibid,, P• 241.
28Tyler Dennett, Americans in Eastern Asia (New
York: The Macmillan Company, 1922), P• 482. Although
Foulk's stint as Charge ended in February• 1886, he
continued to dominate the American legation. William
H. Parker became the chiet American representative in
February, 1886, and he was !ollowed by Hugh H. Dinsmore
in January, 188?. Ibid,

12
The Foulk Interlude
,

If Foote was pro-Korean in his personal views,

Foulk was no less so.

.

Even as Naval AttacheI he felt

that "the prospect of good work in all directions

pointed to the springt!me."29

But the .revolt or 1884•

appeared to have dampened such prospects.

As the

Americans were considered pro-Japanese the conserva

tively oriented Seoul mobs expressed their disapproval
(of Japanese action) by burning down.Foulk's house. 3 0
But the American legation was able to recapture its

earlier stature shortly thereafter, when the Japanese
returned to Seoul.

Foulk wanted to aid in the modernization of Korea,

but he was hampered by Washington's haphazard interest

in the peninsula. A case in point was Kojong's request

for military advisors, made during Foote's ministry,
which Washington ignored for several years. 3 1 Foulk

realized the increasing seriousness of the sterility

of Washington's policies, and tried to rouse the State

Department to action. by commenting favorably
29Harrington, P• 40.

on

Kojong•s

3oibid.
31Actually the advisors did not come.to Korea until
the Korean monarch made his
five years had lapsed· · since
·
request in 1883.

13.
request !or military assistance.

Foulk reported thata

In speaking of this subject, His Majesty
remarked upon the friendly offers of assistance
made by the United States, • •·. and spoke at
length of the great benefit Korea must derive
from the assistance o.f competent Americans only 1
at this time of her weakness amidst the threaten
ing dissensions of the European powers. • • • ,c

\
I'

But the plea found only the traditional response o!

' .

non-interference.

Foulk believed that -"American intluenoe and repu
tation for good faith are at stake"33 in Korea. But

Washington expressed a different viewpoint, and saw
the peninsula as:

[A] center of conflicting and almost hostile
intrigues involving the interests or China, Japan,
Russia and England, and ••• it is clearly the
interests of the United States to hold aloof from
all this and do nothing nor be drawn into anything
which would look like taking sides with an.y of
the contestants or en er1ng the lists of intrigues
for our own benefit. ?

4

..

.. And there were even some people who wanted to close
the Seoul legation and handle all Korean--American

affairs through the American representative in Peking.

It became .increasingly obvious that Foulk's opinion on

the importance or Korea to American interests was not
32williams, p. 377. The English had taken over
Port Hamilton in the south, a�d in order to counter
balance this move, the Russians threatened to secure
.the ice-free port at Lazaroff. �•

33Harr1ngton, P• 212.
34seoretary Bayaro to Foulk, August 19, 1885. as
quoted in Harrington, P• 212.

14
shared by the diplomats in Washington.

Foulk also played an important part in furthering

\

the interests or the American commercial community.

'

For example, at the beginning o! 1886, he obtained
fishing rights for oysters from Kojong.

It,was.pri

marily because the King liked the American representa

tive that he agreed to give the Americans exclusive
rights to the oyster trade.

After succeee!ully com- .

plating this venture he was chided mildly by the

State Department.

They informed Foulk thati

As a general rule it is undesirable that a
legation abroad should appear to advocate con
cessions or exclusive privileges of trade or
business in favor of its countrymen • • •
All this government asks is fair and equal
treatment of its citizens.
The department views herein given are
advisory merely as to future occasions or this
nature. There is no purpose to condemn your
reported actions which seems to have been
characterized by your usual good discretion. 35

Foulk, who was also interested in modernizing Korea's

educational system advised Kojong in the founding of the

Royal English School in September, 1886.

This school

was staffed by three American teachers who concentrated
on the teaching or general science and the English
language.

Foulk's ,influence also helped to obtain

Kojong' a acoeptanc.e of. the American Methodist Mission
35Mc0une and Har.rison-, P• �.

15
School which was named "Pai Ohai Bak Tang" or "Hall ot
the Rearing of Useful ,Men. 11-36

\

Foulk's su¢cess. in promoting better American and

\

Korean interests aroused the indignation of the Chinese
who saw Foulk's ascendancy in Kojong•s court as detri
mental to their policies in Korea.

Working through the

Korean foreign minister they urged the State Department
to recal� Foulk.

The specific charge against the

American representative was that he had written a series·
of supposedly slanderous articles in a Shanghai news�
paper which insinuated that ,the Pro-Chinese advisors in
Kojong's court were "corrupt.""?)_?

On June l?, 188?,

Secretary Bayard acquiesed to the Chinese demand.

His

letter to Hugh A. Dinsmore, who had become resident
minister in Seoul in January, 188?, set forth the reason's
for Foulk's recall:

,

�

The Chinese Charge d'A!!airs ••• has made
oral and written representations to me that the
continued presence of Mr. Foulk in Korea was a
source of peril to the relations between Korea
and China ••• it was even stated that Foulk,
in concert with some evil-disposed persons o!
Korea is planning a rebellion against China •••
In view of all this, � •• it has been
determined to relieve Ensign Foulk as Naval
Attache, • a e 38
36weems, p� 244�
37Palmer, P• 5?�
38�� t P• ?8.
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Dinsmore immediately protested on the grounds that

not only was Foulk the only interpreter attached to the

\

legation, but he was also a strong influence on the

\

Korean �onarch.

Kojong also showed bis displeasure

over Foulk'a dismissal·by discharging his toreign

minister who had acted as the �gent or" the Ohinese.,9

But the protests were of no avail,

Washington would

not reverse its.stand, nor would Baya�d even listen

to Foulk's defense.

It was olearl� a Chinese victory,

and once again revealed that �he United States did not

want to become involved in matters relating to Korean

sovereignty.

"We Cannot Interfere in
Internal Politicai Matters"
In the several years following the recall of

Foulk the Koreans turned increasingly to the Russians
The Chinese cause which had won

for aid and advice.

a victory in the departure ot 1oulk, was checked by

Peking's fears of possible Japanese aggression in

Korea.

American influence remained substantial, though

more as a co�sequenoe or the activities of private
citizens than o! American_diplomats.

.

.

Perhaps the best known American oitize�,\in Korea

-

39Ibid., PP• 81-82.
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at this time was Dr. Horace Allen who had founded a

hospital in-Seoul. -In 188? he convinced the Korean

monarch of tbe,advisability or establishing legations

\

in Europe and the United States in order to emphasize

Seoul's independence from Peking.

The King agreed

because he believed that, "everything depends on •.• •
interesting America in-this country,"40 and he asked
Allen "to guide the diplomats who went to the United
States."41

Again the Chinese intervened; this time

to prevent the departure of the Korean minister who

was chosen to represent his country in Washington.

Only when Kojong asked Peking's permission was the.
diplomat permitted to leave for his new poat.42 -Arriv

ing in Washington, the Korean representative, at Allen's
instigation, presented himself first to the State

Department rather than to the Chinese embassy.

By

this action, Kojong's promise to acknowledge continued
Chinese suzerainty over Korea was broken, but his

small nation had now established a diplomatic post

in the United States, which was the !irat of a series
o..r Korean legations in various parts of the world •.

A facet of the American position in Korea at this

time that aroused a considerable concern in the State
40Harrington, P• 226•
. 41�., P• 83.
42�., P• 231•
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Department was -missionary work., American diplomats

were convinced .thq.t .American missionaries.were over
zealous in their attempts·to convert the Koreans •.

�

1

\

Certainly• reported an American representative in Seoul,
they were to be commended for their work in schools,

hospitals• and, orphana.gef)• but he "considered .• • ..•....
any evangelizing·work here at least ,premature and en

d.?ngering their position and popularity with the

natives." 4 '

Korean opposition to the increased religious

activities prompted a further exchange ot notes between
the State Department and its Seoul legation in which

it was agreed that the missionaries should stay within
their treaty rights and roatrict themselves .to secular
ma.tters.44 The diplomata believed that "it would

certainly be unfortunate ••• if ••• they [missionarie�

should render their well-met efforts a ground.of hostility

on the part of the natives.11 45. At least one American

churchman expressed displeasure over the State Depart-•

ment's actions which he considered as an absolute ban
43Palmer. P• 205

44Ibid., PP• 208-211. Although both the Korean
laws and the Shufeldt Treaty restricted the American
missionaries to non-religious teaching the letter of
the law was not·upheld until the period in question.
Ibid.
45Ibid.
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on the teaching of religion.

.,

He longed "for the time

when our treaty shall be revised and freedom of religion
allowed. 11 46 But Washington st.ood fast_ and reiterated
its position:

You are aware.that the' Corean people in
general look with little favor on.the propagation
of foreign religious views in that country and
that the Government there, in concluding the
treaty of 1882-, refrained fr.om oon �rr1ng any
special privileges in this regard. 4·1

. American missionaries later obtained greater freedoms

through the operation of the most favored nation clause
in the Shufeldt treaty.48
Although the Shur'eldt treaty committed .the United

States to a policy of "perpetual p·eaoe and friendship"
between Americans and Koreans, at times Washington's

behavior seemed to belie .this commitment.

This appears

most clearly in State Department responses to Kojong's

friendly request for advisory aid in-reforming the

·Korean army and its governmental administration.

It

took Washington five years to dispatch three military
advisors who were to train a nucleus o! a modern army
46�., P• 223.
4?
·
.!lli

48This occurred· in 1893 when the French acquired
religious freedoms !or their missionaries. Through the
most-favored nation clause of the Shufelt Treaty the
Americans were able to gain the same rreedoms. Ibid.

20

for Korea.49

When Dr. Allen, who had become a member

of tho American legation's-start· helped the King to·
\

\

• and teaching jobs,
secure Americans for administrative

he -.vas :i.nformed by the State Department tho.t, he, "should

not have used his good offices to secure teachers or

· other employees tor the Korean government.
not part of job."5�

This was

Washington's seeming indifference to 'the growth

of Amarican influence in Korea came at a time when th9

Korean monarch was increasingly desirous of American

assistance and advice in !aoe of the growing Sino-Japanese
.rivalry in his country. 5 1 Not only did he readily
comply with the requests of the American legation to

renew the contracts

or two American teachers at the

Royal School, but he named Dr. Allen to head the Royal
Hospital, and appointed two Americans as his personal

advisors. 52

In 1892, Kojong �iapatched Dr. Allen, an4

the American teacher from the Royal School, Homer Hulbert,
and a Korean diplomat to Washington in order to obtain

financial and advisory asa1ste.noe, but the State Depart
ment rejected their overtures. 53

-

49 Ibid., P• 144.

50Harrington, P• 245•

51nennett, PP• 706-70?.
52Palmer, PP• 131-132.
53 Chung, P• ·168.
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Japan, Russia, and Dr. Horace Allen
During the 1890's both the internal and the external

\

affairs of Korea were deeply affected by the struggle
between China and Japan for the ascendancy in the Hermit
Kingdom, a contest which culminated in the Sino-Japanese
war of 1894-1895•

At this time the Chinese, through

their resident minister in Korea, Yuan 8hik-ka1 1 was
· successfully reasserting its influence on the Korean
government.

Tokyo realized that its own plans in Korea

were threatened by Yuan's success.

Although the United

States continued to take a neutral stand, it was in
clined to view the Korean aspirations or a swiftly
modernizing Japan with greater favor.
The immediate origins of the Sino-Japanese war
are to be found in the internal strife that character•
ized Korean politics.

In March 1894 1 a reactionary

anti-foreign group in south Korea rose against the
Seoul government in what is known as the Tonghak
rebelli.on.

An 1n1tial rebel victory prompted the King

to ask Peking for military aid,

The Chinese responded

by dispatching !i!teen hundred �oldiers to Korea,
hereby failing to c�mply with article three of the Treaty
of Tientsin of 1884, which forbade either China or
Japan sending troops into Korea without obtaining the
other's permission.

After receiving the delayed

22
notification of Chinese troop movements, Japan ordered

four hundred marines to Korea where they were placed

\

at the disposal or their ambassador.in Seoul. 54

This

situation further deteriorated when neither the Chinese

'

nor the Japanese removed their troops from the peninsula

after the capitulation of the rebels •

American reaction to these developments was in-

ciined towards the.Japanese position.

Commenting on

Korean attempts to induce both powers to withdraw

their forces, John M. B. Sill, the American resident
minister, believed "that the fault in the present

difficulties is due to the action of the Chinese in
forcing their troops upon Korea. 1155

According to Sill,

the Japanese would not leave because they feared the
possibility of losing face.

Furthermore the situation

offered them a good "opportunity to [re]assert the,ir
fast-fadinr� influence in Korea. u56

The Koreans were not concerned with which party

was at fault, but rather witn the immediate removal of
both Japanese and Chinese forces.

They made overtures

to the French, British, American, and Russian legations
to intervene and force the offending·troops from the
54weema, P11 250.

55Palmer, P• ;;2.
56Iill •

peninsula.

Although the Occidentals retused to commit

their military forces some did send messages to the

Chinese and Japanese which asked !or the withdrawal

of the unwanted forces. 57 When the Koreans renewed

their plea tor American military assistance. Washington

again refused, although it did send a note to Tokyo

condemning �ar. 58 ·Neither or the intervening powers
was inclined to accept the modest mediations of the

West and the ensuing war lasted until April 17 t 1895 t
w.hen China acquiesced to the terms of the Treaty or

Shimonoseki which "recognized definitely the full and
complete independence and autonomy of Korea�n59 Japan
quickly took advantage of its victory; and within

-�

several months the American minister noted that the
Japanese were running Korea.60

Although the war effectively disposed of one of

Japan's rivals in Korea, another and more powerful

competitor• Russia 9 was. ready to thwart Japan's long
term plans for exploiting the fruits of victory.

Russian

penetration of Manchuria and northern China had in
creased in the years immediately
• preceding the war,
·57 Ibid., P• 335•
58�., P·• 337•
59Bo�ton, P• 20?.
' ..

'1'

..

GOibid.
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and the Russian bear became a willing ally in King
Kojong's attempts to thwart a Japanese takeover in
,\

'

Japan's position was further compromised by

Korea.

the palace coup of October 8, 1895, in which certain
Korean nobles sought to enhance their own influence
by assassinating the anti-Japaneae·Queen Min.

Tokyo's

minister to Korea was also implicated in the plot,
Kojong took refuge in the Russian legation and issued
a series of statements condemning the Japanese.
The American role in these developments was again
characterized by the differing positions taken by her
representative in Korea and the State Department.

Sill

sought to convince the Korean people that the Japanese
should not be held responsible for the actions of one
of their bureaucrats.

On the other hand the State

Department disagreed and, condemned Sill's action in
two succeosive notes.

He was told that "intervention

in the political concerns of Korea is not among your
functions, and is forbidden by diplomatic instruction

64.11 61

Washington also issued a condemnatory note to

one of its minor officials at the legation who was

J�

interested in Korean matters:

ooking ·towards strengthening the authority
of th_ king or otherwise taking part in matters
which do not immediately concern the interests of
the United States, might be open to serious ob
jection on account of our consistent polioy,
_
61

Palmer, P• 267.
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which we carry out in Asia as well as Europe and
elsewhere, of abstainin� from cooperation with
other powers in any intervention of whatever nature.
We appreciate the difficulty of your position
but we must be:conaistent with our traditional
policy. 62
With the King's removal from center stage by his
isolation in the Russian embassy and the United States

committed to a policy of non-interference, Japan felt

.

.

the time was ripe to consolidate its position in Korea
. by increasin� its control over the Seoul cabinet.

But

Tokyo underestimated the strength or Korean nationalists
who, embittered by the murder of their Queen and aroused
by the anti-Japanese remarks of their King, vented their
anger toward the Japanese with several days of violent
street demonstrations.

These disturbances were directed

by private American citizens, the most influential being
Dr. Horace G. Underw�od.63 The American missionaries
in Korea, unlike their brethern elsewhere, were ardent
supporters of nationalism in their adopted countries.
Shocked over the loss o! his wife and grateful to
his Russian protectors, King Kojong stayed in the
Russian embassy for two years during which time his
63nr. Underwood·was an important member of the
American religious community in Korea and, was respon
sible for saving many lives during the cholera epidemic
in the summer.of-1895•. Harrington, P• 101.
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hosts gained increasing influence in Korean affairs.

The emergence of Russia as the dominant foreign in

fluence in Korea did not� at first, have an adverse

effect on the American position in Seoul.

For example,

American Homer Hulbert became .head,o! �he Royal English

. School and an American company was unhampered in 1 ts
construction of the Seoul-Chemulpo Railway.64 But when
Alexis Speyer came to Korea in 1897 as the Russi�n
representative a new policy was initiated when he

announced bluntly that "no Korean entertaining friendly
sensations (sic] for America shall have a place in the

6
c
,- .. _·· KoreaiTI .. Government. 11 5

Washington Acknowledges the Japanese Ascendancy
The Russian ascendancy in Korea was ahort-lived,
partly because Russia was more interested in China

than in Korea and therefore did not want to antagonize

unduly the Japanese and the British, and partly because

Korean nationalism began to reassert itaelt under such
native leaders as the American-educated Dr. Philip
Jaishon. 66 By April, 1898, Russia indicated her

willingness to acknowledge Japanese ambitions in Korea
64weems, P• 3lle
65Harrington, p. 298. Speyer did allow an American
lawyer of pro-Russian views, Clarence R. Greathouse, to
continue on as an advisor to the Seoul government. Ibid.
66

Borton, P• 219.
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by signing the Rosin-Nishi agreement in which the Czar

recognized Japan'a dominant position in Korea.

During this period Washington -. became increasingly

'

convinced that its interests would best be served it

.the American legation waa closed and Japanese suzerainty
in Korea accepted.

Again the American field represent

ative, now_Dr. Horace Allen, disagreed.

Contrary to

his stand he was to be America's last significant official

representative to the Korean government until the end

of the Second World War.

_. Allen's course as minister resident clearly in

dicated that he felt American influence in Korea should

be'enlarged rather than diminished.

His success in

this area was indicated by the remarks of an American

traveller, who reported "that in thia country they

[traveller� find the only Asiatic community of foreigners
where American influence predominates. 116 7 In 1900·

Kojong once again turned to Allen for advice, this

time concerning action to be taken against a revolt
in the northwest.

The Doctor suggested that the
monarch-immediately suppress the disturbancea.68

Al-

though Allen's activities gained wide respect among

Koreans, hia own assessment o! the American position
67Harr'ington, p� 196.
'68
�., P• 115.
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in Korea, as of 1902, was less than optimist1os

The Koreans have the idea that we don't
count anymore. We live in this little disreput
able Korean bungalow, and put on no style; make
no threats, and they think they can neglect us. 69

Seeking to change this image, in 1904, he tried to

persuade Washington that American troops should be used

to safeguard Korea's independence from Japanese intrusion •

He was rebuffed with a reply that the use of force was
"wholly unjustifiable and dangerous as establishing a

precedent which may be used to destroy what little

semblance there still r�ma.ina of Korean independence."?O
The following year Washington closed its long

debate with ita field representatives in Seoul by

closing the American legation.

President Theodore

Roosevelt looked upon Japanese domination of Korea

as desirable both from the atandpoint of Korean progress
and the protection of American interests.

He also

believed that the United States had "the same interests
with Japan and Great Britain in perserving the peace
of the Orient. 11 71 This viewpoint was implemented near
the close of the Russo-Japanese war on July 29, 1905,

69 Ibid.,

P• 309.

?O�., P• 191

of- Theodore
7lElting E. Morison (ed. ) ,T
.;;.h
..eLetters
~-------Roosevelt: The Bi B Stick, 1905-1902 (Cambrid ge1
.Harvard Univers i ty Presa• 1952), P• 49. ,
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when Secretary of War William H. Taft• and Japanese

Premier Taro Katsura, met behind closed doors to ex

change Japanese recognition of the American position

in the Phillippines for American approval of Japanese
suzerainty over Korea.

The American--Japanese accord

on Korea as expressed in the Taft-Katsura Memorandum
explained that,

[fin regard to the Korean question Count
Katsura observed that ••• if left to herself
••• Korea will draw back to her habit of
improvidently entering into any agreements or
treaties with other powers, thus resuscitating
the same international-complications as existed
� before the war. ••• [.1raft] fully admitted the
justness of the Oou.nt's observations and remarked
to the effect that, ••• the establishment by
Japanese troops of a suzerainty over Korea •••
was the logical result of the present war and
would dir�ctly contribute to permanent peace in
the East. ·12

When the Treaty of Portam.outh, which was significally
influenced by the moderating talents of Theodore

Roosevelt, removed the last significant barrier to

Japan's ascendancy in Korea, the United States closed
ita legation in Seoul in November, 1905, replacing

it by a consul who was to receive his orders from the
American representative in Tokyo.

Little notice, if

any, had been paid to a secret appeal from the Korean

King in which he had asked for American diplomatic .and

..
7�ewksbury;
P• 22.

'

�o
military assistance; 73 Roosevelt had closed the door

on the Korean people.

He believed American interests

would be safe under the watchful eye of the Japanese,
\

and he would not aid people who "could not strike one
blow in their own de.fense. 11 74

Amerioan policy towards Korea was .further defined

by t�e Ropt-Takahina agreement of November 30, 1908.

In this accord, Secretary of State Elihu Root and the
Japanese ambassador in Washington, Kogoro Takahira,

agreed to acknowledge the "Open,Door" in China, but

nothing was mentioned about Korea.

Tokyo interpreted

the American silence as an acknowledgement of the
Japanese supremacy in Korea.75 Two years later, the
Japanese Empire officially annexed Korea.

From 1883 to 1905 the American field representatives

constantly disagreed with their superiors in Washington,

and tried to help Korea, but they were continuously
hampered by the State Department,

During this period·

the United States was trusted by the Korean people,

yet she failed to aid the country's modernization in
73Ibid., P• 25.
74.aor.ton, p. 2�2.

75Ibid., p. 248. Subordinating the consul at

Seoul tothe American representative in Tokyo would
also indicate Washington's recognition of Japan's
position in Korea.
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any substantial way�

Time and time again the Koreans

would turn to Washington for assistance• but they
always received the same reply;

"We oan not interfere

in internal matters."
\

The Challenge to Japanese Supremacy
On August 29� 1910, under the pretext of protecting
Korea's independence� Japan annexed the peninsula,
relinquishing its power only after its defeat at the
end of the Second World War�

During this period the

United States, which had secured commercial and religious
privileges through the Taft-Katsura agreement of 1905, ?6

ceased to accept Korea as an independent nation.

Any

transactions between American and Korean interests were
handled in accordance with the Japanese Proclamation
of Annexation.

The Government of Japan and Korea, being
convinced of the urgent necessity of introducing
reforms responsive to the requirements of the
situation and of furnishing sufficient guarantee
for the future, have, with the approval of His
Majesty the Emperor of· Japan and His Majesty the
Emperor of Korea, concluded, • • • a treaty
providing for complet� annexation of Korea to
the Empire of Japan. 7 '/
At first the apathetic Koreans accepted their fate,
but at the end of the First World War they became hopeful

..

·?6For the pertinent excerpt from the Taf't-Katsura
agreement, see above, P• 29 •
??Tewksbury, P• 37.
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when it was revealed to them that American president

Woodrow Wilson believed in the principle of eel!
determination of nationalities.

While diplomats

. designed the new world at the Paris Peace Con!erence,
the first concrete signs of Korean opposition to
Japanese suzerainty were developing.

Using King Kojong•·s

i'unera.l services .in Seoul as a rallying point• thirty

three prominent Koreans signed the Declaration or

Independence on March 1, 1919.

They appealed to

President Wilson for aid, but even though one of the
group, Dr. Syngman Rhee,78 had developed a friendship

with the American leader, the President did not acknowl
edge their plea; evidently Wilson believed in self

determination !or Europe but not for Asia.79

Although this political .unrest, which continued

for about a year, went unnoticed outside of Korea, the

Japanese swiftly suppressed it, forcing the nationalists
underground.8O Many Koreans fled their homeland, moat of
78Robert T. Oliver, Syngman Rh.ee, The Man Behind
The Myth (New York: Dodd, Mead and Co., 1954), pp.
109-114. Rhee had obtained his Ph.D. from Princeton
while Wilson was President of the University •
· 79In April, 1919, The State Department instructed
its representative in Tokyo to warn the American consul
in Seoul not to int�rfere in Korean--Japanese affairs.
U.S., Department of State, A Historical Summary of
. United States--Korean Relations, p. $6.
8Ornduk Pahk, September Monkey (New Yorks Harper
Brothers, 1954), p. 58.
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the exiles settling either in China, Hawaii, or the

United States.

\

These people, individually and through

their organizations, continuously appealed to the
United States for economic and military support in
re-establishing their political freedom.81
These pleas were of little avail as Japan continued
to strengthen her-political and economic hold.on Korea
rluring the twenties and thirties.

Although the pen

insula was developed as an integral part of the
Japanese economy, Koreans remained in the status o!
second-class citizens.
Throughout this period the United States paid little,
if any, attention to Korea and ignored the Korean Govern
ment-in-exile.

Very few Americans knew, or cared,

about the peninsula, and Washington.did not want to
antagonize the Tokyo government by interfering in the
internal affairs of the Japanese Empire, as long as
American commercial interests were secure.

Even when

the Japanese started to expel American missionaries
from Korea in 1941, the State Department acquiesed to
Tokyo's wishes.

Then, during the War, the United

States made no distinction between Koreans and Japanese,
either in Hawaii

or

81Tewksbury, P•

on the American continent, as local

5,.

military commanders treated the former as prisoners
of war.82 The United.States .refused.to.acknowledge

that Koreans were not Japanese, and.that they possessed

their own culture, tradition, and language.

After the attack on Pearl Harbor, Dr. Rhee, who

headed the Korean exiles in the United States, aoceleratfd

his drive to obtain recognition of his homeland from
the State Department. He was aided by a group of

Americans and.Koreans who were politically and finan
cially interested in Korean independence.83 The State

Department was constantly pressured by these lobbyists,
but its response was negligible as it felt that this
group did not represent the Korean people.

It is

questionable whether Washington would have acknowledged
a representative group.

In December, i941, Rhee, through his secretary,

Chang Kee Young, wrote to Se_nator Guy Gillette asking

for the Sena.tor's assistance in approaching the State·

Department.

But Washington officials told the legis

lator that they feared any move to recognize Korea

..

8201iver, Syngman Rhee, p; 189.
83Yong-sin Im, My Forty-Year Fight for Korea
(New York: A. A. Wyn, 1951) , p. 257 • Some members
of this group were: John G. Staggers, Jay Jerome
Williams; Dr. Robert T. Oliver; Colonel M. Preston
Goodfellow; Mrs. Lorraine Engels; Dr. Maurice Williams;
Colonel Ben Limb; Dr. Sae Sun Kim; Dr. Henry De Young;
and Dr. Herbert.Kim.

:;5
would complicate the delicate problem of the exchange

of diplomats between.Japan and the United States taking

place in the weeks immediately. after the declaration

of war.

Senator Gillette explained the American attitude

·. to Rhee in his letter of December 18:.

I have discussed the recognition or Korea
as an independent political entity with the State
Department. ·I found them sympathetic but of
course no action can be taken until the exchange
of diplomatic representatives and attaches be
tween the Japanese Empire and the United States
··
Government has been e·ffected. 84

In January the resourceful Rhee tried a new approach.

He offered Alger Risa and Dr. Stanley Hornbeck of the
Department of State's Far Eastern Section the use of

Korean exiles for military purposes in exchange for

recognition of his government-in-exile, as the legiti
mate representative of. the Korean people.85 Although
this offer was refused, Rhee placed some young Korean
men at the disposal of Korean lobbyist, Colonel M.

Preston Goodfellow of the Office of Strategic Services

Rhee's plan was to drop

!or training in sabotage work.

these men into Korea when the Allies launched their

.

proposed
pincer movement on Japan.
-

But when the

strategists adopted an island-hopping approach this
86
plan was never implemented•.
84olive�, Syngman Rhee. p. 176 •.
85�•• pp. 177-178.
86

�., P• 185.
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During this period the American government per�
sisted in its refusal to r.ecognize a Korean Government
in-exile.

Assistant Secretary,o! State, Adolf A. Berle,

Jr., informed Rhee and his compatriots that they did_

not represent the Korean people as most of them had

been away from their homeland for nearly twenty-five
y�ars.

,

The infuriated Rhee replied:

The Pr.ovisional Government of the Republic
of Korea is the sole representative of the Korean
people, ••• and regards itself, on the basis
of the treaty of 1882, ••• not as a free movement in any sense whatever of that phrase, but
as the only government agency of Korea that is
in existence.8 7
But as the All:tes stepped up their war effort in

the Pacific increased attention was focused on stimu
lating discord among the subjugated peoples (i.e.,
Koreans 9 Thais, Burmese, Formosans, and others) within
the Japanese Empire.88 In early 1942, President
Roosevelt, in a radio broadcast, made a passing remark

concerning "Japanese despotism in Korea; 1189 and shortly

8701iver, Syn man Rhee,' p. 179. For pertinent
excerpt from the S�ufeldt treaty of 1882, see above,
P• 5.
8 8u.s., Department of State, Foreign Relations
of the United States, 1943, III (Washington, D.C.:
U.S. Government Pri�ting Office, 1963) 9 1090-1096.
89u.s., Department of State, A Historical Summary
of United States--Korean Relations, p•. 57.
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after, the Acting Secretary of State, Summer Welles·

told a press conference that the American government

was sympathetic to the Korean cause.9° -Throughout the

year, Washington officials, esp_ecially the Pacific War

Council, discussed the possibilities· of Korean inde

pendence, and in March, 1943, the topio was reviewed

by the State Department and the visiting British Foreign
Minister, Anthony Eden.91
The Fruits.of.Victory
As American policy-makers paid increasing attention

to the war against Japan it was decided at the Cairo

Conference of December, 1943, that the Korean people·

should be given some idea of their political status in
the post-war world.

To.stimulate resistance to the

Japanese Army in occupied Asia, the United States,

Great Britain, and China declared that "the aforesaid

three great powers, �indful of the enslavement of the·
people of Korea, are determined that in due course
Korea, shall become free and independent. 11 92 The
90-1 id •' P• 9 •
=2..91w. D. Reeve ? The Re ublic of Korea (London:
Oxford. University Press, 1 �63), p. 23. During 1943,
resolutions were introduced in Congress calling for
recognition of the Korean Provisional Government, but
they never passed committee. U.S., Department of
Sta-'ce, A Historical Summary of United States--Korean
Relations, pp. 9-10.
9 2u.s., Department of State, The Record on Korean
Unification ~ 1 94 3-1960, Publication 7084, Far Eastern
Series 101 Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing
Office9 1960), P• 42.
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Allies did not announce what was to happen during the

interim period and they d�d not concern themselves with

,,

this problem until .later.

This reviyed interest.in

Korea by the American government was prompted primarily
by General Douglas MacArthur's westward advance, but

unlike the plans for Japan, nobody had bothered to

study or prepare for the future American occupation of

Korea.

The Allies reiterated their pledges to Korea

at the Potsdam Conference in July, 1945, acknowledging

Declaration shall be
that "the terms of the Cairo
,
carried out and Japanese sovereignty shall be limited
to the islands of Honshu, Hokkaido, Kyushu, Shikoku,
and such minor islands as we determine."93 Finally

when the Soviet Union entered tpe war against Japan

it renewed its previous pledges to its allies concerning

Korea:

"Loyal to its Allied duty, the Soviet Government

has accepted the proposal of the Allies and has joined
in the declaration of the Ailied Powers of July 26
[the Potsdam Agreemen� • u94

The Allies first anxiously concerned themselves

with the details of governing post-war Korea at the

93canada, Department of External Affairs, Documents
on the Korean Crisi� (Ottawa: King's Printer and
Controller of Stationery, 1950), p. 18.

94t:J.s., Department of State, The Record on Korean
Unification, p. 44.
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Yalta Conference of January-February, 1945.

President

Roosevelt reiterated that the Peninsula should be

developed under a joint American-Russian trusteeship.95 .

At first Stalin agreed to this plan, but during the

latter part of the talks he proposed that Great Britain

be included as one of the ruling partners.

While the

Briti$h did take part in discussions concerning the
future of Korea they did not join the Americans and

the Russians in ruling the country.

Toward the end.of the War, the American position,

as expressed by Roosevelt, was that the military forces
of the Soviet Union and the United States would accept
the surrender of the Japanese Army in Ko1·ea.

I
Following

the military roundup, both governments would jointly
develop a plan for trusteeship.

While Stalin believed

that the Koreans, who were adamantly opposed to trustee

ship 9 should be given some semblance of internal political
responsibility, the Americans strongly disagreed.96

Washington refused to acknowledge any of the so-

called Korean governments, and on June 8, 1945, this

'•

95u.s., Department of State, Foreign Relations
of the United States: The.Conferences of Yalta and
Malta, l94z, Public�tion 6199 (Washington, D.C.:
U.S. Government Printing Office, 1955), p. 770.
96walter Millis (ed.), The Forrestal Diaries
(New York: The Viking Press, 1951), p. 56.
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policy was clearly defined by Acting Secretary of State

Joseph
\
I

c.

Grew.

He declared that "the 'Korean Pro

visional Government' and other Korean organizati.ons

do not possess, at the present time, the qualifications

requisite for obtaining recoeni•tion by the United States

as a governing authority for any part of Korea • • • • .. 97·

The Korean reaction to the Allied plans for trusteeship

was best expressed by the pro-Korean American educator,

Dr. Robert Oliver who remarked that the Koreans "found
to their credulous amazement that the defeat of Japan·
meant they were losing one master in order to acquire
two. ,,9S The unquencable nationalism of the Koreans

offered fertile ground for the future rift in East-West

relations.

_,,,

97chung, p. 183.
York:

98E_obert T. Oliver, ·why wa.r Came �o Korea
D. X. Mc ullen Oo., l9 50), P• 132.

..
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CHAPTER II

'\

ALLIES CONFER
'.

Division at the 38th Parallel
The American return to Korea, forty-five years
fter acquiescing.to Japanese suzerainty, did not take
1
pace
under particularly favorable circumstances.

The

Japanese peace offer of August 10, 1945, found the
American troops closest to Korea some 600 miles away
in Ok::.nawa, while a Soviet army was poised on the
Russian--Korean border and additional Russian troops
were moving southeast through Manchuria.

With the

Russians in a favorable military position relative
to the occupation of Korea, and with no detailed
agreements between the two great powers on the im
plementation of the Cairo Declaration,1 the American
position in Korea seemed far from secure.
Although the Soviet forces could have easily
overru.i� the Korean peninsula, the Moscow government,
1In testimony before the House Committee on Foreign
Affairs, General T. s. Timberman explained that 9 at
Potsdam, the Russians had proposed that the Americans
assist; them in a joint "amphibious landing in Korea,"
b1t the then Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff,
General George C. Marshall refused 9 explaining that
all American troops were needed for the expected
assault on Japan's home islands. U.S., Congress,
4-1

42

on August 16, 1945, accepted an American proposal !or
the division of the peninsula at the 38th parallel
north latitude, with the Russians being responsible
for the surrender of Japanese ;,..· .)rces north of the
dividing line, and the Americans for those south of
the line.2 Originally meant as a-temporary division,
the line not only-permanently cut Korea in two but was
,
also a large factor in increasinf5 East-West tensions.

Although the Russians had knowingly moved south of the
38th on August 26, in the Kaesong district, they

evacuated on September- s3--the same day as American
troops disembarked at the port city of Pusan on the
southeastern tip oft e peninsula.

This adherence to

the prior agreement on Korea may have been motivated
by Stalin's desire to improve his bargaining position
on matters relatin8 to the occupation of Japan.

The

official announcement of the Allied occupation of

Korea came on September 2, when General Douglas MacArthur
issued his "General Order Number One;' which acknowledged
House� Committee on Foreign Affairs, Background Infor
mation on Korea, 81st Cong., 2nd Sess., July 11, 1950,
Report 2495, P• 3.
2Ibid.,
P• 2.
'Roy E. Appleman, The United States Arm.yin th�

Korean V!ar: South to the Naktong,. North to the Yafu
'{vJashin.gton, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office,
1961), p. 3.
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the Japanese surrender and announced the beginning of

the military occupation.

Th� .decision to divide Korea along the 38th was
a joint project of the Secretary of War, the State

Department, the Joint Chiefs-of-Staff and the State

War-Navy Coordinating Committee (S.W.N.C.C.).

It was

_p1:oposed on Au\;ust 11, one day before Soviet fore es

entered north Korea, but was not accepted by President
Truman until the fifteenth and on the same day Wash
ington notified Stalin of its decision.4 The wisdom

of dividing the country in this fashion was questioned
by a junior member of the S.VJ.N.C.C. who informed his

superiors that they were arbitrarily splitting a social

and economic entity,5 but his objections, to which

subsequent events provided some validation, were
ignored.

At a 1950 hearing of the House Committee on

Foreign Affairs, a State Department official was asked:
"Was this line that was drawn across Korea only for

purposes of surrender, or was it also a line that was

chosen to determine where the Russians would fight and

we would fight? 116

His reply was that:

4u.s., Congress House Committee on Foreign
,
,
Affairs, Background Information on Korea, P• 2.

5John Gunther, The Riddle of t!acArthur (New
Harper and Brothers, 1951), p. 178.
6u .·s., Congress House, Committee on Fore· gn
,
Affairs, Background Information on Korea, p. 3.

York:
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.
�he division between United States and Soviet
forceJ along the 38th parallel was a line of
demarcation adopted solely for the purpose of
receiving the surrender of the Japanese forces.
It was never intended by the United State§ to be
he artificial barrier it has now �ecome.�
/
Wbether division at the 38th parallel was meant to be
a temporary condition, or not, it laid the foundations

for a future war and the political division of the

Korean peninsula that has continued to the pre_sent time.
The division of Korea had a great effect on the

political, cultural, and socio-economic patterns of
the nation.

In the last months of the war, the Japanese
(

Governor General of Korea, Nobuyuki Abe asked the leftist

nationalist Lyuh Woon Ayung to take over the civil

administration of the country8 because his party, The
People's Republic of Korea, seemed to have strong
popular support.

Hyung'a influence increased throughout

the country, especially after MacArthur issued "Order

Number Ona", and on September 6, he named Rhee as

President, an honor that Rhee declined? and designated

But when Lieutenant General
John R. Hodge, Commander of American forces in Korea,10

himself as Vice-President.

8As the tide began to turn against the Japanese
they helped to stimulate nationalism in occupied Asia
in order to establish a power bloc aeainst the Occidentals.
9Yong-sin Im, p. 243. Rhee refused this offer be
cause he objected to the leftist influence in the People's
Republic of Korea. Ibid.
10aeneral Joseph Stilwell was suppose to have headed
the Korean Military Government, but because of opposition
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arrived in Seoul he refused to acknowledge Hyung, or
his party.11 To recognize a civilian government would
not only have been contrary to the secret Allied agree
ment on ,trustreeship but also to MacArthur's directive
to the Korean people in which he stated:

"By virt�e

of the authority vested in me as Commander-in-Chief,.
United States Army Forces, Pacific• I hereby establish
.military control over Korea south of 38 degrees north
latitude and the inhabitants thereof • • • nl2 A somewhat similar pattern developed in the north, where the
Japanese Governor of Pyongan Namdo Province, which
includes the capital city of Nor.th Korea, Pyongyang,
named Christian nationalist Man-sik Cho as head of the
province's government in early September.

At first

the Russians accepted Cho and allowed him to guide the
civilian affairs of their zone.

But his continuing

opposition to the Allied policy of trusteeship proved

his undoing and he was deposed and interned by the
Soviets.13

from Chang Kai-shek, he was replaced by Hodge. Gunther,
pp. 179-180.
11Ibid.

12u.s., Department of State, The Record on Korean
Unification, p. 45.
13chong-sik Lee, "Politics in North Korea: Pre
Korean War Stage," North Korea Today, ed. Robert A.
Scalapino (New York: Frederick A. Praeger Publisher,
1963) 9 PP• 4-5•
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Not only did the division of Korea affect ·the
embryo political life of the nation but it also dis

\'

rupted the economic balance of the country.

The south

is basically agricultural and lacks any substantial

mineral deposits, while the north possesses an abundance
of minerals and hydroelectric power, but little good
farm lands.

Prior to division the-north had supplied

the south with electric power, coal, and fertilizer
and in return received foodstuffs.

With the erection

of the invisible barrier, at the 38th parallel• this
complementary exchange came to an abrupt end.

Although

the north Koreans, with their greater industrial power
suffered less than did those south of the 38th, all
Koreans were outraged.

The policy set forth in "Order

Number One" was not only creating economic hardship,
but it also denied them their long-anticipated inde
pendence.

General Hodge had only been in Korea two

. days when he informed MacArthur. on September 10, that

"dissatisfaction with the division of the country grows; 1114

tb e welcome mat was already wearing thin.
The Moscow Conference
From December 16-26, 1945, the foreign ministers

of the United States, Great Britain, and the Soviet
14Appleman, p. ,.
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'(.;;J.ion met in Moscow to discuss poat-wa.r problems, one
of which was the trusteeship plan for Korea.

Although

Washington officials, at the end of the war. had.taken

t·10 s�and that Korea should be placed under a five-year
trusteeship,15 they changed their minds when Russian

influence increased throughout the nation.

In order to

safe6"1:..B.rd the American position t Secretary of State

James F. Byrnes introduced a ten-year plan for trustee
ship but this was vetoed by Molotov.16 Finally the

Allies agreed on a five-year plan with the stipulation

that an all Korean provisional government be established.
In order to implement this plan, the ministers agreed

that a Joint Co�oission, composed of the American and
Soviet commanders in Korea and their representatives,

be initiated to aid in the establishment of a provisional
government.
itj

The Coomission's job would be to "consult

-;�he length of time proposed by President Roosevelt
for a Korean trusteeship is definitely unclear. General
Stilwell reports that at first Roosevelt suggested a
twenty-five year trusteeship but later reduced it to
iive years. Theodore R. White, (ed.) The Stilwell
Pa.-;)ers ( 11 !!acfadden Books 11; New York: Macfa<id.en Bartell
Co� 1962), p. 203. But an official pamphlet reports
that after the Tehran Conference, the President told
the Pacific War Council that Stalin had agreed to a
forty year tutelage for Korea. U.S., Department of
State 9 A Histortcal Surlli-nar.y of the United States--Korean
Relations, p. 58.
16carl Berger, The Korea Knot (Philadelphia:
University of Pennsylvania Press, 1957), p. 64.
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with the Korean democratic parties and social organi
zations,'' after which they would pass on their recom
mendations concernin3 the formation of a provisio�al
government to the Governments of the United States,

Soviet Union, Uni�ed Kingdom and China.

Once established

the provisional government, would consult with Korean
political groups and the Joint Commission in order to
.. implement "a four-power trusteeship of Korea for a
period of up to five years.11 1 7 Although the diplomats
at Moscow had seemingly reached agreement, on what to
do in Korea, the plan was never fulfilled.
Not all Americans were in agreement with the
decisions being made at Moscow.

On the third day of

the Conference 9 Secretary of Nayy James

v.

Forrestal

sug5ested to other Afilerican officials that Washington
adopt a different plan concerning the future of Korea:

It might be more realistic to bypass trustee
ship and seek gu�rantees directly • • • • In absence
of Russian cooperation a possible solution would
be to have U.S. trusteeship for South Korea and
trusteeship for North Korea under U.N.O. to end
mutually with withdrawal of troops and invitation
to U.N.O. membership after five years, with free
movement of persons and goods between zones in
meanti�e. This should be last choice, however.
(sic)le

1 7u.s., Depart�ent of State, The Record on Korean
Unification, pp. 47-48. For pertinent excerpts from
ic\1.e Korean section of Moscow declaration see Appendix
A ,, �• 198.
18Millis, p. 125.

4.9

While the Allied diplomats were satisfied with the
results obtained at Moscow the Korean people were not.
Yet t most Koreans apathetically accepted trusteeship
because they were in no position to challen�e the Allied
decision.

The only Koreans who openly-welcomed trustee

ship were the Communists, although they had previously
opposed th� idea. - Now they saw it as the only 11 guarantee
that Korea will not fall into the hands of the Western
_:npcrialists.11 19 Understandably General Hodge saw the

'

matter· in a different light as noted in his response
to a query by nationalist Yong-sin Im on the meaning
of trusteeship:

11

[ir]rusteeship means simply that Korea

'Hill receive the material and spiritual aid of the
Allied Powers.11 20

Joint Conferences
In mid-January, three weeks after the conclusion
of the Moscow talks, the coIT;.:iG.nders of the American
and Russian zones in Korea met in the first of numerous
but fruitless pre-Commission discussions that were to
last 9 with several interruptions for three weeks.· .
From the start both sides had distinctly opposing views
ar:-.:.. as the talks continued their differences became more
,o7

Im, P• 247.
20�., p. 246. •
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acute.

The Russian position, as expressed by General

T. F. Shtikov 9 was that unification should wait upon
.,

the establishment of a provisional 3overnm.ent, while

the American viewpoint as put forward by General' Hodge

was that.unification should precede any native govern
ment.21

It is interestinc; to note that the Moscow

a6reeroent does call for the establishment of a provisional
government before unification but only after the success

ful completion of the Joint Commission talks.

So the

opposing stands were obviously interpreta.tions of an

ambiguous agreement.

It seems that the Russians wanted

to extend the talks in order to. provide more tirne for
the deYelopment of _pro-Russian sentiment among the

Koreans.

When the talks began most Koreans still were

inclined to accept the myth of American'friendship,

thus immediate unification mie;ht wea.ken Russian in
fluence in the north.

Whereas a continued division

of the country t while Russia soui_�t to e:.1.hance its

influence in the provisional government, might better
serve the long-run interests of the Soviets in Korea.

The results of these first meetings between Hodge and

Shtikov, which lasted until February 5, were virtually
negligible •

.About the only positive achievement was

21u.�.
... , Department of State Korea; 1942 to 1948,
,
Publication 3305, Far Eastern Series 28 (Washin5ton,
D.C.: U.8 •. Government Printing Office, 1948), p. 4.
..,
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that the commanders had been able to size up each other,
and could now plan their maneuvers for the future
,,

Commission discussions with greater precision.
Althou5h the Russians were adamantly opposed to
immediate unification at the Conference table, they
were not disposed to parade this fact before the Korean
people.

When General Hodge announced that "the

Commission's task is the early unification of Korea
both economically and politically,11 22 Shtikov was
quick to agree.

As in the past, words were spoken and

promises made, but still the barrier at the 38th
remained.
The first meetin5 of the Joint Commission con
vened in Seou

six and a half weeks after the cessation

of the Hodge-Shtikov preparatory talks.

The Russian

dele�ate adopted a nonsensical and an obvious political
move when he advocated that no group which had disavowed
the Joscow agreement be allowed to confer with the
Joint Com.mission.

Under such a dispensation all of

the n�merous Korean political groups, except the
Comm unists would have been disqualified.

Obviously

the Soviets were playing for more time and did not

expect the United States to acquiesce in their proposal.
22

George M. McCune, Korea Today (Cambridge:
Harvard University Press, 1950), P• 276.
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They were therefore not disappointed when Major General,
Albert E. Brown, the American delegate, rejected the

Soviet proposal, and the talks were suspended, not to
be resumed for more than a year.23 While the joint

talks were in suspension, views on how to go about

establishing a provisional government were exchanged

through correspondence.

American officials proposed

that the south Koreans should have a two-thirds repre
sentation in the provisional government as opposed to

one third for the north as about twenty-one of the

thirty-two million Koreans lived south ot the 38th

parallel.

Although the Moscow Agreement made no mention

of selecting the provisional government through pro
portional representation the Russians agreed to the

American proposal on the condition that the northern

representatives be given veto powers in order to pro
tect the minority in the industrial north from the
majority in the agrarian south.24

As this exchange of notes between the two military

governments continued there were signs that the United

States was beginning seriously to contemplate organizing
P• 4.

23u.s.

,

Department of State, Korea;

1945

to

1948,

24Leland M. Goodrich, Koreas A Study of U.S.
Policy in 'the United.Nations (New Yorks Council on
Foreign Relations, 1956), P• 22.

south Korea as a separate nation.

Late in July, con

vinced that the Russians were etallin� for time in·
their studied scouting of the eligibility for consul
tation of the numerous Korean political groups, the

Americans proposed that each· of the _occupying powers

consult with the political organizations-in their own
zone.

The Russians a:?;reed, and now both sides appeared

ready to accept a policy of immediate d.ivision w:!.th.

unification put off for some indefinite future.

About

a month after he proposed the proportional representation

plan, General Brown suggested that, in Ol:ider to accelerate

the Allied plans for Korea.r:i. independence, the time-

consuming ora.l consultations with the various Korean
political parties should cease and be replaced by
written questionnaires sent through the mail.

Again

the Russians agreed, but o
. nly temporarily--they answered

Brown's 1>roposal of proportiona.l re:presentation by
suggesting that a provisional assembly be convened

with the north and south havtng equal representation.2 5
Since the proposals and counterproposals suggested

in the exchange or notes between the two military

governments were never implemented the Department of

State believed that.the Joint Commission talks should
be reconvened in order to make further attempts to

establish a Korean provisional government.

On April 8,

1947, Secretary ot State .George C. Marshall proposed
that the Joint, Commission discussions be reopened.26

The Russian foreign minister Molotov agreed, but speci
fied that the talks be conducted "on the basis of the

exact execution of the Moscow Agreement on Korea, •

The second and final series of talks commenced

•

• • J27

in Seoul, on May 21, and dealt primarily with the
problem of which of the numerous Korean political

groups were to be considered as "democratic organizations"
as specified in the Moscow Agreement.

Although there

seemed to be an attitude of compromise.among the

opposing foroee they swiftly came to an impasse.

The

Russians who had envisaged consultation with some one
hundred and eighteen political groups, were appalled

when four hundred and twenty-two groups presented
their credentials to the Commission.

The Russians,

convinced of the anti-Soviet character of these develop�
ments, tried to restrict recognition to those groups
having at least ten thousand members.28 The American
representative would not agree to such a restriction
26McCune, Korea Today, P• 281.
27Ibid.,
P• 28?.
28John o. Campbell, The United States in World
Affairs, 194 -1948 (New York: Harper and Brothers,
1948), P• 176 •

'
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because he believed that all parties which had not·
actively opposed trusteeship were.aoceptable.29 The

American line was unmistakable:

reduce Communist.in

fluence in the proposed provisional government through
a policy of numbers.

The American position in the joint talks was made.

difficult not only by the increasing tensions between

East and.West, but also by the character of the dominant
political organizations in south Korea.

Virtually all

of them, but particularly the large party headed by

the ultra-nationalist Syngman Rhee, carried on a con

tinuous campaign against the Moscow Agreement.

Despite

the "hard line" pursued by the Americana in the.joint

talks with the Russians the rightist groups were dis
satisfied.

The American Commander in.Korea "was

seriously worried that Rhee would use extreme rightist
groups to sabotage the work of the Oommission.":;o :Al

though there was little indication on the part of

American policy makers to place any trust in these

rightist groups, Washington.found it.increasingly

necessary to accept them aa a counterbalance to growing
29� ••

30Harry s •. Truman, The Memoirs of HarrV s. Truman:
Garden City, New York:
Years of Trial and Hope
Doubleday and.Company, Incorporated, 1956), p. 323.
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Communist influence in K.orea.

Thus on July 14, 1947,

General Brown dismissed Russian requests to hold back
recognition of the numerous righist organizations,
\

pointing out "that exclusion 1."rom consultation oan
only be by mutual agreemente·of both Delegations as

specifically stated in the Marshall-Molotov letters."}l
Faced with a continually growing Communist in

fluence in Korea and the failure or bilateral talks
to produce any significant agreement, the United States,
in August, made overtures to Moscow concerning a new
approach to the.Korean problem.

The proposal called

for "the four powers adhering to the Moscow Agreement
to meet to consider how that agreement may be speedily
carried out.1132 In addition to calling for four-power
talks, Washington suggested seven steps to Korean
independence:

l) elections should be held in each

zone to elect· provisional lee;islatures;

2) those elected

should "choose representatives in numbers which reflect
the proportion between the populations of the two zones"
for a "national provisional legislature;" 3) the pro
visional government should meet with representatives

31U.S., Depart�ent of.State, The Record on Korean
Unification, P• 51.
32u.s., Department o! State, Korea; 1945 to 1948,
P• 43.

5?
of the United States, Russia, Great Britain, and China

in order.to implement the plans laid down in the Moscow

\

Agreement;
\

4) the United Nations should observe the

activities taking place in Korea;

5) all those con

cerned will set a date on which all foreign troops
should be withdrawn from the peninsula;

6) the provisional

. legislatu.re.a in caeh zone should initiate constitutions
which may be used as the foundation for a national con
stitution and;

7) until Korea becomes independent it

should be the responsibility of the United Nations.33
By this date it had become obvious to Washington that

its' position in Korea would not change for the better

unless Russia was politically outflanked.

It seems

that the Americans believed that the best way would be
through the use of collective, rather than bilateral
diplomacy.

Although Great Britain and China accepted the

American proposals. Moscow responded with a blunt

rejection.

That Russia was not inclined to depart !rom

the letter of the Moscow Agreement was abundantly clear

. in Molotov• s reply:

I consider it necessary to draw to your
, attention that the preliminary elaboration of
measures to assist the formation of a pro
visional Korean democratic government, in accord
ance with the decision of the Moscow Conference

-

33 Ibid., P• 44.
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of. the three Ministers for Foreign Affairs, is
to be carried out by the Joint Commission con
sisting of representatives of the Soviet Command
in northern Korea and of the United States Command
..... : .. •
•,
.
in southern Korea.34 .
\

Not long after Churchill's "iron curtain" speech
. of 1946 had sown the seeds of East-West mistrust the
Americans openly attacked the Communists through Kennan's
. policy of containment and the Truman Doctrine. ,·with
.American and Soviet forces.facing each other across
the 38th parallel, Korea swiftly became an ideological
battlefront.

In the developing "cold war" the struggle

for Korea was of considerable importance and there was
little assurance of an easy American victory.

back as June 22, 1946, Edwin

w.

As far

Pauley• the conservative

personal representative o! Pre$ident Truman, had written
perceptively to the chief executive concerning Korea's
political future.
It is here where a test will be made of
whether a democratic competitive system can be
adapted to meet the challenge of a defeated
feudalism, or whether some other system, i.e. ,,
communism will become stronger.
Communism in Korea could get of! to a better
start than practically anywhere else in the world.35
American policy was now openly opposed to Russian
policy, and Washington officials had decided that the
34
�. • P• 45.
35Truman, p. 321.
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best way to advance their position was through a
collective approach.

On September 17, 194?, while the

Joint Commission talks.were in their last weeks, Lovett
notified Molotov of the new American approach.
In view of the fact that bilateral negotiatio�a
have not advanced • • • there is but one course
remaining. It is-the intention, therefore, of my :
Government to refer the problem of Korean inde
pendence to the forthcoming session of the General ·
Assembly of the United Nations.;6

3 6u·.s., Department of State, The Record on Korean
Unification, p. 60.

CHAPTER III

.

',

I •

THE MILITARY OCCUPATION
The Americans Return to Korea
Implementing the Moscow Agreement by means of
bilateral discus3ions was not the only task faced by
the United States in Korea., The military occupation
of south Korea presented the occupying authorities
with a Pandora's box of formidable problems touching
upon all aspects of Korean life, especially in the
economic and political areas.

That the Americans were

ill-prepared to cope with the complexities of the
situation is obvious from even a cursory glance at
the record of the occupation.

Some explanation for

this may be found in the dwindlinB American interest
in things Korean during the forty years of Japanese
occupation. Also, characteristically t Americans at
war have given much greater attention to the probl,ems
of military victory than to the question of post-war
occupation of conquered territories.

Finally the

Koreans themselves, excluded from positions of
responsibility during the Japanese tutelage were of
little aid to the Americans in the technological and
administrative aspe·cts of military government.
60
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Besides accepting the responsibilities of an
occupying power without suitable preparation. the
military government's attempt to guide the Koreans

'\

'

towards independence was further hampered by the lack
of proper direction and coordination from superior
offices.

At first the American officials in south

Korea received their orders, which in many cases were
.contradictory, from diverse sources of authority,
sometimes coming directly from Washington and other
times from MacArthur's headquarters in Tokyo.

Thia

impeded the military government officials in their
shaping of occupation policy.

Also these officers

tended to avoid any long range commitment pertaining
to governmental reforms since they tried to guide
their policies in accordance with the day to day
proceedings of the joint discussions.

:At the commence-

,

ment of the occupation the Americans turned to the
Japanese for assistance, but this policy was dropped when it produced strong nationalist reaction from the
Korean people.

Washington had not anticipated the

strength of Korean nationalism which also became a
factor in obstructing the military government's
attempts to modernize Korea.

This modernization

program was further stifled by the lack of a stabile
Korean economy.

The Korean economy was in a parlous state when

the Korean Military Government (K.M.G.) established
its headquarters in'Seoul.

Korea's economy, which had

been closely linked to Japan's since 1943, was almost
non-existent because industrial plants were either
producing far below capacity, or as in most cases,
completely closed-down.

(This situation resulted

from the Japanese home government's policy of using
Korean equipment to replace its• own destroyed or
worn out heavy machinery equipment in Korea.)

In the

latter part of the war nearly all attempts to supply
Korea's economy with neede& products were hampered
by the intensive concentration of American submarines
in the Sea of Japan.1 The situation was not completely
hopeless, however, as Korea was physically untouched
by the war.
Of similar importance to the nearly defunct econ
omy was the unequal distribution of farm lands which
left nearly everybody landless and without financial
means.

Under.Russian occupation this problem was

eliminated in the north by the confiscation of the
Japanese-ovmed land and its redistribution among the
peasants.

But, in the south, conservative American

and Korean officials blocked all attempts at land

1u.s.

P• 25.

9

Department of State, Korea,

1945 to 19L�8,
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reform:

·,.

even a State Department official's mild sug

gestion that the government assist the peasants to
buy land was vetoed.2 Inasmuch as the Japanese owned
most of the land one would think that the Koreans

should have materi.ally benefited from .the Jar,anese

surrender.

But American policy, as expressed by one·

official, .f:>�oroised that

11

the Japanese I!'oul� · enjoy

all freedoms without restraint or discrimination."3

The Korean people were quite perplexed as to who had
lost the war.

When it was suggested that the Americ�

authorities adopt the same type of land reform program
in south Korea as being undertaken in Japan,4 the

officer responsible for finding a solution to the land
dilemma stated:

"That's Communism.

I won't have it. 115

Although a concrete program was eventually adopted in

1948, it achieved only minor success in sustaining the

sagging economy.

2Mark Gayn, "Cold War: 'Jlwo Police States in
Korea, t1 New Republic, C1."VII (Septembe 15, 1947) • 16.
3Andrew J. Grajdanzev, 11 Korea Divided," Far
Easter·n Survey, XIV (October 10, 1945), 382.
4The American military government in Japan
.
devised a plan where absentee land-owners would sell
their land to the government which in turn would sell
:it to the peasants.· The farmers would then be allowed
to pay off this debt through thirty installments at
low interest rates. Gayn, 16.
. 5Ibid.
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In most cases the Americans failed to stabilize
the Korean economy,.

During the three years of occupation

$212 9 000.000 in financi�l ass�stance was pumped into
.

.
see�od to be bottomless.
the Korean eccnon::y ? 6 which

The division of the country also aggravated the economic
situation.

On the positive side the K.M.G. did keep

most south Koreans from starving, and it also indirectly
a'ded the economy by increasing health services and
· education under the auspicies of the United Nations
Relief and Rehabilitation Administration (UNRRA).7
But economic problems in Korea paled to insignif
icance in comparison with the political problems, and
·the former were unlikely of solution until the latter
had to some extent been resolved.

The political record

of the American occupation in south Korea is not an
edifJ... :.J.g one.

As pointed out previously 9 confusions

in ai�s, conflict of missions, lack of co-ordination
in administration, an imperfect sympathy with Korean
nationalism, and the pressure of the growing East-West
conflict were contributory factors in producing this
r,cord.
6u.s., Congress, House� Committee on Foreign Affairs,
Background Informat1on on Korea, p. 32.
7channing Liem, "United States Rule in Korea,"
F�r Eastern Survel, XVIII (April 6 t l .... 49), 77-80.
✓
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The man chosen to direct the occupa'iiion of south
Korea, Lieutenant Gen0ral John R. Hodge, was a competent
\

officer 9 but his k.. J.owledge of Korea was limited.

Before

e;nbarking for Korea Hodge was ieeued two orders:

he

was first directed by his itimediate superior to "super
vise the functioning of those agencies of the Japanese

Imperial Government within the areas of their commanda,118

and shortly thereafter the Joint Chiefs-of-Staff in
structed him to,
(1) Take the Japanese eurre�der� 6i8ar� the
Japanese armed forces, enforce tho terns of the
surrender, and reffiove Japanese imperia�ts� from
Korea; (2) Maintain order ? establish an a!!ective
government alon;� (°lemoc::-etic linen and r2:Y.... ::._:d a
troa0 eco�o�� a� a basis for Korean indcpe�dence,
[and} ( 3) ':::r�::..�-. �(oreans in ho.ncllinr; thei ow-..
a fairs and p�o?�=e Korea to govern itself as a
free an& inde)aildcnt n�t�on.9
Whi�e Zo��e efficient:y accoLlp:iste� the first of the
Joint Chiefs-of-St&I: 1 0 di�ectiveo 9 he made little
pro��ass in the latte= two.
�or accepting the Jap&nese surren&e�� �t �ailed to
o.::::0r aay substant::.ul sol utions for ·,~Ile •. 0:.- n::.li tary

p.;.·0 .:, .... ~:::.s which awai te · the occ upat;io:.:: ..;.r ...~y .

;.-.;o:1e of

�c�rl J. �ricdr�c� and Associatcs 9 l�o�ican ExD er
ic�� � 5n Military Govorn�cnt in World War II (:r ew York :
a necar� an Co., Inc., 1948). p. 358.

9 ohung, p. 187.
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the officiu s realized that because of their unprepared
ness they gave too much responsibility to General Hodge;
�his was a great mistake einco it is debatable whether
\

even a pol tically minded comma.:-�cler could have achieved
any succa�� 9 consi·erin3 Korea's chaotic situation.

The initia

reaction to this lack of toresight was

colorfully summed up by an officer attached to Rodge's
!'lea.dquarters:
Thirty million people and they expect an
ur:t;1...ained army of combat soldiers to become
civilian admin:i.ntratorst This is bunkt Some
body in Washington made a serious error. They
were n0ver even prepared to enter Korea. 10

Whether properly prepared. or not, Hode;e and his },.'XIV
Cor:ps disembarked at the seaport of Pusan on September 8.
Unlike officials in Washington, the Korean people pre
pared .or the .American landings by organizing large
welcominr committees.11 Althouf,h Japanese troops

attempted to hold back the crowds at the Pusan harbor i
tbree Koreans were able to free themselves in order to
present personal greetings to Hodge.

The three were

irr,mediutely sbot down by the Jopanese soldiers under
t�e pretext that the General's life was in danger.

the ve::::y day that

On

e arrived in Korea 9 Hodge made his

lOim ? p. 242.
11?ahk� p. 209. About a week bofore their entrance
into Korea ? the Americans d�opped 1-�flets on the south
notifying the natives of their proposed arrival. Ibid.
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:irst ove�t, and perhaps his greatest mistake as
iti�itary Governor o� Korea; he commended the Japanese
troops for carrying out their police duties.12 Quite
\

understandably the Korean people were stunned when they
heard that the Anerican military commander bad congrat
ulated the Japanese instead of punishin5 them; nor was
their dismay reduced when Rodge collaborated with
Japanese officials.
Unfortunately �ost American officials looked upon
Korea as a back�ard province of Japan and were inclined
to view its inhabitants as loyal Japanese citizens.
This attitude was :co hinder American--Korean rela tiona
for some time.

This distorted opinion about Korea's

status went unchanged, even though Tokyo, made its
contempt for Koreans clear in the following message
to Genera 1 MacArthur on .Aut)ust 28th:
Local Japanese authorities eagerly wait for
an early arrival of the Allied forces which are
to take over the maintenance of peace and order·
.from the Japanese forces in southern Korea and
urr;ently desire that the allied forces will
fully take into consideration the actual con
ditions on the spot before preceeding with the
disarmament of Japanese forces and the transfer
of administrative organs from Japanese hands. 1 3
12

Im 9 p. 240 • .

13George M. McCune "The Occupation of Korea,"
9
Foreip,n Policy Report, XXIII (October 15, 1947) 9 18?.
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This .A.i�erican--Japanese policy of i[511oring the Korean
people was reminiscent of the Taft-Katsura A�ree1nent

\

of 1905.

The American occupation ari:-.y ) U."llike its counter

part in the north which posGessed soldiers of Korean·
ancesto:r.y capable of ma.nagin.5 cj_vilian acti vi•ties,
tur�ed to the Japanese for assistance.14 Believing

.that an easier adminiatrative transition could be

a.ccor:iplished through a gradual l:l.djustment, General

Hodge allowed the fo:cmer ,Japanese Governor General of

Korea� Nobyuki Abe, to stay on in Seoul as an ad.visor.
·�vi thin a week WashirJ.�ton irLtervened 9 and General. Abe
was forced to return to Japan where he was urrested

and t:-ied as a war criminal because of his membership
in the ultranationalist Imperial Rule Assistance
Asoociation.15 Although Hoo.ge' s unhappy decision to

u�ilize Japanese skills in technical and administrative
tasks might be defended on grounds of expediency, his
greatest hlu.�der was the incorporation of the hated

Japanese military police into the K.M.G. police force.

Evon in his relationi:; with Koreans 9 Hodge was inclined
14The Americans did not even bother to bring
translators. Friedrich & Associates, p. 366.
15George t-1. !-!IcCune "Oecupa tion Politics in Ko�ca,"
3
F2.:-:- 3as�ern Snrve;v, XV. 1.,February
13 � 1946) 9 34. Abe
ho.d also been prirae minister of Jap r. from August, 1939
to January 9 1940.
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to make use of educators and industrialists knovm for

tneir collaboration with the Japanese, rat er than those

.,

\

· of nationa��st orientation�

Washington may, or may not

have knowr... t�10 extent of the Arne:ci.c&:..--Japanese entente,

but on Septe�ber 18, ten days after the Americans

entered Korea, White House officials sanctioned Hodge's

course with a statement that "such Japanese as may be

temporarily retained are being utilized as servants of

the Korean people and our occupying forces only because

they are deemed essent:al by reason of their technical
qualifications.

•

• •" 6

This attitude was most unlike

the policy adopted by the Russians who had interned
all important Japanese collaborators.

For about two weeks General Hodge ruled southern

Korea without specific orders from Washington, but

when it became increasingly obvious that he was mis

directing the occupat:on, his superiors began to pay

more attention to Korean affairs.

On September 22, the

K.M.G. received a s.w.N.C.C.P. directive entitled

"United States Policy for the Administration of Civil

Affairs in Korea i 11 \Vhich had been approved by President
Truman.17 The orders directed that the Japanese advisors
16M
C
TT
m d
48
i,1C une, ..'\.orea ·10 ai, p.

17

Friedrich and Associates, p. 360.
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ba imDediately expatriated to Japan; except for the
detention of a few technicians these orders were

exped.i.tc:d.

Even after the initial shock of the K.M.G.--Japanese

collaboration subsided the Koreans did not lessen their

..., occupation.
o:pposi tion to ·c·.e

Although the vast major

ity of Korean people opposed trusteeship the American

government felt that Korea was not ready for independence.

The American attitude was clearly defined when Truman
stated t:i.o.t "the assumption by the Koreans themselves

of the responsibilities and functions of a free and

indepe:ident nation • • • will of necessity require time

and putience.11 18

But K.M.G. actions sue;gested that the

occupation authorities cared little for Korean inde
pendence.

It was only after increasin3 pressure from

Korean nationalists and State Department officials

that Eodge dispatched speakers to the countryside in

order to inform the farmers of the political situation
in their country; the Koreans responded with stones
and eggs.19 Such attempts to inform the Korean people

of the Areerican commitment to Korean independence were
counteracted by other K.M.G. actions.

Mature political

18nu • .:.:i.
c ' Department of State, The Record on Korean
Ui.'!.i.fica·clon ? p. 46.
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eaders seeking an audience with General Hodge were

discouraged by .American and Japanese military police. 20
Pro-Zapanese terrorist groups were reorganized wider
\

K.r.!. G. supervis · on to serve as tha nucleus. for a south
Korean army.21 Such groups were also used to suppress
lef ist political organizations.

The Korean police,

who were responsible to K.M.G. officials made mass

.arrests in villages to ncontrol seditious activities.11 22
Such action must have deeply undermined the Korean
peoples belief that the Americans were g�iding them
towards independence.

Although WashinDton continued to stress that

Korea was politically sterile, political activity
within the country belied this view.

The two chief

political groupings were the Korean People's Republic,
and the Korean Provisional Government.

The former,

led by Lyuh Woon Hyung was left of center and gained
most of its support from the masses, while the latter
s:r:·oup headed by exiles who had fled the country after
the 1919-disturbances, was ri3htist orientated, re
ceiving its greatest support from the upper middle
20r:)id., P• 240.
21F�:edrich and Associates, p. 366.
22corneLius Ossood. The Koreans and their Culture
(New York: The p.or..ald. J?ress�:;-co.; :;g-51), p. 311.
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class.

The =orsa� People's Republic �ncreased its

�nf:uence durins the early staccs cf the occupation,

but this :;rowing popula::-ity only VG:.:·ed the K.M.G. who

\

b0liev·ed that the party, if left a.lone ? would eventually
be led by pro-Soviet factions.

In order to prevent

�u.ch an event1.:.a.�ity ? in late Jovember Hodge adopted
. .,__
v the People's Republic.
s�pp�essive measures agains

:e explained his action to the native population in

this manner:

I feel it necessary to the public understand
in6 to announce that ? resardless of what it calls
itself� the Korean People's Republic is not in any
sense a governr:1ent.
I have today directed my occupation forces
ar-d the ?,i:. li tary Gove:.:-nra nt of Korea that the
activities of any political organization in any
attempted operations as a government are to be
treated as unlawful activities ••• 23

The suppressive measures did not prevent an increase
in the party's populatil'"y ? and by January 3� 1946, a

correspondent of the Christian Science Monitor could
report that "the so-called People's Republic, composed
of Socialist and Communist elements� enjoys more

popular support than any other single political group
• .. n 21.1..
J..n:::;
Although the actions of some natives belied the
23r,!!cCune, Korea 'l'oday, p. 49.
c..:.;·:oid. � p. 50.
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A�eriGan assumption that Koreans lacked necessary
political and administrative skills,25 nationalist
.,

\

aspirations were continually thwa:�tied by the K. M. G •
i:-::is ?:.:.icy found support in Gen.e:::..""�l Hodge's firm
belief that "military eovernme�t is the only sovern
ment in southern Korea.11 26

Ironically, Hodge was

instrumerital in advancing the cause of the politician
who 1.,·,ras to become the most effective spokesman of
Kor,an nationalism, Syngroan Rhee�

Despite his claim

to impartiality in Korean politics Hodge was on hand
to greet Rhee when the ardent na.tionalist returned
from his long exile in October.

Rhee repaid this

kindness by launching an attack on the American Govern
ment for de .... aying Korean independence.27 · His command
of the English language, his Washington contacts, and
his political skills enabled him to become the guiding
light for Korean independence in south Korea.
By November� 1945, Hod-3e had become extremely dis
ill,!sioned as he tried to carry out his orders pertain
ing to the occupation in the face of constant attacks
by Koreans of every political shade.

There was little

evide�ce of either political or economic progress in
25Ibid.,

P• 46"
26
Ioid• 9 .P• 49.
27Li0:m 80.
'J
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the American zone and it was a very disenchanted Military

Gover-::or who told President Truman that:

The U.S. occupation of Xorea under present
conditio�s and policies is s�r�ly drifting to
t�1e edc:;:: cf a poli tical-eco:::1c...:.:....c e.byss from which
l
it cc�"'l naver be retreived with a:y
credit to the
United States' prestige in the Far East. 2 8
Rodge considered the situa,.:;ion so desperate at the end
of 1945� that he even went so far as to suggest that
.a simults.neous withdrawal of .American and Scviet forces
be arranged in order to "leave Korea to its own devices
and an inevitable internal upheaval for its self
pw;-ification.11 2 9
During 1946, the K.M.G. continued to struggle
under the burden of ill-conceived occupations policies
and .verc further embarrassed by the lack of proper
1

communications bet;v10en Washington and Seoul.

On

January 20 9 General Shtikov :i::·eleased a statemen t; con
demning American attempts at the ilioscow Conference to
extend the length of trusteeship to ten years.

Hodge 9

under the impression that V/ashington had always backed
t'.le five year trusteeship plan� called the Russian
cor::unander a liar •. Four days later the State Department
informed IodGe that Shtikov was in fact telling the

truth.

One consequence of this unhappy incident,

28T_�,,��n. � 318 •
'-'--"=', . .l:".
-

/ - w-...... :. ·.': •

=---
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�esulting from the State Department's failure to keep
Hodge inforr:icd of diploma tic deci:=.ions was a decline
of pro-American sentiment among (oreans.30 In order
\

to cor.ipe�:::: ..... -u-.3 for this si tuation 7 a:ld to bolster the
stu:b::�g economy of the country, President Truman

sup9lied Korea with $6 9 000�000 under the Government

and. Relief in Occupied Areas ( GAlUOA) Act which
Congress passed on August 2� 1946.31

The favorable effects of policies of aid, as

exemplified by GARIO, were too often offset by actions

t_1at induced only resentment among the Koreans.

Such

was the case of K.M.G.'s direction of the Korean police
force, whose upper echelons were largely filled with
persons previously employed by the Japanese.32 The

Korean police were known fo= their acts of brutality

which h&d been perfected du.ring the Japanese occupation.
!�stead

,,

01

abolishing such practices and reformin5 the

police force, K. tL G. officials it-nored the situation.
o�e of tbe worst cases of brutality reported during
t .._2 Ar:.erica:::1 occupation occurred on the island of

30B arger� PPo 6--)-6/Jr.
31u.s., Department of State� the Conflict in Korea:
Events Prior to the Attack on June 25, 1950, Publication
4266, �ar Bastern 3eries 45 (washington 9 D.C.: U.S.
Govern�ent P�intin6 0 fice, 1951), p. 8.
32,..,1.-.<J.�rn, 16 •

76
Cheju-do where police ruthlessly shot down marchers

,\

who were protesting against political and economic
conditions .. 33

Another dubious partnership developed by the K.M.G.

was with Korean citizens who had been educated in the United
States.

Beca.use of their .American education and their

knowledge of English somo Koreans enjoyed a superior

position in the esteem of the American officials.

In

many instances these people were given jobs for which

they were ill-prepared while experienced individuals
were ignored.

One such inexperienced person was Gladys

Koh who was appointed as chief of the women's police

she was chosen because she attended
· 34 Not only were these
11
�ves
l ayan C o 11 ege in
. G eorg1.a.
force in Seo 11:

poor selections in most cases but it also became

obvious to General Hodge that K.M.G. would never gain

the confid.nce of the people if it continued to ex
clusively deal with this small group.

It became so

clear to Hodge that collaboration must be enlarged that
on Febru ry 15, 1946, he wrote Secretary of Defense

ForrestB.l:

33william F. Dean and William L. Wardon, General
De§;��s Story (New.York: The Viking Press,.1954),
p .,

1Llr8o

-!i.

''Pahk, p. 219.
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�e are opposed by a strongly organized
ruthless military machinery designed to appeal
to the millions of uneducated Koreans. The U.S.
must do likewise and not be satisfied wi�� deal
in5 with wealthy u.s.-educated citizens.
Although Hodge was not inclined to place all his

trust in these "wealthy U.S.-aducated citizens" he

nevertheless acknowledged, on the previous day, the

convening of the Korean Representative Democratic

Council; a poli tics.1 ?;roup which he personally selected.

Designed as an a.dvisory bc-dy it consisted entirely of
conservatives, many of whom had collaborated with the

Japanese.

To many Koreans this group was reminiscent

of the Central Advisory Council of the Japanese occu
:pation.36

Ac;ain the K.M.G. ha.d bltmdered into pro

voking the Korean people Biainst the American government.
Korean agitation for independence continuously

ha�pered K.M.G. attempts to stabilize the political
situation.

At the end of August Syngman Rhee, now

hea.d.ing the Representative Democratic Council, com
missioned a Korean nationalist, Yong-sin Im, to plead

Korea's case at the United Nations.

Before going to

the U .N.? Miss Im went to Washini�ton, where she was
refused an interview with President Truman; then
-c

. - s'

:) _,1}\i .:
-'· .1.·

l

1.·

p. 135 •

36 agwon Sunoo and William N. Angus, "American
Policy in Korea: Two Views," Far Eastern Survev,
XV ��uly 3 , 1946), 228-231.

?8
State Department oftioial, John Williams

or

the Korean

Affairs desk tried to persuade her to return home. 37 .

At the U.N., Miss Im was ignored by all the big.

countries, pointedly so by the United States and the

In November,·another attempt to make
diplomatic oontaote met with a similar response.�8

Soviet Union.

Even when the K. M-. 0. sought to enlarge the political

.rAsponaibilities
fired.

or

the Koreans their attempts back

In order.tQ silence popular outcries for in

creased political representation the Korean Interim

Legislative Assembly convened on September 12• 1946.

Hal! the representativeA were popularly elected, re

sulting in a rightist victory, and the other half were

selected by General Hodge.

His attempt to balance

the conaervativ,e representation by appointing some

moderates . and leftists met with strong disapproval

from both American officials and the .Representative

Democratic Council which had refused-to disband.39

Like its predecessor, the Representative D8mocratic

.

nemesis
Council., the Aaeembly proved to be a political
.
. to American policy-makers. Syngman Rhee 9 40 headed the

3'7 Im• PP• 254-256.

38Tewksbury, P• 79•

..

,: _.

39u.s., Department or State• The Conflict in Korea,

P• 14.
40Arter Rhee failed in his attempt to address the

?9
Assembly and used ita limited facilities to attack
trusteeship and the K.M.G.

On January 20, 1947, the

Assembly passed an anti-trusteeship act, whioh caused
the K.M.G. to respond that it "regard[� as both
wasteful and useless the discussions of problems whose
.
solution is beyond the power of the legislature."4l
During the occupation American officials believed
that �ithout their presence the establishment of a
democratic in1ependent Korea could not be accomplished.
Althouzh the Amerio.ans professed such concx•ete occu
pation aims as the unification and independence

or

Korea, the K.M.G. had not been materially or intellec•
tually prepared for the occupe.tion.

One of K.M.G.'s

most obvious weaknesses was the unavailability of a.
responsible nucleus of administrators.

BY the time

one group of soldiers were trained in administrative
duties they were eligible for rotation, and were
usuallf replaced by raw recruits.

Hodge's problems

were further complicated by.the attitude or the typical
American soldier toward the Korean.

.

.

This attitude was

reflected in the term usually applied to the Korean-n gook". 42It was not d.eatgned to develop rapport between
U.N. the State Department tried unaucoeastully to keep
him from returning to Korea. Im, P• 269.
41 McCune, Korea Today, P• 82

�2 011ver, Why War Came to Korea, P• ?O
·,
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occupier and occupied, ' ,

Instead of uttemptin� to establish eome sort of

fraternization the Americans preferred to spend as

much time,aa possible "at his office, canteen, or
• club. n 4 3

Although the Americans had no great reeling for

the south Koreans,-·they liked those north of the 38th

parallel even less.

Me.ny officials in Washington

realized that Syngman Rhe& was bothersome, even danger

ous, to the K.M.G •• hut they also acknowledged that he

was one of the few leaders who could rally the people

against possible military threats from the north. ·When
General Hodge did attempt to deflate Rhee's popularity
/

by sponsoring other political personalities, such as

Kimm Kiusic and Lyuh Woon H.yung,44 he met with strong
4
oppos.1 tion from· American o.nd Korean oonserva ti ves. 5
As the "cold war" intensified Rhee's political

power was enhanced and consequftntly he had e;reater
•

influence with the K.M.G.

Because of the possible threat

from the north, and to safee;ua.rd conservative rule in
4'John c. Caldwell, The Korea Story (Chicago&
H, Rig:nery Co., 1952), P• 9,

44 Aa Lyuh Woon·Hyurlg was mysteriously assassi
nated on July 19, 194?. it oould be posRible that
the conservatives believed him to be too.strong an
opponent of Rhee,

45campbell, P• 173.
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south Korea, the Rhee--K.M.G. coalition established
a large defense force, the exact size of which was

\

never made public.

This organization received its

recruits from three main groupss

the police torce1

numerous private groups which were led by rightist
political leaders; and youth movements, the largest
having alm�st 500;000 members and led by Korean nation
46

aliat L@e Bum•auk

who was later choaen by S,ngman

Rhee to be the Republic of Korea's first prime
m1n1ster.
Another youth brigade was the National Youth
Movement which numbered ?0,000; the K,M.G. issued to
this group 5,000,000 yen, military equipment, and an
army officer as an advisor.47 American officials
rationalised their actions in their customary fashions
in order to safeguard American democracy a strong
defense system had to be built up along Communism's
borders.

On a visit to Korea, in 194?, Roger N.

Baldwin, the then Director of the American Civil
Liberties Union offered a different interpretation
of the K.M.G.--rightiat ententes

"we have ottered no

constructive demonstration of democracy for its own
sake as a counter-iine to communism; , , • by
46osgood, P• 30?,
4? Ge.yn, 1 .-6
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nurturing the police state we drive moderates into
the communist camp • •.•.• n 48

By 1947, many American o!!ioials felt that it.

would be in the beat interests o'f the United States
to end the occupation.

This opinion was prompted by

the miserable record of the K.PA. G. and. because Korea

was thought to be-militarily unimportant for the
defense of American interests in the Far East.49

President Roosevelt's policy o! a long-term trustee

ship had to be abandoned because it had !ailed to

achieve results beneficial to the United States.

After two years of occupation the peninsula of Korea

was not under a government loyal to Washington,
'

'

The Abandonment of Trusteeship
The decision to abandon trusteeship and the-mili

tary occupation was not a haphazard one, but a judge

ment made by many important offici�ls over a lengthy •
period.

From the days of the Cairo Declaration

Koreans had·overwhelmingly opposed trusteeship, and
48Mc0une, Korea Today, p.•88.
49»u.s. Decision to Quit Korea," U.S. News and
World Report, XXIV ·(May?, 1948), 19 •. The estimated
annual cost of the occupation was s250,ooo,ooo. �-
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military occupation only increased this opposition.

By the early part of.194?. General Hodge informed

President Truman that "if it [trusteeship] is imposed

now or at any future time. it is believed poasible·that

the Korean people will actually and physically revolt."50

The establishment of the Interim Legislative Assembly

under the auspices ot General Hodge seemed to indicate

.that the K.M.G. was preparing to relinquish its respon�i
bilities to the south Korean politicians, although the

American commander denied that this w as his intention,

He ·pointedly reminded the·Korean people that the United

States had no desire to act independently o! the Soviet.

Unions

Certain elements are creating the impression
that the United States now favors and is actively
working toward a saperate government in Southern
Korea; and that the Korean Interim Legislative
Assembly is a completely independent body designed
as a forerunner of that government. Both of the
above assumptions are incorrect and dangerous
conclusions, entirely without justification, and
are contrary to the announced baaio policies or
the United States and the other great Allied Power
who liberated Korea from the Japanese.,l

Although later events seemed to give lie to Hodge's

remarks they may well have been sincere, as Washington
.•

was not always inclined to keep Hodge fully informed
of their changing plans for Korea.
50Truman, -p. 318.
51Mc0une, Korea Today, P• 81.
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Washington supplemented its reports from the··

K.M.G. headquarters with.other findings, especially
those of General Albert C. -Wedemeyer.

In 1947 President

Truman had commissioned Wedemeyer to investigate the
situation in Ohina and Korea, upon returning to

Washington, he informed the President that

11

the United

States has -little -military interest in maintaining

troops or bases in Korea," if the Russians pulled out
from the north. 52 Concerning the future.defense of·

Korea. he advised

That the United States organize, equip and
train a South Korean Scout Force, similar to the
former Philippine Scouts. This force should be
under the control of the United States military
commander and, initially should be officered
throughout by Americans, withe program for re
placement by Korean o!ficers.5,

He went on to say that "the establishment or a self

sustaining economy in South Korea is not\_feasible. 1154

He concluded his report on Korea by suggesting that

the Korean problem be passed on the United Natio�a.55.

Wedemeyer•s suggestions were opposed by Secretary

of State Marshall who advocated that a strong military

52Truman, P• 326.
York:

o. Wedemeyer, Wedemeyer Re orts! (New
Henry Holt &-Company, 1958), p. 4?5.

5 3Albert

54

�.,

55Ibid •.

P•

.477 • .
.•
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government be continued in south Korea.56

But Marshall's

viewpoint was not shared by other officials, such as

the Secretary of War, Hobert P. Patterson who, aocord
ing to Secretary Forrestal, believed

That we should get out of Korea at the earl
iest possible time. He stressed the expense to
the U.S. and the insignifican�e of the strategic
and economic value of Korea.5'/

�he determination of the Eightieth Congress to reduce
government expenditures also gave support to the con

clusions of Wedemeyer and Patterson.

By late September, 1947, the Joint Chiefs-of-Sta!!

decided that withdrawal would be the wisest course to
pursue, both militarily and politically.

they reasoned that "in the event

or

Militarily

hostilities in the

Far East present forces in Korea would be a liability
• • • • n58

Furthermore they believed that the prospects

of political unification would be advanced by the

withdrawal of American troops.59

The idea that unification could be achieved through

peaceful means was held by few American or south Korean
officials in 1947.

In contrast to the failures of the

56Millis, P• 273.
5?Ibid.
58

Truman, p • 32·5 •
59�., P• 328.
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K.M.G. in the south, the Soviets were doin� a fairly
good job in the north, and their following was in

'\

creasing throughout the peninsula• though to a much
greater extent in the north than in the south.

Uni

fication under such circumstances would probably have
precipitated a power struggle between the ultra
conservatives of the south and the uommunists in the
north; a situation which neither south Korean nor
American leaders desired.
Thus, with increased assistance and a military
training program Washington believed that in the face

of the continuing division of the peninsula, an in

dependent state should be established in.south Korea.
But instead of pursuing a unilateral course in setting
up an independent south Korea, American policy makers
sought to gain the sanction of the United Nations for
their plan.

Not only would this show the world that

the Americans, rather than the Russians, were inter
ested in the future of the Korean people, but it would
also reduce Washington's military and financial respon
sibilities in Korea through the use of collective
security.

If the Korean peninsula continued to be

recognized as a nation which was temporarily divided 9
....

the United State.d would be unable to obtain military
and diplomatic support from the United Nations in the
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event the Communists attempted to upset the status
quo in Korea.

The United Nations Charter provided that

"nothing contained in the present Charter shall
authorize the United Nations to intervene .in matters
which are essentially within the domestic jurisdiction
of any state • • • • 0 60 But, if the United Nations took
part in establishing an independent state in south

.Korea the world body would also share responsibility
for its future.

Therefore, with the assistance of the

United Nations, it seems that the United States hoped
to achieve the first step towards its ultimate aim in
Korea--the unification of the Korean peninsula under
a government loyal to Washington, possibly through the
future use of force.
In order to implement the plans for south Korea,
Secretary of State Marshall announced in a September
17, 1947, speech at the United Nations, that "it is
the intention of the United States Government.to
present the problem of Korean independence to this
session of the General Assembly. n61

On October 9, the

Russians retaliated with Molotov's proposal that all
foreign troops leave Korea so as "to give to the Koreans
60

united Nations Charter, Article 2, Clause 7.
61u.s. Department of State, Korea, 1945 to 1948,
,
p. 48.
'·

,.
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the possibility of forming a government themselves, •

•

• • 1162

But the Americans rejected this suggestion.

It was fine for Washington to call for free elections
throughout the peninsula knowing that the Russians,
who ruled only one-third of·the population would never
agree to such an arrangement, but to leave south Korea
militarily unprotected might ensure a Communist victory
�n a possible civil war.
On October 16, the United States representative
to the United Nations, proposed that a teraporary�
commission be sent to Korea in order to supervise free
elections as a requisite to Korean unification and
independence.

This suggestion was attacked on November

. 13, by Andrei Gromyko, the Soviet delegate to the
United Nations, who believed the Americans intended
"to bury or pigeonhole the entire Moscow Plan for the
settlement of the Kor�an question and replace it with
some special United States plan which apparently
pursued its own designs in Korea ·• • • • n 6 3 The .American
representative, John Foster Dulles, responded immediately
by questioning the feasibility of Gromyko's counter

proposal to bring "duly elected representatives of the

Korean people" to New York, and urging the Assembly to

....

62�-, · P• -49.
-�·-

63
�., P• 54.
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authorize the immediate dispatch of a commission to
64
Korea.
Dulles emphasized the urgency of immediate.
action by the Assembly, arguing that the delay involved
in selecting representatives from Korea "would have

·
meant doing nothing as far as this year is concerned. 11 6 5

He also stated that

j_t

would be highly unlikely that

the south and the-north would agree on the choice ot

,the others representatives.

Accepting Dulles' advice, the Assembly adopted
a resolution establishing
the· United Nation Temporary
•
Commission on Korea (U.N.T.O.O.K.) by a vote of
forty-three to zero, with six abstentions:
Union refused to recognize this action.

the Soviet

The resolution

designated Australia, Canada, China, El Salvador, France,
India, Philippines, Syria and Ukraine Soviet Socialist
6
Republic as mvmbers of the Commission, 6 but the Ukraine
refused to accept a Commission seat in face of the
Russian position on the resolution.

The end result

was a commission consisting of either American allies
64
u.s., Department of State, The Record on Korean
Unification, p. 65.
65Ibid..,
p. 66.

66u .N. , Department of Public Information, yee.rbook
of the United Nations 1 l94 7-1948 (New York: 1949),
p. 87 •7 For excerpts of reso1ution of November 17, 1947,
see Appendix X; pp.-199-200.
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or recipients of American financial assistance.

American

policy-makers had accomplished their first important
goal in their new offensive.

Headed by Kwnara P. S. Menon of India, the Commission
travelled to Korea but found its movements restricted
to south Korea because of Soviet opposition to the United
Nations resolution.

Even in south Korea where U.N.T.C.O,K •

. launched a series of meetings with south Korean political
leaders in June, 1948, the course was not an: easy one.
The most powerful of the south Korean politicians,
Ryngman Rhee, refused to.recognize U.N.T.C.O.K., at
first, because it would not acknowledge his claim to
the entire peninsula.67 later he adopted a more
amenable attitude.

Perhaps his original extreme position

was taken to satisfy his ultra-nationalist supporters.
In face of the continued refusal of the Soviet commander
in north Korea to allow U.N.T.C.O.K. to enter his zone,
the Interim Uommittee of the General Assembly, on
¥ebruary 27, passed a resolution, thirty-one to two

with eleven abstentions, that "the United Nations Tem
porary Commission on Korea will discharge its duties,
t�at is to say, observe elections in such parts of
67william Reitzel et al. United States Forei�
Policy, 1945-5� (Washington: Brookings Institution,
1956), p. 178. Yongjeung Kim, "The Cold warz Korean
Elections," Far F.astern Surve;z:, XVII (May 5, 1948),
101-102.
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Korea as are accesible to the Commission, not later
than 10 May 1948.11 68 Significantly, the negative
votes came from members of U,N.T.C.O.K., Australia

and Canada.

Their attitude, as expressed by the

Australian delegate to the United riations, was that
"in the event of threats from the North, the United

Nations might be �laced in the difficult position of

having either actively to support, or else to renowice

all responsibility for, the government it had estab

lished.11 69

But the two Commonwealth nations acquiesced

to the will of the majority and, retained their· status

as Commission members.

In expectation of the establishment of the new

state, Washington increased its financial aid to south

Korea to provide a strengthening of its "constabulary"

by an additional 15,000 men, making the overall strength
65 9 000; the United States also supplied the south
Koreans with light military equipment.70 Heavy equip�
was proscribed not only because of the mountainous

Korean terrain, 71

but also because Washington was

68u.s., Department of State. Korea,
P• ?l.

69 Goodrich, p.-47.

1945 to 1948,

70Gene M. Lyons, Militar� Policy and Economic Aid:
The Korean Case, 1950-�2, ( olumbus: Ohio State
University, 19 6 1), p. l •
71Later events proved the State Department wrong
in its assumption t at Korea was too mountainous for
tank warfare.
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apprehensive about Rhee's outspoken desire to unite

Korea, even if it involved the use of force.
,,

Preparations for the elections were carried out

by U.N.T.C�O.K. and by the K.M.G.

9

the latter increasing

its propaganda concerning the advantages of a democracy

and the use of the secret ballot with the hope of

attracting more people to the polls in support of the
American position.72 The Communists countered with a
Coalition Conference held in north Korea on April 22
and 23, which attracted two hundred forty delegates

from south Korea, including political moderates like

Kim Koo and Kimm Kiusic, who joined in condemning a
divided Korea.

Returning home, the emissaries urged

the south Korean people to boycott the elections as

an expression of their dissatisfaction with the con
tinued division of their homeland.

General Hodge sought

to offset the delegates' influence by condemning them
as Communist instigators and, he went·on to describe
a bleak picture of Korean life if the population
acquiesced in the wishes of the Reds.73

Although many Koreans, and especially the Commu

nists, attempted to prevent the elections, they were

72George McCune, "The Korean Situation," Far Eastern
Survey, XVII (September 8, 1948), 198.
73Ibid., P• 201.
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held as planned with

7 1.2$

74

of the eligible voters

making a choice from about thirty-one parties all

representing the political right. 7 5 The results were
a deqisive_victory for the conse�vatives who were un

challenged on the ballot by leftist groups.

It is

interesting to note that twelve of the fifteen members

of the National Election Committee, which was responsible

.for accepting or denying candidates for the election,
belonged to Rhee's Hankook Democratic Party.76

But

in a "carefully worded" statement U.N.T.C.O.K. hailed
the results of the election as:

[A] valid expression of the free will of the
electorate in those parts of Korea which were
accessible to the Commission and in which the in
habitants constituted aQQroximately two-thirds
of the people of Korea."/'/

The validity of this statement 1s somewhat suspect when
one notes that U.N.T.C.O.K. never had more than thirty

74u.s., Congress, Senate, Committee on Foreign
Relations, The United States and the Korean Problem,
83rd Cong., 1st Sess., July 30, 1953, Doc. 74, p. 23.
Although 7c_;;/4 of the eligible voters showed up at the
polls 38% of the ballots cast were blank or considered
void. All statistics on the elections were secured
from the Census Division of the South Korean Interim
Government. Ibid.
75

Ibid., p. 22.

76Leon Gordenker, The United Nations and the
Peaceful Unification.of Korea (The Hague: Martinus
Nijhoff, 1959), P• 99.
7 7u.s.,

Congress, Senate, Committee on Foreign
Relations, T�� United States and the Korean Problem,
P•. 24.
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men observing the pre-election events 78 in an area em
bracing a population of 18,000,000.
Consequently many people did not believe that the

elections were as calm as described by U.N.T.C.O.K.

Between March 29 and May 10, five hundred and eighty
nine people were killed, and over ten thousand were

arrested; 79 hardly a typical situation before a "free"

election.

To offset leftist pleas to boycott the

election the Americans increased their propaganda con

cerning the citizen•s duty to vote and, the Korean

police, under indirect American supervision, forced the
people to the polls through various tactics.

One method

was to threaten the confiscation of the very scarce
rice ration cards if the people did not vote.80 At the
polls the people were met by the south Korean constabu
lary nwith bayonets unsheathed 11 and, in some areas by
groups of Rhee's terrorist youth corps who had been

dispatched by K.M.G. officials as election officials.81
These "officials" and the sight of bayonets reminded
the Korean people of their duty, as free citizens, to
vote.

That many Koreans, who might have boycotted the
78Gordenker, P• 96.
79McCune, "The Korean Situation," 199.
80McCune, Korea Todai, P• 229.

81Maxwell S. Stewart, "Blundering in Korea,;,
1:2.tion, CLXVI_ ( ay 22, 1948), 571.
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election ? were forced to the polls was admitted by

General William Dean who was then the military commander

'\

of the K.M.G.
\

Although he bad dispatched American offi

cials to observe the elections, their number was in
sufficien t to cover all the polling stations in Korea,
especially those furthest away from Seoul which went

unobserved by either K.M.G. or U.N.T.C.O.K. officiala.82
Considering the social structure of rural Korea one
wonders how many peasants followed the "suggestions"
l.
of their village leaders on elect·on
day?

Under such

conditions� the outcome could hardly be viewed as the
free expression of the south Korean people.

Yet it was

accepted as such by the United States and the United
Nations.
The elections and the subsequent creation of the
Republic of Korea through tho agency of the United Nations
can be viewed as a shrewd and successfuQ maneuver by
the United States.

Now, not only was there a pro-West

government in Seoul, but it owed its existence to t�e
United Nations which seemed to indicate the latter was
responsible for the future welfare of the newly indepe:dent country.

In changing collective security from

a slogan to a reality the Americans had scored a victory
and strengthened their position in>the cold war.
82nean and Wordon, pp. 148-149.
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Considering the pro-American make up of the United
Nations at that time it can be easily presumed that the

,,

\

United States was confident of securing such a diplomatic victory over the Russians.

Yet with the creation

of the Republic of Korea, American authorities were
still faced with the same old problems:

unification

under a pro-western leader, and political and economic
stability.

Would the Republic of Korea become a show

cf;:. se for democracy ? or a convenient laboratory for
documenting Communist charges against the western
imperialis ts?

CHAPTER IV

\

THE REPUBLIC OF KOREA
Establishing the New State
The establishment of the Republic •Of Korea created
as many problems for the United States, or left as many t
as i t; resolved.

Although the United Nations recognized

the existence of the l."nfant state, the United States
r
was still most respo1sible
�or its upkeep which was

complicated by the problem of unification.

The two

questions of how to stabilize the economic and political
life of the nation and of how to unify it were so inter
twined that one could not be separated from the other,
Although the Republic's immediate antecedents were
questionable, Washington attempted to strengthen the
infant state by diploratic recognition and by a con
tinuous flow of military and financial aid.

Thus the

Repub1 ic of Korea became, like Greece. Turkey, and Iran
a critical arena in the developing struggle between the

t·1qo gr.sat world
powers--the United States and the Union
•

of Soviet Socialist Republics.
In order to sanction the existence of the Republic
a.nd to aid in its development, the nation had to be
diplomatically recognized; an event which divided the
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peninsula even further.

The initial step to stabilize

the political fou..--idations of South Korea was taken by
,1

_the State De1Jartment on Au3ust 12, when it declar·ed, in

a press release, that "it is the view of the United

states Goverume�t that the Korean Governru0nt so estab
lished is entitled to be regarded as the Government of

Korea envisaged by General .Assembly resolution of

.November 14, 191.1.7. 11 1

In its attempt to stabilize the

Republic's political status through diplomatic recog

nition the United States sou3ht to ignore the issue of
unification that lay at the heart of the problem.

The

importance of this issue to the Koreans was clearly

recognized by General MacArthur i· his speech at the

new republic's inausuration ceremonies:

As the forces of righteousness advance, the
t_iumph is dulled by one of the greatest tragedies
of contemporary history--an artificial barrier has
divided your land.
This barrier must and will be torn down.
Nothing shall prevent the ultimate unity of your
people as free men of a free nation. 2

It was not until the second week in December that the
U:ai ted Nations acknowledged that

11

there has been es tab-

.,_D.S.; Department of Statre ., Korea,
P• 101.
2 Gunther

1945 to 1948,

, p. 169. On Au3Ust 15, 1948, the State
Department relieved M&.cArthur of his political respon
sibilities in south Korea, but as Commander of 'American
F0�ces in the Pacific he was still responsible for the
Republic's defense. Tewksbury, p. 117.
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lished a lawful government having effective control and

.'urisdiction ove1.· that pa.rt of Korea where the Temporary

Commission was able to observe • • • and that this is
the only such govern11ent in Kor.ea; • . . . "3 On NP-w

Year's day the south Korean's status as citizens of a

recognized nation was acknowledged by the United States

Government's decision· 11 to extend full recognition to the
Gove1.�nment of the Republic of Korea. 11 4
Although the United States and the Unite� Nations

recognized the Republic of Korea, there were others who

challenged this action.

It was believed by world diplo

mats and those Koreans who opposed the May elections

that the SoviP-ts would retaliate by acknowledging the

existence of a separate state in the north which would

only further complicate the problem of unification.5

This prediction became a reality four months after the

election--with the eatablishment of the People's Repub

lic of Korea.

There was little question that the

Soviets would support the north Korean government and,

on October 13, Pravda quoted 3talin

RS

saying that

3u.N., Department of Public Information, Yearbook
of the United Nations, 1948-1949 .(~~w Yorks 1950),
P•

290.

4U.S., Depa.rtment of State, The Record on Korean
Unification, p. 78.

5u.s., Congress, House, Committee on Foreign
Relations, Background Information on Korea, p. 41.
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"the Soviet Government expresses its readiness to
establish diplomatic relations between the

u.s.s.R.

the Korean's People's Democratic Republic . • • •

�

1

\

and

Trusteeship had been brought to an end and, the Koreans
had achieved self-�overnment but, instead of being
united they were separated by opposing "democratic"

government� which-ascribed to antagonistic ideologies.
When diplomatic recognition proved insufficient

to stabilize and strengthen the Republic of Korea,
especially after the appearance of the government in
the north, Washington enforced its words with financial
assistance.

Up until the last day of 1948 the United

States had financially assisted south Korea through
the Government and Relief in Occupied Areas Act
(G�A.R.I.0.) 9 but in the following year these respon�
sibilities were handled by the Economic Cooperation

Administration (E.C.A.) which was an offshoot of the

Marshall Plan.

In its first year of operations the

E.C.A., staffed by officials who were familiar with
Korea� instituted a $60,000,000 aid program,7 which
was to carry into June, 1950.

In order to assure the

. 6McCune, Korea Today, p. 305.
7U.S., Congress, Senate, Committee on Foreign
lations, The United States and the Korean Problem,
p. 33 •.
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T'oreans of their economic future President Truman
looked past this first E.C.A. program and planned for

.,

the following year.

In the late spring of 1949 the

Chief Executive appealed to Congress for $150,000,000,
and:
[R]ecomrnend[ed] that the Congress authorize
the continuation of economic assistance to the
Republic of Korea for the fiscal year ending
June 30, 1950 • • • Without continuation of such
relief, its economy would collapse--inevitably and
rapidly. 8
After long deliberation 9 Congress approved� on February
10 9 1950, an amended version of Truman's original request.
In order to safeguard Rhee's government against
external and internal military pressures and, to enable
it to use the newly acquired funds to bolster the south
Korean economy 9 Washington stepped up its military aid
program.

According to an agreement signed by the two

nations the Commanding General of the American military
forces was responsible for the organizing, training, and
equipping of the South Korean army until the withdrawal
of American troops from the peninsula.9 A short time
later a supplementary agreement provided that "military

u.s., Department of State, The Record on Korean
Unification, P• 78�
8

9u.S. Congress, House, Committee on Foreign
9

Affairs, Background Information on Korea, p. 15. By
the August 24, 1948 9 agreement the American govern
ment was granted extraterritorial rights.

102
property • • • will be transferred to . • • the Republic
of Korea from time to time_as authority for such trans
fer is given by th� Government of the United States ••
• •

The first such transfer involved forty thousand

Japanese rifles and an appropriate amount of ammunition
which was used to equip the Korean �onstabulary.11
Although United States troops were still in Korea the

Americans increased their military aid in anticipation
of the day when south Koreans would be responsible for
their own defense.

When American forces withdrew in

July, 1949, Washington handed over to the Seoul �overn

ment military and naval equipment valued at $56,000,000,

and, kept in storage in Japan an additional $1,000,000
worth of spare parts.12 Included in this transfer
were:

small arms and ammunition; rocket launchers and

rockets, vehicles of all types; anti-tank guns 9 and

ammunition; mortars and ammunition, and ships with
$150,000 worth of spare parts.13

In order to establish a strong defense force, and

to see that the above supplies were used to good
10u.s., Department of State, Korea
,
P• 105.
11Goodrich, p; 87.

1945 to 1948,

12u. s·., Congress House, Committee o.n Foreign
,
Affairs, Background Information on Korea, pp. 33-34.
13Ibid., P• 34.

103
advantage, President Truman informed Congress that
na military advisory group •.• • will be retained in
Korea after the withdrawal of United States troops. 1114
�s soon as the last American troops were withdrawn from
the peninsula the United States Korean Military Advisory
Group (K.M.A.G.) began to operate in accordance with
its instructions Qto advise the government of the
Republic of Korea int e continued development of the

Security Forces of that government.11 1 5

The la.st sub

stantial military aid program before the outbreak of
war was the passing, by Congress, of the Mutual Defense

Assistance Act at the end of September, 1949.

Through

this Act, South Korea, Iran, and the Philippines shared
an additional $27,640,000 worth of military equipment.16
If American officials thought that systematic doses

of diplomatic, economic, and military aid would stabilize
the Republic of Korea they were grossly mistaken.

Dur

ing the first two years of its existence the new state
did not attain a semblance of stability.

Among the most

14u.s., Department of State, The Record on Korean
Unification, p. 80.

15Appleman, p. 13.

This type of program was
previously suggested by General Wedemeyer in his report on Korea.
1 6u.s., Congress, House, Committee on Foreign
Affairs, Background Information on Korea, p. 35.
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important reasons for this failure were the overwhelming
desire on the part of virtually all Koreans for national
unification and the quality of Rhee's administration.
Rhee's government could hardly be described as democratic
and in view of its almost complete reliance on the United
States for military and economic essentials it could
scarcely claim to-be independent.
Attempts to Survive
From its birth on May 12, 1948, until the outbreak
of the Korean War� the Republic of Korea was a classic example of chaos, corruption ? and instability.

Political

assassinations occurred indiscriminately with such
leaders as the leftist Lyuh Woon Hyung and the once
moderate, turned rightist,
murdered.

im Koo being mysteriously

Even within the rightist government, groups

vied with each other for prized positions in the
ministries. 17

Another factor which hindered stability

was.the apathy of the south Korean people who believed
that their f ture would be shaped by the "cold war",
a
not by themselves.18
While Washington officials thought they could lessen

17 Im, p. 291.

18Ibid., p. 295.
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their military responsibilities by establishing the
Republic, Syngman Rhee and his followers thought other
,\

wise.

Once advocates of foreign troop withdrawals • .

the south Korean politicians changed their minds when
it became known that north Korea had a well-trained
army; they also feared internal disturbances.

While

the Seoul officials took a dubious view of the quality
of their own troops, it was "the judgement of the
responsible American military representatives in the
field that the state of combat readiness of the Korean
forces was such as to justify the withdrawal of American
�
r.orcesv
• • • • 1119

South Korean officials attempted to persuade
Vlashington to keep a substantial force 'in Korea, but
American officials would not defer to the obsessive
fears of invasion and subversion that plagued the Korean
leaders.

Because of these fears the Republic of Korea

was a virtual police state as the Rhee government
ruthlessly suppressed all opposition to its policies.
For its external security the Seoul government attempteu
to compensate the loss of American forces by extending
mi"itary training to rightist groups. such as General
Lee Bum-suk's Korean Youth Movement and General Lee Chung
P• 6.

19U.S., Department of State, The Conflict in Korea.
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Chien's Daidong Youth Corps.20

Also their fears quieted

somewh-t with the belief that American military with
,\

drawal would be swiftly reversed if the Communists.
struck southward.

This view possessed some validity,

especially as the Joint Chiefs-of-Staffs, in 194?, re
ported that t�e American military position in the Far

:Sast would. be impaired
if "The Soviets established
.
.military strength in south Korea capable of mounting
an assault on Japan.n 21

The view that t_ United States would defend the
Republic of Korea from external Communist aggression
lost much of its strength when an increasing number of
reports began to circu late that Korea was definitely
not in the American defense perimeter.

One such inci

dent occurred in March, 1949, when British journalist,
G. Ward Price reporte

General MacArthur as saying:

Our line of defense runs through the chain
of islands fring�ng the coast of Asia. It starts
from the Philippines and continues through the
Ryukus Archipelogo 9 which includes its main
bastion, Okinawa. Then it bends back through 22
J"apan and the Aleutian Island chain to Alaska.
20McCune,

11

The Korean Situation 9 " 202.

- 21Truman, p. 325.
22Richard H. Rovere and Arthur M. Schlesinger,
The General and the President (New York: Farrar 9
S-cr,.:.us 9 and Young, 1951) 9 p. 101. In the latter part
of 1949� MacArthur expressed a similar view to William
R. Jatt news of the Arizona Daily Star. Ibid.

10?
That Rhee was disturbed by such reports is clearly
indicated in his remarks to John Muccio, the American
ambassador 9 when the last American troops were leaving
Korea.

Rhee pointed out:

The question is not when or whether American
troops are withdrawn. The question is: What are
the policies of the United States in regard to
Korea. 2 3
The Sbuth Korean leaders fears of invasion were,
at least 9 equaled by their fear of internal upheaval.
Developments in 1948 proved their fears to be well
grounded, although clearly part of the internal unrest
was of their. own making.

Fe·v Koreans cared about their

country's relation to the cold war, they were more in
terested in acqu·ring food, obtaining jobs, and in
bringing the police state tactics of the gover.ment
under con�rol.

The first ov rt expression of the

people's op9osition to the Rhee government occurred
in October,

948, when the Republic's Fourteenth Army

revo te , and seized the southern towns of Yosu and
Sur '10n. 24 Although the insurrection was put down by
trusted troops from Seoul, many rebel leaders escaped
into the hills, and continued to harass Rhee's government

..

,.2301iver, Why \var Came to Korea, p. 233.
24Richard c. Allen, Korea's Syngman �hee (Rutland,
Veroont: c. E. Tuttle Co.? 1960;, pp. 108-113. The
author presents a good description of the political
assassinations and the military revolts.
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by organizing guerilla bando.25

Officials blamed the

revolt on Communist instigators, but specialist in

,,

\

Korean affairs, Channing Liem reported "that the recent
army revolt in South Korea was caused at least as much

by police unpopularity as by the Communists. 11 26

Police

brutality had been accepted by the K.M.G., and by the

summer of 1948• the police were aided in their question

able actions by a number of youth organizations.

Trained by American peroonnel the police, the army,

and the youth corps forcefully assured Rhee of con

tinued support.

Time and American aid did little to improve the

character and stability of the Rhee government, and by
on the verge of collapse.
June ? 1-950 9 the Republic was
•

Inflation had becoce rampart, military attacks increased

along the border areas, and guerilla warfare became more
intensive.

In addition, Rhee was losing his grip on

the political machinery of the country.

of destruction

Although seeds

had been sown at the Republic's birth,

it was the impact of events in the ten months preceding
the war that almost destroyed any semblance of South

Koree.n independence, and caused one American observer,

1::�.C.A. labor advisor� Stanley Ea.rl, to note that, "the
25nean and Worden, P• 148.
26Liem, 79.

109
oppressed South Koreans [would] have rebelled against
the Rhee government had not tbe war broken out.0 2 7

From mid-summer to tl e end of 19-4•9 � the Republic 1

:;

had to conteLd with border clashes, defection, internal
dissatisfact�on, and a

runaway economy.

At the be

ginning of August North Korean forces moved into the

northwest Ongjin Peninsula but they were repulsed;

about five weeks later the crew of a privately owned

steamship defected to North :orea; and in early October,

ff ee reported that two

were executed on C h ej

und.red and forty-nine guerillas

Island� an area which had
y t�e end of
strongly opposed the 1948 elections.28

the year, the Republic was suffering from inflation as
prices had increased ten fo�d during the past few

mont s, while only twenty percent; of the industrial
potentia

was being utilized, and unemployment was as
high �s thirty percent in some provinc�s.29 Owen

Lattimore, a specialist in Asian affairs, prophetically
summed up the situation:

The army cannot be trusted to fight, the
people do not trust the government; the govern
ment cannot be depended on, and does not depend
on itself: it appeals for continued .American

27Gunther, p. �88.
-2 8u.s.� Congress 9 House 9 Committee on Foreign
Affairs 9 Background Information on Korea 9 p. 69.

29 0 iver, Why War Came to Korea, p. 153.
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occupation and protection. If there is to be a
civil war, South Korea would not be able to sub
due North Korea without a great deal more
American help than is now available. North
Korea would be able to overrun South Korea
without Russian help 9 unless stopped by American
combat troops.30
Instead of mending its ways in 1950 the Rhee

government increased its efforts to destroy all of its

opponents, and because of the corruptness of the

officials involved, failed to strengthen the Korean

economy.

American officials became increasin�ly

frustrated over Rhee's tactics and on ro�ny occasions

threatened to abandon him.

As winter changed into

spring the Republic of Korea moved closer and closer

to a state of pol'tical and economic anarchy.

During the second week in January, Secretary of

State, Dean Acheson, in speaking about the American

defensive perimeter in the Fa.r East announced that in

sone places,including Korea, "no person can guarantee
these areas against attack.1131 While Korean officials

w�re familiar with this aspect of American foreign policy,
the statement made to the National Press Club, had a

depressing effect on the Korean people who felt they
had been abandoned by the Unitad States.

Korean

,30o�en Lattimore, The Situation in Asia (Boston:
Little, Brown and Company, 1949), pp. �?7
,31Appleman, p. 83.
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nationalist Im Young-sin stated that Acheson's speech
placed the Republic in u position where it "was leaning
'.\

far over a precipice, ready to fall at the slightest
touch. n32
Acheson's speech was hardly designed to check
rrorea's political and economic disintegration which
continued apace. -In the latter part of January, a
New York Times correspondent, Walter Sullivan reported
that a group of South Korean troops had defected to
the Communists.

His interpretation of their actions

were:
Here, as in China 9 the Government on the
whole has been bucking this tidal wave of
revolution rather than riding it. In responding
to the pressure of communism, .reforms that were
contemplated have been trodden under.33
Following up stories concerning t.e political instability
o� the Republic, correspondent Sullivan came across a
typical case of police brutality. The son of a blind
farmer was killed during an "armed rice collection by
the police.

The official explanation, ••• was that
the policeman had meant to shoot the farmer's dog."34

At a higher plane Rhee's inability to cope with the

32rm, p. 299.

33new
York Tl' mes, January 3
n
. 1 ' 1950 t p • · 2 •
·34Ibid., February 1, 1950, p. 13.
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financial problems of his country brought a statement

of disapproval from the American House Committee on

Foreign Affairs:

The Department of State has sent instructions
to Ambassador John J. Muccio to make it abundantly
clear to President Rhee that the Korean Government
must put its financial house i� order if it ex
pects continued American aid. ?)

After six months of debating, Congress hesitantly

approved President Truman"s plea for $120,000,000 in

aid for Korea.

Even though Congress approved the bill

the legislators were not overly endowed with confidence

on the future of the Rhee government.

Representatives amende

The House of

the bill by pledging to cut

off aid if the Republ.:.c 1 s cabinet included "one or

nore meCT ers of the Co,."'!.. unist party or the party now
in control of the government of northern Korea. 11 36
The fears expressed by the Congressmen were not un

founded, for by the end of February the guerilla war

which was nearly two years old was spreading, and
border raids on both sides of t e 38th parallel
seemed to be increasing.

As the anti-Rhee forces

gained strength the Seoul government countered by in

creasingly ignoring the civil liberties of its citizens.
35Mc0une, Korea 'l'oday, p •.313.
36Francis o. Wilcox and Thorstein V. Kalijarui,
Recent American Forei an Policy (New York: Appleton
Cent" .....Y- rofts, Inc., 1952 ) , P• 405.

During this period many people were killed by Rhee's

police and, some people lived long enough to be
,,

sentenced to death by the South Korean courts.
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One

such case involved fourteen of the nation's leading
journalists and \vriters who were accused of spying;

they were all shot.37

As Rhee's government felt less secure it increased
its effort· to weed out possible subversives, which meant

anyone who opposed the government's viewpoint.

In March,

a group of one hundred and ninety-six people were
arrested on suspicion of planning a revolt.38 "ut the
most sensational episode of Rhee's witch hunt was the

conviction of thirteen former members of the National
Assembly who were accused of "conspiring against the
Republic."39

\'Jhile Rhee was able to suppress his opponents at

home he had less success in dealing with the United
States Government.

lashington had always disapproved

of Rhee's handling of the Republic's finances 9 and at

the beginning of April the State Department issued a
37 rm, p. 303.
38u.s., Congress, House, Committee on Foreign
Affairs, Background Information on Korea, p. 69.

39u.s.,

Korea, p. 22.

Department of State, The Conflict in
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strong note to the Korean Ambassador, John M. Chang,

,\

requesting that something be done to rectify the economic
situation.40 The American Ambassador in Seoul, John J.
Muccio, was recalled for consultations concerning
financial problems.
But the economic difficulties were quickly over
shadowed by indications of war.

Towards the end of the

month Rhee claimed that his forces had captured six
hundred Cornrnunists who had moved south of the 38th
parallel on March 27. 41 Whether or not Rhee's statistics
were accurate is unimportant, but they do indicate that
the violent anti-Rhee forces were not small pockets of
dissenters.

Rhee was under attack from within and

withou':;.
One of the most important events of the immediate
pre-war period was the election of the General Assembly
on May 30.

hee desperately tried to postpone the

elections until November because of the chaotic con
ditions in the Republic, and because he feared the
possible loss of his political leadership.

This fear

manifested itself in government attacks upon any of
Li· 0U.S.� Congress, House, Committee on Foreign

Affairs ? Bac�A�ou:�d Information on Korea, p. 72.
41u.s., Congress, Senate, Committee on Foreign
Relations, The United States and the Korean Problem,
P• 140.
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its political opponents who showed any intention of
talking to the U.N.T.C.O.K. officials about the election.
,\

These people wer� arrested and in �;ny cases charged
.

I.J.?

as Communist agents.·�

Eut

hee

ad little 9 if any�

power over American public opinion which had been aroused
by his autocratic methods 9 and the State Department
strongly suggested" that the Korean leader proceed
with the elections.4-� The results were disasterous to
11

t e established parties 9 and particularly to Rhee's
organization.

Over 65% of the newly elected repre
sentatives were indap r-dents.44 This election not only

stimulated furt e:::::-· opposition to the Seoul administration,
but i� also suggested the possibil ty of ousting Rhee
and .--....is clique at the next elections.

In order to

further emphasize the plight of the Koreans the North
Korean army, on the night before the elections, had

bombarded the border city of Kaesong; 45 Rhee was being

softened from within and without.
During the three weeks prior to the outbreak of the
42Gordenker pp. 162-163.
9
43chung, p. 208.

Ll-4u.s.� Congress 9 House, Committee on Foreign
___ fairs ') Background- Information on Korea 9 , p. 72.

4 5u.s., Department of State i The Conflict in
:.:ore a� p. 23.
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war there was a growing restlessness amongst the Korean

The North Koreans.issued two pleas for national.

people.

elections� and dispatched three representatives south

to discuss unification with the Rhee government, but
these men were arrested by the South Korean police.46

A further weakening of Rhee's position occurred in the
new Assembly where he was confronted by a strong
opposition.

One day after the commencement of the war,

the United Nations Commission on Korea (U.N.C.O.K.)
reported that "the initial sess · ons
J.,

[or

the new Assembly]

have indicated the determination to tackle the Adminis
tration in a critical spirit for its numerous short
comings.11 4 7

the

On the opening day of the new Assembly

orth Korean legislature passed a resolution which

called for the merging of the two assemblies as a
prerequisi'te to uni'f'ica t'ion. 48 But Rhee dismissed the
proposal as propaganda� and continued his wholesale
arrest o

political opponents.

One measure of Rhee's

c.�·�errr.ination to stay in power were the some fourteen
thous�nd political prisoners waiting to go on trial
Cl.

46

Ibid. � p. 42 •.

47U.S., Department of State, The Record on Korean

Unification, p. 97:
48Tew sbu.ry, p. 156.
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at the outbreak of the war.49

The American viewpoints on Rhee and his so-called

democratic nation were numerous.

At the top of the

American political ladder was President Truman who

realized the instability of the south Korean republic,

but accepted the situation in order to keep south

Korea out of the Communist camp.

Truman knew that:

Syngm.an .Rhee is a man of strong convictions
and has little patience with those who differ
from himo • • • I do not care for the methods
used by Rhee 0 s police • • • • Yet we had no choice
but to support him.50

Another American viewpoint is expressed by General

William Dean who had served as military commander of
the KeM.G.

He had believed that the south Korean

people truly felt that Rhee ad the Republic were
representatives of the nia.jority v·ew.
1
capture'Dean was:

But after his

Struck by the fact that if the people of
South Korea resented the northern invaders, they

49 Gunther 9 p. 188.

c;oTruman,

✓
po 329. In res·::ionse to a reporter's
Question on the importance of Korea to the United
States' defense strategy, Senator Tom Connally,
chairman of the Senate Foreign' Relations Committee
explained: "I don't think it is very greatly im
portanto It has be_en testified before us that Japan,
Okinawa, and the Philippines make th� chain of de
fense which is absolutely necessary. And, of course,
any additional territory along in that area would be
that much more ? but it's not absolutely essential.n
U.S. News and Wor_d Report, XXVIII (May 5, 1950), 30.
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,,

certainly weren't showing it. To me, the civilian
attitude appeared to veer between enthusiasm and
passive acceptance. I saw no sign of resistance
or any will to resist.51

It becomes obvious that by the time the war began the

Republic of Korea was in a very precarious situation.
Unification or Death
"We hereby reassert that it is our firm, unanimous
determination that our people will either live together
or die together in our struggle for the complete res
toration of our country. • • • u52 Those were the words

of President of the Republic of Korea, Syngman Rhee in

a speech to the First Congress of the Republic.

Uni

fication under a Seoul government had always been Rhee's

pri�ry goal 9 and even during the initial build up of

Soviet troops in the north he clamoured for war against
these overwhelmingly superior forceso
the Korean people he explained:

In a speech to

I advocated unification, o o o so that we
could drive the Russians from the north • • • •
We must fight those who are not our friends. As
soon as the time c0mes, I'll instruct you. Then
you should be prepared to shed blood • • • • America
is our f�iend • • • • I have already made connections
abroad o ,.?

-51Dean and Wardon, P• 87.
52u_s., Department of State, Korea,
p. 74.
53Rovere and Schlesinger, p. 110.
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Rhee was the leadin� advocate of unification by
force but hFJ was rein.forced by other southern 11oli

,,

ticians.

When they proclaimed the Republic's constitu

tion in July� 1948, it became evident that unification
was their prime aim.

Article Four proclaims that

"the territory of Korea shall consist of the Korean
peninsula."54 Article Six states that "the mission of
the national military forces shs.11 be to pe.t•fo:r.m the
sacred duty of protecting the national territory. 115 5

Therefore, acc0rdin3 to the constitution, the South

Korean army had the legal riGht to operate in the
north.

This ·1>1as contrary to the �ieneral Assembly's

resolution of December 12, 1941, which recognized the
Republic of Korea's claim to only that area of land
which was south of the 38th parallel.

The opposition

of the Rhee government tot .e U.N. interpretation of

the Republic 0 s territory wa.s clearly expressed by one

of Rhee's cabinet ministers:
What wa'-1 discus sec. vd th the U. N � Commission
is ... hat peaceful unification of South and North
is nothing rnore thRn a political plot. The only
way to unify South and North Korea is for the
Rep,ililic to regain the lost land in North Korea
by force.56
� /J.
)·u.s.,

-

Department of State, Korea
1945 toj.948�
p. 79. Later·the North Korean constitufion also pro
claimed sovereignty over the entire peninsula.
55:-')id.
56�overe and Schlesinger, pp. 110-111.
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_'. .:: many times as Seoul politicians advocated war the

State Department threatened to discontinue American aid,

althou(". �-Jashington officials f3.iled to stop the munerous

border skirmis es.
J.

In an interview for the New York

Herald Tribune a few months before the outbreak of war,
Rl1ee declared:

South Korea [is] strong enough to take
Pyongyang in a few days ••• If we had our own
way we �.vould, I am sure, have started up already.
But we had to wait •••• The American government
keeps telling us, No, no, no--you are not ready. 5 '/

Even after three years of war Rhee would no deviate

from his intention to 1nify Korea by force.

When approached

by PresiGent Dwi3ht D. Eiser_ower on the possibility of

signing an armistice,

P.hee

replied that:

In case the idea of simultaneous withdrawal
is found unacceptable to either or both of the
negotiating parties 9 I beg of you to allow the
Koreans to continue the fighting, for this is the
universal preference of the Korean p�ople to any
decisive armistice or peace •••• 5d

�lthough Rhee finally made a verbal agreement to abide

by the truce� the Republic did not become a party to

the official armistice.

On the eve of his overthrow

in 1960 Rhee's views remained unchanged 9 as revealed

in his remarks to� correspondent, Charles
57Gu..�ther ? p. 188.

s.

58u .s., Con3ress, Senate, Cor0..mi ttee on Foreign
Relations, The United States and the Korean Problem,
p. 83.
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Stevenson:

South Korea could reunify the country by
force if given weapons and logistic support.
As for fighting that might ensue, the
Koreans are ready to undertake it themselves
and aek no man power contr b" ions from the
United States or other friendly countries.59

It is obvious that the South Korean government was

at least as aggressive as the North Koreans; but the
question is, how aggressive?

At the outbreak of the

war the North Koreans were.condemned as aggressors by

the Americans, and subsequently by the United Nations.

But, taking into consideration the relationship between

north and south this label becomes a very ambiguous one.

The Oxford Universal Dictionary defines aggression as
"an unprovoked attack; the first attack in a quarrel;

an assault.11 60

If one is to accept this definition

then neither side, or both should be considered aggres

sors.

Taking into consideration the atmosphere of

corruption, rebellion, and apathy in the south, could

it be possible that the Seoul officials felt very in

secure in their positions, and believed that through a

war for unification they could strengthen their positions?
Instead of waiting for a probable internal upheaval
- 59charles S. s-tevenson, "D + 10 Years," Army,

X (June, 1960), 64.

60The Oxford Universal Dictionar yon Historical
Principles, 3rd ed., rev. Oxford, Eng land: Clarendon
Presst 1955), P• 35•.
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did the desperate South Korean officials provoke the
nervous foes in the north into attacking the Republic?
Were they desperate enough to believe that the United
\

States and the United Nations would rally to their
support, if the two were convinced that the Republic
had been attacked?

The Americans were in a very pre

carious position at this time as shown by the remark
.of the State Department• s George Kennanz

"If they

disgrace themselves [}he South Korean� and make a lot
of trouble for us, they will make it impossible to
support them, but to the extent we can support them we
think we ought to do it.11 6 1 The South Koreans might
have been confident that they would receive assistance
from the Chineoe lobbyists in Washington, and other
Americans who were seeking ways to compensate the loss
of China.

Although American officials had previously

stated that Korea was outside their defense perimeter
there was a chance that Washington. ·might use a Communist
attack to strengthen its policies of collective security
and containment.

Did Rh3e copy tl.1.e v.nification plan

used by the Sardinian statesman Cavour in the latter's
attempt to unify Italy in the nineteenth century? 62
61
62

Goodrich, p. 90.

cavour, who was trying to unify Italy, made an
agreement with Napoleon III of France in which the
former agreed to assist the Sardinians if Austria was
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Although the Republic's soldiers were lightly equipped,
many American officials, such as K.M.A.G. commander,

Brigadier General William L. Rolunta, and William C.

'

Foster, the deputy administrator of E.C.A. had officially
stated that the South Korean army was the best military
force in Asia.63 •Equipped with such a force did the

South Koreans believe they could overpower their
northern neighbors, or could their plan,have been to
just delay the North Korean forces until the Seoul
government received external assistance?

The above

questions and suggestions may never be answered or
proven, but they must be acknowledged and investigated.
The Attack
The official American view of the attack was
clearly defined by the Deputy Representative to the
United Nations, Ernest A .. Gross, when he declared that
· "an attack of the forces of the North Korean regime
• • • constitutes a breach of the peace and an act o!

aggressi on. "�

But the events l6ading up to and

made to look like an ag�ressor� Cavour was successful
in provoking the Austrians into attacking Sardinia in
late April, 1839, a�d France immediately declared war
on Austria initiating the unification of Italy.
63Rovere and Schl�singer, PP• 112-114.

64u.s., Department of State, The Record on Korean
Unification, P• 87•
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surrounding June 25, 1950, raise serious questions
about the validity of such an interpretation.

By June 24, the Republic of Korea was near collapse,

\

while in the north, the economy had been growing
steadily since 1946.65 Although many South Koreans

welcomed the armies from the north it seems strange
that the Communists would want a war with all of its
.national and international implications rather than
to await the almost inevitable collapse of the Rhee
government.

If North Korea had planned to attack on

the twenty-fifth, why was Russia ·absent from the United
Nations?

How much substance is there in the belief that

even if Moscow knew about the attack it considered the
seating of Red China in the United Nations more important?
The non-Communist world has been repeatedly told
that the North Koreans _planned their attack well in
advance, and that they had a modern well-equipped
military force which went into action on June 25.

Yet

in a series of articles from Korea, the New York Times
reported that the North Korean fo1·cee were poorly
equipped, having weapons which were at least eight

years old, and some were of World War I vintage; 66
65Yoon T. Kuark, "North Korea's Industrial Develop
ment During the Post-War Period,". North Korea Today
ed. Scalapino, p. 52.
66New York Times July 27, 1950, Sec.l, P• �.
,
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and that the weather, the rainy season having started,
made modern mobile .warfare e�tremely difficult.67 The

newspaper also reported that although the North Koreans

were supposed to have had large stocks of weapons they
did not replace their destroyed t�nks by new ones,68
and another point of interest was that."the North

Korean Army had not carried out its mobilization plan
at the time the war began June 25..

•

•

A similar

interpretation of the unpreparedness of the North

Koreans is put forward by General Dean who had seen

many North Korean soldiers pitifully armed with pitch
forks and homemade weapons.70 According to Allens.

Whiting, a specialist on the Chinese participation

in the Korean War, the North Koreans had not received

any tanks or heavy equipment until April, 1950, which

gave them little time to train, equip, and organize an

army which was not familiar with modern Russian weapons. 7 1
67�., June 25, 1950, Sec. l, p. 21.
'68Ibid., July 30, 1950, Sec. 1 9 P• l.
G9Ibid., July 31, 1950, Sec. 1, P• l.
70Dean and Wardon, p. 10?.

7lAllen S. Whiting, China Crosses the Yalu (New
!ork: Macmillan, i960), p. 43.
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Much attention has also been fixed on reports,
produced by the United Nations observers in connection
with the outbreak of the war.

One such statement, offer

ed a day before the start of hostilities, informed the
New York headquarters that:·
No reports, • • • have been received of any
unusual activity on part of North Korean forces
that would indicate any impending chanee in general
situation along parallel.
South Korean commanders• • • • instructions
do not go beyond retirement in case Qf attack
upon previously prepared positions.?�
It is obvious that this party of observers saw nothing
of any suspicious nature; a very probable conclusion

considering that this group, which was responsible for
observing the situation along the one hundred ei5hty
five miles of the 38th parallel, consisted of three
members,73 only one being a military officer possibly
capable of detecting a concealed atmosphere of im
pending bellieerency.

The United Nations had never

dispatched a large group of observers into the field·
and this party of three, representing U.N.C.O.K., had
supposedly carried out the impossible task of in

specting the military situation along the 38th parallel

72u.s.,

Depar�ment of State, United States Policy
in the Korean Crisis 1 9 0 Publication 3922, Far
.Eastern Series 34 Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government
Printing Office 9 1950)• p. 22.
73Gordenker, p. 298.
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within a two week period.

Such an operation could.

never have been much more than a farce con,.,idering the

,,

number of men involved and the size of the area to be
investigated.

A day after the completion of this U.N.C.O.K.

observation tour the war.commenced.

Not even one

United Nations observer witnessed the start of hostil
ities as the Commission, bedded- down in Seoul, was in
formed of the North Korean attack by the Foreign

M.inister of the South Korean Government about eight

hours after the invasion·bee;an,

The official report

to United Nations headquarters i made a little over

two months later ? informed the world 'body that:

On Sunday, 25 June 1950 J at 1:30 p.m. (Korean
Time), [U.N.C.O.K.] was officially informed by the
Foreign Minister of the Republic of Korea that
the territory of the Republic had been invaded
early that morning by the a.rmed forces of the
North Korean authorities� and was still und�r
attack along; th� 38th para.llel of latitude."14

Note that U.N.C.O.K. Officials were not spectators to
the attack.

It also seems that they were being ignored

by the Seoul government for they were not informed of

the invasion until the American Ambassador Muccio had

already reported the early morning's events to
Washington.75

74u.N., Department of Public Information, Yearbook
of the United Nations, 1950 (New York: 1950), p. 251.
75Goodrich, p. 104. U.S., Department of State,
United States Policy in the Korean Crisis, P• 11.

128
.Although U.N.C.O.K.'s responsibilities were "to

observe and report any developments which might lead to
or otherwise involve military conflict in Korea, 11 76

they failed to notice any preparations for a larse

scale invasion, even with the fluid mi�ration of refugees

crossing the border.

Realizing that the approximately

ei3hty-fiv� members of U.N.C.O.K. lived in Seoul this
lack of surveillance is understandable, and as field

observation was almost null, would it not have been

possible for a larger than usual grcup of South Korean
soldiers to have entered enemy-territory?

Considering

that both sides had made numerous previous incursions

on to the others prope:rty, might not a lare;er 'than

usual foray by South Korean forces have provoked the

North Korean co�manders into a premature all-out attack
a5ainst the south?

If zuch·an incident cid occur it seems probable

that the K.M.A.G., which was directing the South Korean

Army and which was acting as an advisory body to those
troops closest to the border, would have planned. or at
least have had knowledge of this venture.

But, since

the capture of an American soldier in North Korea

would have been difficult to explain, it is unlikely

76U.S., Department of State, The Record on Korean
Unification, p. 85.
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that American advisers rp.oved north.

Correspondent

Lloyd Norman in the June, 1960, issue of Army reports

,,

that "the :R.OK 17th Regiment, first.to take the brunt

of the attack, had five U.S. advisors who were flown

out [ of the combat area] in .two Army liason planes. "77
It seems strange that these Americans who would have

been needed to keep the South Korean ranks together

in face of the advancing enemy were removed., but this

action would be quite juGtified if the ROK 17th

Regiment had taken. t•the brunt of the attack" while
north of the 38th parallel •

.Accepting the interpretation

that the invasion was a surprise and, considering that
the military situation throughout South Korea was

completely chaotic, especially in the air where the

North Korean air force went unchallenged, the swift
and supposedly unplanned air rescue of the two
a.dvisors b0comes somewhat of a my5tery.78

77Lloyd Norman, "Washington's 'iar," �, X
(June, 1960), 44.
78K. Sawyer ., Milita.r":?' Ad.viso�:·s :in Korea: KMAG
in Peace and War 9 Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government
Printing Office, 1962), pp. 114-115. The official
KMAG historian describes the military events of the
day but does not give any reasons for ·the removal of
the two advisors. While plans had been prepared for
the evacuation of American nationals in danger of loss
of life a similar program had never been established
for K.M.A.G. officials. Contrary to Washington's
o:::-ders Ambassador Muccio directed K.M.A.G. officials
to evacuate their forces from Korea but this command
was swiftly reversed by orders from the Pentagon.
�-, PP• 112, 121.
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Other obscurities surrounding the attack concern

the operations of K.M.A.G. and its personnel.

During

the late spring of 1950, K.M.A.G. was involved in a

�\

changeover of its top personnel, most of whom returned
to the States.

It is possible that the North Korean

goYernn:ent saw thj_s transitional period as an opportunity

to destroy the South Korean forces, but it also appears

that the Seoul Government feared the possibility of

military abandonment "since the United States appeared

to be losing interest in the milttary defense of the

Republic of Korea, [and] K.M.A.G.'s future was at best
On the da.y th.at the hostilities sta:i:·ted
the acting K.M.A.G. comma.nder,8 Colonel Wright, was

dubious. u79

°

in Tokyo awaiting his impending transfer, but he was
im.I!lcd.iately ordered be.ck to Korea.

While Wright had

been with K.H.A.G. since 1948, during which time be

familiarized himself with all phases of Korea, especially
its terrain, he was lar,er relieved of his duties and
left Korea on August .1.�, 1950. 81 It seems strange that
a man with Wrig-,ht' s knowledge of the Korean scene

should. be released from duty when the war was going so

-

79 Ibid., p. 113.

SOThe regular commander had completed his stay
of duty in Korea.
81sa.wyer p. 138.
,
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badly for the United Nations forces.

Possibly his

rele2.se was a result of a communication sent to him on

\

the afternoon of the invasion by General MacArthur in
which the latter told Wright:
· Return to your former positions.
decisions are in the offing. 82

Momentous

While the wording of these two messages appear dubious
enough they- become even more so when K.M.A.G. historian
Sawyer reports that "although several sources [}:right
and his subordinate� mention this second message

[:momentous decisions:J, the writer has not found a
copy in the files available to· me.11 83
What were the "momentous decisions"?

Were they

President Trurr�n•s decision to fight the Communists,
and was this action connected with the recent visit of
imports.nt American officials to the Far East?

In Tokyo,

seven days before the attack, Secretary of Defense
Louis Johnson, and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs-of
Staff ? General Omar Bradley, conferred about military
matters with the Commander-in-Chief of the American
forces in Asia, General Douglas MacA.rthur.84 At the
same ti r.ie, a former American R-epresentative to the
82Appleman, p. 40.

83sawyer, p. 125.
84Norman, "Washington's War," 43.
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United Nations, and a consultant to the Secretary of
State i John Foster Dulles was visiting the Republic
of Korea and, its famous 38th parallel.

In his book,

War or Peace, which was published in early 1950 9 Dulles
expressed his belief that "in South Korea we have

responsibilities due to the fact that we were in

occupation of that-area and primarily sponsored its
transition to independence.11 8 5

On June 19, six days

before the attack, Dulles told the South Korean

National Assembly:

The American people give you their support,
both moral and material, consistent with your
own self-respect and your primary dependence on
your own efforts.
You are not alone. You will never be alone
a3 lon� as you continue to play worth-whilg your
part in the great design of human freedom. 6

Finally, on the day of the attack, Dulles in Tokyo cabled
the State Department that "to sit by while Korea is

overrun by unprovoked armed attack would start a dis

astrous chain of events leading most probably to world

war.n 8 7

The Dulles episode raised many questions in

the minds of numerous observers around the world.

French reaction was subsequently described by historian
85John Foster Dulles, War or Peace (New York:
The MacMillan Co., 1950), p. 231.
86Goodrich,
p. 85.
87 orman, "Washington• s War " 45.
9
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A exander Werth:
Many French observers .felt that the whg�e
thing vrasn't quite above board; ire Dulles'
visit to Korea and to the 38tu parallel only a
few days befor� the .outbr a se me "curious
coincidence; 11 �';1
Another incident whic. may, or may not, be relevant
to the dubious atmosphere of the attack t was presented
by writer, John Gunther.

While a guest of General

MacArthur� in Tokyo, Gunther was told by an officer
;;vho had just returned from a telephone call concerning
the attack:
A big story has just brokep
Koreans have attacked N. Korea.�◊

The South

Who was initially responsible for the events of
June 25?

On June 26 ? the events of the previous day

seemed less important than the plea made by the South
Korean National Assembly to the President and the
Con�ress of the United States:

11

We appeal for your

increasing support and ask that you at the same time
88This was the same John Foster Dulles, who, as
Secretary of State in the Eisenhower cabinet advocated
that the United States Government "make it publicly
known that it wants and expects liberation to occur 9 "
in the Communist countries, cited in John Spanier�
American Foreign Policy Since World War II ("A Praeger
Paperback;" New York: Frederick A. Praeger, Publisher,
1962) ? P• 100.
89:__ exander Werth, France, 1940-1955 (New York:
He· �y R t and Co., 1956), P• 471.
90Gunther, p. 165.
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extend effectively and timely aid in order to prevent
this act of destruction of world peace."9l

it was now time for the Seoul Government to wait;

the world and the United States had been notified of

the events of June 25.

History had immediately shifted

from Korea to Washington where the leaders of the United

S ates contemplated their future moves.

The status-quo

had been broken; something had.to be done.

9lu.s., Department of State, The Record on Korean
Unification, p. 94.

CHAPTER V
THE KOREAN WAR.

'\

The American View of the War

'

There was no question as to the United States
coming to the aid-of the South Koreans in repelling
the invaders.
essary.

A plea for aid was completely unnec

The only questions were on the nature of the

aid and, how the United States was to effect it,
through a collective approach or unilaterally.

This

!
examines the American inter
is apparent to anyone \ho

pretation of the war.

T e Ju..Yle 25, attack was vi e1,-ed by Washington as
J

a calcu1 ated Russian offensive in the continuing world
contest between the Soviets and the Americans.

i dea that the N ort

The

Korean action might have been

interpreted as an unfolding civil war, rather than an
unprovoked attack on South Korea was never seriously
entertained.by American officials.

Few Americans

q· stioned the explanation offered by President Truman
on the Communist movements:

"The attaclc upon Korea

makes it plain beyond all doubt that communism has
passed beyond the use of subversion to conquer independent
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nations a.nd will use armed inYasion and war.111
Truman j_ t was· obvious that

To

we were fighting in Korea
for our own national security and s.urvival. 112 The
11

American president viewed the attack in a similar
light to the aggressions of the thirties, and believed
that if force was not met by appropriate action another
World war would b& imminent.

According to Truman, the

Russians, like the Nazis before them, were gambling
on the assumption that no one would challenge their
7.

military moves.�

Before discussing the action taken

by the United States, we should attempt to see if
military acts by Russia warranted such an interpretation
as put forward by the President.
If we are to accept the Russian age;:r.ession thesis
advanced by Truman ani. his adviso:cs then it seems quite
logical that the strategists in Moscow should have
selected an area for its !llilitary action which was
not so obviously close to a large concentration of
Ameri,e.n forces.

In June, 1950, American troops were

scatter d thinly throughout the world, except in two
areas, Western Europe and Japan.

Accepting the belief

1u.s., Departme�t of State The Record on Korean
t
Unification, p. 99.2Truman, p. 389.
3Ibid., p.
355.
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that Russia would want a swift victory, why would she
attack Korea, which was so close to Japan, instead of
',,

advancing an :nvasion against Iran� Afghanistan ?
South-East Asia,4 or other such vulnerable areas?
American officials were not ignorant of this fact, for
according to the then Army Chief-of-Staff, General J.
Lawton Collins:

The Communists picked the worst place in the
world at that time to start a war •• o It was
one place to which we could move troops quickly,
The Communists c9uld not have picked a place more
favorable to us. '.J
Not only is it unlikely that Russia would want to attack
Korea but it is very doubtful whether the Soviets antici
pated inva ing any country at that particular time.
Although the R�ssians were developing their atomic and
hydrogen bombs they were primarily concentrating on
the development of defensive weapons as "they labored
under the illusory concept that we were building to
strike them there [Eu.rep� •n 6

Soviet apprehensions

on being attacked by American forces and the absence of
se�ious thinking concerning offensive wars was also
4Lloyd Norman 9 "Lightening•Joe Talks,"
(June, 1960), 50.
5Ibid.

!EN_ X

6charles A. Willoughby and John Chamberlain,
Mac,_rthur 1941-19 1 (New York: McGraw-Hill fiook
Company, Inc., 1954-, p. 358.
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elucidated in a paper presented·to an American military
studies group.
•\

In it the author stated that during

the post-war period the Soviets put more stress on the
manufacturing of s or··--range "defense fie;h ters n than
on any other aerial weapon.7 - Nevertheless, knowing
that the Soviet state was ill-prepa.red for an offensive
war ? the United States under the direction of President
Truman prepared itself end·its allies to meet the
situation in Korea on the grounds that it was an act.
of Russian aggression.
The armed forces of the United States seriously
undermined by public pressure for demobilization ever

since V-E day, and beca�se of American reliance on,its
new atomic stockp::.le,was now augmented.

Military

strategists believed that the arreed services were
dangerously undermanned and were far below the accepted
standards for combat readiness, b t they were not in
a position before June 24, 1950, to do anything because
of public opposition to rearmament.

But the American

people responded immediately to Truman's plea for
assi A:m__ ce � and on June 28, Congress extended the draft

and Jassed legislation making it easier to call up the
Nat·onal G· ard.8 Whereas on July 1 9 1950, Army strength
7Peter Ogloblin� The Korean Wa r (Cambridge,
Massachusetts: Massachusetts Institute of Technology,Press
958) ') P• L. •
8Truman, p. 338.
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stood at 593,000 men, the lowest figure since World

War II� a year later it had climbed to 1,532,000, and
•·'

in July, 1952, the Army reached a wartime peak at
l c; 596 ., 000 men.9 In 1950 the three armed services had

a total of 1,500,000 men and this increased to 3�500,000
by the end. of the we.r.10 mhis buildup in men was paralleled
by an increase in �efense e�penditures which rose from
$14-08 billion in 1950 to $56.9 billion by 1952.11

�eedless to say this spending of federal funds was a

gr��c stimu ant to the American economy which was in
the midst of a recession.12 But not all of America's

military and economic might was directed towards Korea.

As Washington bel"eved that the events of June 25,

were directed

rom Moscow� American policy-makers feared

possible invasions e sewhere and consequently took

military and political precautions throughout the world,

espv.:;ially in South-East Asia.

A day after the attack

President Truman ordered the American 7th Fleet into

9Dean Acheson� Power and Diplomacy, (Cambridge,
l'Iassachusetts: Harvard University :Press ') 1955), p. 57.

lOFoster Rhea Dulles, America's Rise to World Power,
1898-19� ( nHarpe_ Torchbook"; 'Nev'7 York and Evanston:
'arper � Row Pub ishers, 1963), p. 259.
11Henry B. Parkes and Vincent P. Carosso, Recent
America: Since 1933 (New York: Thomas Y. Crowell Company,
1963)� P• 378e
12An excellent analysis of the American economy during
��e Korean War is given in Harold G. Vatter, The U.S.
�_:-�"-OffiY in the 195o•s ("Norton"; 1ew York: w.-w. Norton
0ompany, 963;, PP• 63-97.
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the Taiwan Straits in order to guard Formosa from a

:.'ossible invasion from mainland China, and introduced
a new program of increased. military and financial aid
.for South-I-Dast Asia.

In order to establish a counter

balance to Co:nmunist China efforts were accelerated to
sign a 1)ea.ce treaty with Japan, which was finally

accom9lished in September, 1951.

"Urgency has [ now]

been given to the negotiations of a peace treaty with
Japan, n1 3 stated Secretary Acheson to the Senate Armed
Services and Foreign Relations Committee dealing with

General MacArthur's dismissal •. And to ease the 'burdens
of the American forc0s in Europe, the West German

Republic was asked to supply military forces for the
defense of the Continent even t.ou�h the Bonn govern
ment did not officially join N.A.T.O. until 1955.

Further moves were ma.de to strengthen. Western Europe

when American troops were rea.died for Continental duty
and e.llieo were urged to contribute addi tione.l forces
to the defense of their homelands.

In order to strengthen

·washington' s position in the world-wide contest against

Communist aggression-, N.A.T.O. forces were unified under

an Ai:i.erican cbmmander�

Unofficially General Dwight D.

Eisenhower took over command of the Allied .forces during

98.

l3nAcheson Report�" Current History, XXI (1951),
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the Brussels Conference of foreign ministers on

December 19, 1950, and officially he became SHAPE

'

\

,
(Supreme Headquarters, A-lied
Powers in Europe) command
er on April 2 9 ofth e following year.14 Thus 9 the
United State 5 , not only increased its own, and its
Allies' strength� but also rearmed its former enemies
in order to combat the rising threat of Communist
aggression.,
At the outbreak of the Korean 1'·Itar, because the
United States was the established leader of the West
and the dominent power in the United Nations� Washington
decided that American inte�csts could be best advanced
/
7 d. organization.
within the fr2.;nework of the �or_

According to Pres·dent Truman� the Korean situation
"was the test of all the ta l k of the last five years

of collective securitye" l 5

Nearly a year later, in

June, 1951� Secretary Acheson reiterated his superior's

words:

"This was a test which would decide whether our

coll0ct:ve security system would survive or would
crumb.,.i.e. ,,16 In the contest between East and 'J!est the
14Gc:nera l Eisenhower head:ed SHAPE for only one year
as he �ef t that office to seek the Republican nomination
for President. He_was replaced by another American�
General Matthew B. Ridgway.
15Truman, P• 334.
1611�cheson Report," 98.
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American President made it quite clear to his allies
that he would use all possible means to combat this
,,

communist attempt to change the status quo; the United
States "considered the Korean situation vital as a

symbol of -the strength and determination of the West.11 1 7

Another reason for the establishment of an United

Nations--United States entente goes back to November,

1947, when the Republic of Korea had become the

responsibility of the United Nations.

Therefore the

Co.c.:.:.un · st invasion of South Korea could be viewed as
an attack on the principles of the.United Nations and
a challenge to the concept of collective security.
In Defense of South Korea
Froo the moment that A!'.lbassador Muccio styled the
North :rorean action as
the :.:tepublic of Korea 9

11

n

an a

18

1-ou-t

offensive against

t e American Government19

beian to bui_d its case against the Pyongyang Government
as the age;ressor; the perpetrator of an nunprovoked
17Truman

9

p. 339c

�8u.s., Department of Stat�� United States Policy
iL the Kore�n Crisis, 1950, p. 2 1.
19For a list .of the major officials responsible
fo� the direction of American policy during the Korean
\'ar see Appendix�B�·P• 211.
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attack n 9 20the agent of th
domination.
,\

Communist drive to world

The initiation of this policy became apparent

when Ernest; A. Gross, the America.n Deputy Representative
to the United Nations ? after being briefed by White
House officials, asked United Nations Secretary General
Trygve L'e for an emergency session of the Security
Council, because the "attack of the forces of the North
Korean regime • • • constitutes a breach of peace and
an act of aggression.tt 21

At the meeting Gross further

declared:
It is an inva.sion upon a State which the
United Nations itself, by action of its General
Assembly, has brought into being. It is armed
aggression against a government elected under
United Nations s1pervision.
Such an attc::.c!c strLr es at the fundamental
.:..
purposes 0£ the un�ted
Natious Charter. Such an
attack openly defies the interest and authority
of the United Nations. Such an attack, therefore,
concerns the vital interest which all the members
of the United Nations have in the organization. 22
The American delegate a so proposed that the North
Korean Army withdraw its troops from south of the 38th
parallel ..
20After Nort Korean planes had attacked Kimpo
Airport in.Seoul, an American official on the spot was
reported to have said: "This t-hing is serious. They
strafed an American nlane. That's destruction of
merican property." -Caldwell 9 p. 168.

1u.s., Department of State, American Foreign
�olicyq 1950-1922, 11, Publication 644-6 9 General
Foreign Policy Series 117 (vvashine;ton 9 D.C.: U.S.
Government Printing Office, 1957), p. 2537.
22 , .d
. ::n. •
2
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Using Article 1, Cla�se 1� of the United �ations
'.)

,\

...

Charter,�� the Security Council ? minus the Soviet delegate
who was boycotting the world organization,24 by a vote
of 9-0 with Yugoslavia abstaining, adopted the American
proposal calling for the withdrawal of North Korean
forces from South Korea. 25

President Truman promptly

thanked the Security Council for its swift action26 and
assured it that the United States, acting in accordance
with the resolution, would "vigorously support the
effort of t e Council to terminate this serious breach
23 or Article l, Clausel of the United Nations
?
Charter 9 see App�ndix �? p. 201.
24On July 27 the Soviet representative to the
9
Security Council, Jacob Malik ? retur!1ed to his seat
after his country had terminated its six month boycott
against the United Nat�ons in protest against that
organization's decisio� not to admit Communist China.
2 5u.N., Departmert of Public Information, Yearbook
of the United -ations 9 1950 9 p. 2220 For excerpt from
Resolution o June 25 ? 1950� see Appendix A 9 p. 201-202.
20 rt appears that the legality of United Nations
:i.nvol ve:-:1ent in the Korean War is questionable as both
the constitutions of the North and of the South pro
c_.aim sovereignty over the entire peninsulao This would
me2.n t_at the ensuing conflict was a civil war and there
fo�6 ? �ccording to Article 2 9 Clause 7, of the United
Ka�ions Charter which forbids "the United Nations to
int;e:r· rena in matters which are 'essentially within the
domestic jurisdiction of any state o o o ," the Korean
W2.r would be outslde United Nations jurisdictiono--The
38-ch parallel was ne·ver recognized by the Koreans, and
t�is attitude seemed to be shared by some Americans,
for a pre-war report to the House of Representatives
stated that "military conflict in Korea would mean the
most barbarous civil war." U.S.? Congress, House,
Oo.e:J:iittee · '1. Foreign Affairs 9 Backf5round Information
on Korea 9 ;, • L, 1.
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of the peace." 2 7
By Washington's actions of June 27, it becomes
obvious that the United �ations was now functioning
as an instru�ent of American foreign policy.

On that

day, at 12 noon, P esident Truman announced that he
"ordered United States air and sea forces to give the

Korean Government troops cover and support." 28
American forces h:.::...

Actually

been ordered into action on the

previous day but the announ.cement was delayed in order

to secure the I!lax i mum results from the positioning of
the ships and planes.29 By i.troducing naval and air
forces, Washington had by-passed Article 41 of the
United Nations Uharter which states that peaceful
means be used to restore peace; instead the United

States fo lowed Artie , e 42 of the Charter which calls

fort e use of armed forces only after the belligerents
have failed to comply with the actions initiated by the
previo s article.30 The American Government's
27u.S. Department of State� United States Policy
9
in the Korean Crisis, 1950, pp. 16- .!.7.
28u.s.? Congress, Senate, Coffi!!littee on Foreign
1
Re &tions ? The United States an� the Korean Problem ?
p. 141. UaSo, Department of State, The Record on
Korean Unification, p. 99.
29Norr:ia.n 11 Washi
ngton's 1/Jar, 11 46.
9
-,o
'For Article 41 and 42 of the United Nations
Ch��te� see App ndix A� p. 202.
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interp:: ':;ation of their r,--:ili tary action was explained

by Secretary Acheson when he told a neVJs conference that
,\

".After June 25, • . . all action i Korea has been under
the aegis of the United Nations.1131 The legality of
'Jiashin[-5ton' s use of the United Nat.:.ons is questionable
as t:e U_ited States. did not adhere to the sequential
order of action as -laid down in the United Nations
Charte�, and the Security Council did not call for
military support of the South Korean Government until

10!45 p.m., June 27; 32 ten and three quarter hours after

President Trtman's speech in which he ordered American
naval and air forces into action.
On the afternoon of June 27, the permanent
American delegate to the United Nations, Warren R.
Austin� informed the Security Council that the North
Korean Governoent had iBnored the Council's plea to
wi thdr-aw its forces from the Republic of Ko·rea 1 and
that fighting was still continuing. 33

rea

Ambassador Austin

President Truman's speech offering American aid 9

31u.s.� Congress 9 Hous� Committee on Foreign
Affairs ? -�ackground Information on Korea ? p. 62 •
32u.s., Congress 9 Senate, Committee on Foreign
Relations, The United States and the Korean Problem,
P• 1410

33u.s., Department of State, United States Policy
in t�: Korean C�isis, 1950, p. 23.

11+7

and he proposed that 'l:;he members of the United Nations

assist the Seoul Government in expelling the Communists.
Under Article 2 ? Clause 5, o.r the Charter�34 the Council
adopte· the American pro�osal exactly as stated by
.�ustin 9 35 and promised to II furnish such assistance to
the Republic o

Korea an may be necessary to repel the

armed attack and to restore international peace nnd

security in the area.".,'Z6
. Washington had already acted

on this matter; the Truman Administration was working

overtime during the convenient absence of the SoYiet
de egate to the United Natio s ..
1

'Jhile the American Gover.1ment
carried out its
·'

policies with unprecedented d.ispa tch and by dubious
methods ? it clearly wanted to prevent an escalation of
the conflict into another world war.

This is the

reason w.y Chiang Kai-shek's offer, on July 3, to supply
thirty-three thousand men for the Korean conflict was

tactfully reiused by the American President.

At first

Tru.r'.k'ln h:;d been inclined to accept the Nationalist
).'..t-:or Article 2� Clause 5� of the United Nations
Chart�r see Appendix A, 9. 203 •

35u • .S. , Cone;:cess, House, Comr:ii t-tee on Foreie;n
Affairs l:33.ck,srou11.d Inform.a tion on Korea� pp. 47-48 o
36u.N., Department of Public Information, Yearbook
,,
�f �'::_.. e United Nation��l950, p. 224. For excerpt of
Resolution of June 27, l 950, see Appendix A� p. 203.
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Chinese offer j but after listening to Acheson's argu

ments that such action •.:ould alarm ':Jashinc;ton' s allies
•\

and increase the possibility of Chinese Coi::imunis•t in.
vol vement, the President chant�ed his mind. 37 Another

expresaion of the A�erican desire to limit the scope of

the war caJe by Secretary Acheson when he stated that
11

the action, pur3aant to t}1e Security Council resolution

[of June 27, 1950] is solely for the purpose of restor

ing the Republic of Korea to its status prior to the
invasion from the north.

.

. 1138

This statement was

intended to keep the �llies loyal to the war effort 9

and to pucify posGible 2ussian and Chinese fears of
Americ�n action nort: of the 38th parallel.
After obtaining the sanction of the Security
Council .for rr.ilitary o:9or£tions against the Horth

Koreans, �merican officials through the United Nations
001:122.::.�,

were able to direct the Unlted Nations forces

throughout most of the war.

In orde:-c to co-ordinate

military activities Secretary General Lie su�gested
that the

:i.litary comma d be given to an American who

would. be responsible to a roili tary council composed of
representatives from Auotralia� France, India, New

7.7Appleman, p. 46.

..,1

38 u.s., Department of State 9 United States Policy
�� the Korean Crisis 2 1950, p. 25.

,_..,.•· 9
Za".:.::..dnd, Norway, and �· c.c U:1.itGd K:i.nedom. 39
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forces; 11 0
force.

,::;c:..c,;.'3 to C:.0.�_:___:;·,-...·.:-·>; tJ.:.e CO!llmander of such
'l'ruman named !t-J.c.X:cthur to head this new

Secratary Geaeral I:ie' s su�ge!:ltion \1:ould. have

made the war effort tr· ly s.n UnitecJ. Na·tions action, but
because the Americans su,plied most of the troops
� · side frorr.. t 1e Republic of Korea fore es) and ma tE:!:cial 9
'-hu,h · nston wanted a r lati vely free hand in. directing
the war·.

Therefore t.)e United ilations Com.l!land with·

MacArt::u.r as its head ? received i s orders not from the
world. ox:· 0anization, but from P:cesident Truman 2.nd the
,JoL t Chiefs-of-Staff.

MacA:i:·-',:;hur also reported first

to the '·'ihi te House 0.n-1 t;'1e P0nta,;011, Hnd then to the
officia-.s at Lake Success.

So althoush sixteen nation$

even tun_ ly contri but(�d militHry forcer:-; to the unified
c0m:1and the United States had the dominant role in
direct�n� the course of action, perhaps to a 0reater
egree .., han the Acrer·can contribution warranted.
In crder to respond successful_y
• to the United
Natj_ons resolutions for a'3sistance it becam0 necessary
39Goodrich, p. 119.
40u • ,,.1,, • � D epa -r-t-�-n4Y ear
· b 00 k
.. b.c�.. v ◊-," PU�·-...
,..a-c;1on,
1: 1-:,,.,'-' --. .l....:.o
.... -..__-,.-. •
of t�e �J�ited Eations .. 1$SO, p. �.;,O, "b'or excerpt of
- eso ution of July 7, i.;50-;- S8C L�::::_)c:.-;.c.ix .L., p. 204.
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150
to complement the naval and air units by ground forces.

·\

\\

On J::-=:e 29? Pres.:.dent Truman approved General MacArthur's
req 1.est i'o ...... the use of ground un:.ts� 41 and the bombing
J.
of mil"tary
targets in North Korea. 42

The first

American troops were used primarily to delay the ad
vancing North Koreans while the United Nations Command
built up its forces.

During July and August the

Communist army continued to push the American and
Repub lie of Korean troops towards the southeast corner
of the peninsula, and the seaport of Pusan.
North Korean advance

Here the

as checked and the United Nations

\'!

forces were able to make some modest gains.

Then� on

September 15, MacArthur launched a successful invasion
on the vestern port of Inchon, subsequently slicing
the Nor-ch Korean forces in t·rn.

This markedly eased

the pressure on the beseiged troops in the Pusan
perimeter, and with their eventual breakout and tie
up with the Inchon landing force 9 the United Nations
ar3Y pushed the North Koreans back across the 38th
parallel.

On the last day of September MacArthur's

t�oops were at the 38th parallel; they had triumphantly
resto::-ed "the Republic of Korea to its status prior to
41 Truman, p. 341.
42 1:rorman, "Washington's War," 48.
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the invasion of the north • • • • n 4 3
The United Nations Move North;
th Communist Chinese Move South
Now that the United Nations forces h�d successfully

expelled the North Koreans from the Republic of Korea,

and at the same time destroying much of the Communist
army ? Washin;�ton believed that the war should be ex
tended north of the 38th parallel.44

While the Americans

saw the opportunity of unifying Korea by force, neither
they nor their allies wanted to expand this limited

conflict into a world war.

The United Nations with the

:..
United States bein� the most emphat·c,
assumed that the

war could be contained to the Korean p ninsula because

they did not believe that the Chinese Communists would

intervene militarily in Korea on behalf of the Pyongyang

Govs::-nment.

It seems t 1:at Washington's optimism was

based on three possibilities:

that the Peking Govern-

·c�t was not strong enough to oppose the United Nations

4 3u.s., Department of State, United States Poli£Z,
-� the Korean Crisis 2 1950 ? p. 25.
44-

0n September 11, President Truman agreed that
U�ite iations forces should cross the 38th parallel
ii' the J)roposed Inchon landings of September 15 1 were
successf�l, and if t"he Chinese and/or the Russians
did not enter the war. Truman, p. 359.
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forces and that the Chinese were only bluffing in
order to "save face" in Asia; that United Nations troops
could easily capture North }area before the Chinese
would be able to offer resistance and thus Peking would
be confronted by a fait accompli; or that if the Chinese
did enter the war in time to do any damage they would
be utterly �efeated.

The American project to move

north and its execution were not results of haphazard,
b t; rather of cautious and systematic planning.
One of the most important phases of the American
plan to forcibly unify Korea was the attempt to con
vince the Communist bloc, and especially China 9 that
the United Nations command did not want to extend the
war elsewhere.

As early as June 28, when American

forces first entered the conflict, President Truman
to d a lationc..l Security Council meeting "that oper
ations above t e 38th parallel should be designed only
to des-roy military supplies ? for I wanted it clearl,v·
understood that our operations in Korea were designed

to �c2to�e peace there and to restore the border." 4 5
A cou,le of day's later 9 Seer e tary Acheson publicly
echoed the P esident's words by presenting his own

interpretation of the situation in his "return to the
45Truman� p. 341.

1 53
status quo" speech. 46

These two soft approaches con-

cerning the containment of the war were swiftly followed

by a proposal made by the American representative in
the Security Council in which he warned that outside

interference on behalf oft h e North Koreans might en
large the conflict.47 Even as late as October 1,

the day that the first United Nations troops crossed
the 38th parallel, President Truman directed a plea

to mainland China in which he hoped that "the people

of China will not be misled or forced into fighting
aBainst the United Nations and against the American

people� who have always been and still are their friends. 1148
The Americans seemed to have believed they had scared
the Chinese and Russian Conµnunists� if perhaps only

momentarily from entering the conflict, and therefore
prepared to cross the 38th parallel.

This belief

became obvious when the American representative to the
Security Council attempted to rationalize his government's viewpoints on the mora- .::,',rounds
of a threat to
'
46Supra, P� 148.
l.!·7u.s., Department of State ? United States Policl
!� �he Korean Conflict, Jul . 1 950 to Februarv,l 2 1g51 '
Publication 4263, Far Eastern Series
' 44 ( Washington,
D.C.: U.S� Government Printing Office, 195l) i P• 11.
For excerpt of proposal made on July 31, 1950� see
Appendix A, pp. 204-205.
48wilcox and Kalijarui, p. 422.
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world peace.

According to him, "the aggressor's forces

should not be permitted to have refuge behind an

imaginary line because that would create the threat
to the peace of lCorea and of the worldo n 49

So with relative ease the Americans prepared to.

cross the 38th parallel in thair first attempt to

unify Korea forcibly.

On September 27, the Joint Chiefs

of-Staff ordered MacArthur, as Commander of the United

1\
.-ations

Forces:

lo [T7J o pursue the North Korean Army over
the 38th parallel :.n order to utterly defeat them
2. to establish Syngman Rhee as President
of the unified cou�try
3. to stay clear of Kanchuria and U.S.S.R.
4o to use only Korean troops alo�g the
northern border reg�ons.
5. to retreat south of the 38th paralle1
if large Russian-Chinese forces [are] sig.h ..-ed. 50

Fov.r c..· o.ys after ItacArthur received his orders

troops of t�e Republic of Korea under the United

1ations Command, accompanied by an American advisor, 5 1

unceremoniously crossed the 38th parallel, and moved
nort

0

52 Because MacArthur believed that the South

49Goodrich, p. 130.
50Appleman, p. 607.
51New York �imes ? October 2, 1950, p. 4.
52General MacArthur wanted to broadcast the news
of the United Nations movement across the 38th parallel
but this request was vetoed by Secretary of State
¼arshall, who preferred to see the results of the move
before commenting on ito Truman, Po 3610 General
MacArthur moved his troops across the 38th parallel
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Korean forces were not capable of defeating the

Comnunist army 9 and inasmuch as the General Assembly

i
had resolved that "a�l
appropriate steps be taken to
ensure conditions of stability throughout Korea ,_ 11 53

American troops entered North rorea on October

7.54

On the days that Mac rthur launched his prima::t·y and
secon ary invasions into Nert

Korea he issued state

ments demanding the unconditional surrender of the

routed North Korean army�55

s the -nited NatiO!S fo�ces swiftly moved north

towards the North KoreE,n capital of Pyongyang ? President

Truman decide

that this was the appropriate time to

m et General r�!acArthur in order to get a f · rst-hand

report on the military situation; especially the

six �ays before the General Assembly passed the resolu
tion giving him such authorityo The General Assembly
too�.-: ovGr the responsibilities of the Security Council
wh�n the use oi the Soviet veto rendered the Council
use l ss. fJhiting ? p. 113.

53For excerpts of the Resolution of October 7 ? 1950,

s e Appendix A� p. 205. The legality of this resolu
tion and the subsequent events are quite questionable
as it was not ur.til November 5 ? that the General
Assemb_y accepted the American proposal that the former
relieve the Security Council of its responsibilities
concerning the Korean ;ar.
5!''Appleman
·
? p. ?22.

55u.s., Department of State, United States Polic.r

i� t�2 :-orean Conflict, p. 16. Canada, Department of
External Affairs 9 Docur.1ents on the Korean Orisj_s
(Ottowa: King's Printer and Controller of Stationary�

1951)? P• 7.
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intelligence reports concernin3 Chinese troop movements
in Manchuria. On October 15 i5 6 the President flew to

,,

Vlake Island in the Pacific where }.:ac��rthur, confident

of victory by Thanlrngi ving, dispelled Truman's anxieties
over possible Chinese or Russian intervention.57. The

General believed that if the Chinese intervened they

would be slaughtered because of their lack of air
support.

Similar opinions were held by the Joint Chiefs

of-3taff ? ad plans were drawn up for the transfer of

troops from Korea to Europe as soon as they became

available.

Reassured that the United Nations forces would

be able to unify Korea, and that the Chinese would not

come to the asf3istance of tho Pyongyang government,
President Truman returned ho1'e. 58

Nine days after the Wake Island Conference, on

October 24 ? tee United Nations Comm.a_d ordered most of
its troops nor-t;h because the roundins up of the last

rerr.::.:.ants of the North Korean forces was progressing
too slowlyo59 During the next week MacArthur continued
c:.5
,,, Altlough the Chinese Communist troops entered
No��h Korea on October 14th they did not come into
C. '-·-�·cact with United N tions forces until October 25th.
Whiting, Po 116.
57Appleman 9 p� 7600 The grounds for Truman's
anxieties over the possible Chinese intervention are
discussed infra, p. 158-159.
58-, .d
p. 761.
59Goodrich, p. 140;
�0?
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to puCTh hio troops further north and contrary to
Washingt;on' s promise to its Allies of deployif-'� only
•\

\

Korean troops neP� the Manchurian border, th

.-:neral�

ignoring the Pe����on's orders, moved American troops
into border pos.i tions. 60 The over-confident MacAr'chur
became slightly appre.h.ensive when his ad-vance uni ts

reported sighting Chinese forces, and on November 5,

the General notified the United Nations that nit is

apparent to our fighti:r.s forces ? and our intelligence
agencies he VG confirmed the fact, that the United
Nations are pre::3ently :i.n hostile contact with Chinese
Communist military uni-ts

. .

.

"

MacArthur and many others were surprised that the
Pekins Government had o:!'derecl its troops into Korea
although the Chinese had never masked their opinions
To the Communists, intervention was

on this point.

a way of cnhan�ing their rising influence in Asia for
"Pekinc=; could [not] as•)ire to Asian leadership so long

as i l::; appeared unwi 1.ling� or unable, to influe!lce
events on ·.ts borde:cs. 11 62 If the Communists refused

60c1ark Lee and Richard Ee�schel, pour5la� J,.iacArthur
(New York: Henry Holt and Company, 1952;, p. 209e
61c�nada Department of �xternal Affairs, Documents
?
on the K0rP-an Crisis, p. 9.
62Vhiting p. 50.
1
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to acknowledge the plight of the North Korean govern

ment the Peking officials vould stand out as hypocrites.

They would be contradicting Aao Tse-tung's famous dictum
that

11

the peop_cs of lLl cotL.""'..tries menaced by U.S.

ag_�ression should uJ1ite and strug3le against the

attacks of the U.S. reactionaries and their running
doss in these countries." 6 3 By the middle of August
Peking had decided to go to war.64

The first indication of the Chinese Communist's

interest in the Korean conflict appeared in the July
26 9 issue of a Peking newspapero

It charged that the

Americans were in --·oro· "to c· ange it into a gangway

of agsress·on
for the United States on the borders
l
of China and the Soviet Uniono" 6 5

As the United rations

forces moved towards the 38-c' parallel the Chinese

stepped up their warnin;s a5ainst extending the war

to North Koreao

In late September, the Acting Chief of

Staff of the Chinese Communist army informed the

Indian amba3sador to Peking that the Chinese govern
ment woul

not "sit back with folded arms and let the

63 .Anne I1're□antle (ed.), J,1a.o •rse-tung: An Anthology
of His ':Jri tipgs ( "Mentor Hook"; New York:: New American
Library, l'J62) ? p. 1780 .Mao's remark was made to Aoeri
can Corr0spondent Anna Louise Strong in August, 1946.
Ibid.
,... t::

o::,Ib:i.d.

i

P•

57.
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Arr erican�; come to the [Chinese] border. " 66

In another

o.iscus;;ion between the Inclian diylomat and a Peking

official� this time Forei;::;n rnnister Chou En-lai, the

\

ambassador was tole. by Chou that the Chinese did not

care ii' South Korean troops crossed the 38th _parallel�

but that PekinB vehemently opposed similar action by
the Aaericans.67 One of Cbou's strongest verbal attacks
came the day before the first United Nations forces

crossed the 3Bth paralle� whsn he stated that "the

Chinese people •• - wil) not supinely tolerate seeing

their neighbors being s;:;.. vagely invaded. by the imperial1.•

�.

ntc, u 68

,.:..

Although .American officials were not ignorant

of Peking'o opinions and the warnings from New Delhi,

they c.ismissed them as being Groundless· that is until

Mac.Arthur discovered. tJ.12.t they were genuine.

Vlhen it became obvious to MacArthur that the Chinese

.

,�.,;::_.,-:.
_,
• \....,.J. . \:-

in Korea he immediately sought to check the infil-

t::::-c..t�on at the source.

He requested that VJashin1ston

ap,rove his plan to bo1� the bridges over the Yalu

R::.vc-::: i the bo"tl:'.dary between Manchuria and Korea, in order

to stop t!le southward flow of additional men and machines.
66-L.,_,; a

�Q ,

67l(. iJ. Pani:.(kar, In Two Chinas (London: George
Allen & Univin Limited, 1955), p. liO. The author was
tne Indian Ambassador to Peking during the Korean war.
681uni
,n •
t 1.• r_g p. 9:z,,1•
?
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Th3 JoiLt Chiefs-of-Staff acknowledged the situation,

but ordered Mac.rthur to destroy only the south end of
the brid6cs�

This limited response was the result of

the continuins A crico.n policy to stay wit;hin t •,•.:.�

framevwr: of the Un·1. ted l'Tat::.ons ? and not to extend t h e

war beyond the

orean penins ,.'-" lao

The orders from the

Pentagon were clarified for MacAr�hur in a State Depart
m2,:1t coomunique' which explained that:

Because of the necessity for maintaining
opti::-..:--.::'.!l position w·1. th .,_he United Nations policy
and directives and because it is vital in the
national interests of the UoS. to localize the
fighting in Korea it is important that extreme
care oe t ken to avoid violation of Manchurian
territory and ai�space and to rguort promptly
hostile ction� rroo M nchur a.·9
During iovembe_, t e

ited Nations forces made

cont2..ct; wit: an increasing nu.:::iber of Chinese Communist

units which

h ad

crosse d the frozen

by t�e third ueek of ��e mo�th ther

alu rivero

But

had still been

no larse direc�- conf'ronta tions with the new belligerents.
bout this

,_

ime reports began to appear in Washington

sugges�_ng the possibility of giving Red China a seat

at t�

United Nations if Peking removed its troops from

Ko�e· o?O

l
This possibil·ty
became purely academic when

69,:-,.:-uman, p. 376. During the War the Communists
used l\�anchuria as a sanctuary and a supply depot while
the United Nations sa.:'ely used Japan and Okinawa for
simi-ar reasons.
70Lee and Ee~schel ~ P • 2 11 0
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O!l.

November 24 9 tacArthur ordered his "end the war"

offensive; it tm:-�ed into a nightmare when, two days

later the Chinese cut through Ha.cL::-thur's thin line

\

of de�ense and -rove �he disjointed United Nations forces
sou-'-h., 71 On Doc ember 1 � t... e United Nations 9 possibly

to

how the Chinese Com!D.unists that it int nded to keep

its troops in North Korea� or as a n gative response

attempting to salvage the territory held by the United

Nations forces 9 called for the establishment of an

agency which would be :::-.�sponsi u le for the rehabilitation
vf Koreao

This organiz tion 9 named tne U!l.ited Nations

Xorean Reconstruc Jcion Agency (U.N.K.B.A.) 72 was later
to be headc

by a reti�ed Americ�n general� Jon B.

Cou .... \;er 9 who was a lor:'.: time friend of Syngman Rhee. 73

The establishment of t1is orJa�ization strengthened

the Peking Gov rnment's conviction that t�e Americans

had to be driven from North Korea.

The Chinese

7�-i'!hen t;Le Chinese Comr:mnist Army swept south a
z;rc,·'--) of A!'D.erican.s � led by former president 9 Herbert
Eocvar ? advoccted that the United Nations forces pull
out of the " 1�dei'ensible 11 peninsula and regroup in
.;0.9:. ::..o l:rom Japan they would then launch an invasion
o: ��� C��nese ma"nlando Harold Mo Vinacke ? The
U:·_ _
__ ·"'s and t>:�_ ?e.r :S:?..s_:b ·19L!-5-19_2l (Stanford:
s����o�� 0cive=sity Pr SS 9 1952), Po 1030
72u.N.� Department of Pub ic Information, Yearbook
9f the United Natioµs 2 1950 ? p. 280. For excerpts of
Reso ution of Dece�bor 1, 1950� see Appendix A 9 pp. 206-207.
7::,Heeve p. 115.
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Com�unists cculd not accept a status quo whereby un
friendly forces would be within striking distances of
its industrial complexes in !.1anchuria.
r:;:1rUffian vs. I:.a c.Art�_._r
Vith some of the American m11·tary leaders and the
Truman administration already at odds over the method
of fighting the Korean War there was a further widening
of opinions when the Chinese Communists entered the
conflict.

While the White House and the Pentagon con

tinued to believe that the war should be limited to
the Korean peninsula, EacArth r and his followers wanted
to extend the war to China, both sides contending that
1.
their uethod was certain of pr0duc·ng
victory.

This

c.i::'.ference of opinions .vas furt er compou..."1.ded by
MacArt:_u.r' s unwillinsn e ss to follow Washington's orders.
�ac_\rthur' s course may well have been influenced by
1is experiences during the Second World War.

During that

wa=· .American military commanders had been allowed to
:.::2.:rn nore field decisions than their counterparts in
t�e other armies; but this was not the case during the
:co::-ean conflict where the Jdministration kept a close
wa.tc

ov r the mi itary situation.

IJfhen the General

ignored �'Jas!lingto!l' s orders in such matters as the
deployment of troops along the Yalu River,74 and the

_57 .
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scope of the var, President Truman interpreted such
actions as a definite challenge to the well-established
principle of civilian control of the military.

\

Further

more� increased. p�blic recos::i.ition of the policy split
might arouse the

merican population into choosing

sides; this would o ly weaken the nation, the adminis
t�at�on, the Democratic Party, the war effort, and the
peace of tDe worldo

Truman recognized the confrontation

but as L1acArthur had a large following ? the President
had to wait for a suita

e s��uation to arise before

he could dismiss the Ge�eral :�o� his duties.
i
In addition to the civ::ia�-Ei-�tary
debate the

Truman Administration ��rkedly increased its problems
by accepting the theory that wor:d communism ? in the
guise o_ the Pe:-dng Go 1 0rnmer...t ., r.:as fi ·"mly committed
to �����g the North Koreans.

Ame�ican fears of a

poss:..b::!..e v10rld conf.:..:..c.. t were furt;_ 0r strengthene d by
t�e fact that the Peking Government had recently signed

a m:litary treaty with the Soviets; 75

to President

T�·:.:..::-::.1 "chis meant "that o • • the Chinese were Russian
1 -'- � I'/ 76
The lo�ic of th President's opinion
S ..... ��---uC.:)o
r •

• ·

•

,..-:as co.:.._ ied one

tep further ., \ llhen the Joint Chiefs

of-Sts.f f ., discuss· ng· the possibility of fighting a large

-9500

l

77This w s ·che s::.no-Sovie�G Treaty of February lllr,
,.
•

0

lru.ma~, P• 399.
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war with Communist China, proposed that "the United

States should develop its plans and make preparations

,,

on the basis that the risk of global war is increased."??
The thought of Russia aiding China was not looked upon
favorably by the European allies of the United States

whose borders were within easy striking distance of

the Soviet armies • . Nor, much to the disappointment of

Washington, were the European allies as enthusiastic

about fighting the Chinese in order to.unify Korea as

they had been in fighting the North Koreans.

Consequently

the Truman administration, which did not propose to

stand alone against the growing threat of communism.

had to follow a less ag6ressive policy in the field, a
tighter rein on MacArthur's desire to carry the war
across the Yalu.

As Secretary Acheson explained:

"We cannot expect that our collective security oystem

will long survive if we take steps which unnecessarily

and dangerously expose the people who are in the system
with us. 11 78
To the Truman Administration a wa·r in China loomed

as a nightmare.

Such a war threatened the United

States with the loss of its allies, who not only feared
the possibility of a·Russian military offensive in
??Ibid., P• 378.
7B"Acheson Report, 11 100.
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western Europe, but also the loss of a lucrative trade

which many of the allies, particularly the Commonwealth
,\

countries 1 had built up with the Chinese Communists.

Also the Joint Chiefs-of-Staff could not spare the needed
men for such a gigantic campnign as such a move would

drastically weaken the American commitment in western

Europe.

Not only was there just one Army division,

stationed in the United States, available for immediate
combat duty, but tho call-up and training of the
national guard units could not be accomplished at least

until March, 1951. 79 The Administration•s viewpoint

on a Chinese war was clearly defined, in June, 1951,
by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs-of-Staff, Omar

Bradly when he stated that "to have extended the .fight
ing to the mainland of Asia would have been the wrong
war� at the wrong time, and the wrong place .. 11 80
General MacArthur and his followers, disagreed

with the Administration ''s opinions on China and

limited war; in their view there was no military or

political difference between North Korea and China.

The views of America's European allies carried little
weisht with this group,, as they believed that the

United States was unilaterally capable of handling

79Trwnan, p. 386.

BOibid., P• 446.
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any military situation.

Many of these, especially

the so-called "China lobby" saw the extension of the
'

(I

war as a way of returning Chiang Kai-shek to his
11

rightful place."

..

MacArthur se..w only one way to end

the Korean conflict, and that·was with the uncon-

ditional surrender of all Communist forces in Asia.81
In order to accompl-ish this feat he wanted to bomb
Manchuria• blockade China, and to employ Nationalist
Chinese troops against the mainland.82 MacArthur's
viewpoints were alno shared by most of his subordinate
officers,83 some of who� were to later occupy his
81 rt would seem that MacArthur's long stay in Asia,
which covered an interrupted span of fifteen years, had
made it difficult for him to form a world-wide perspec
tive of the situation.
8211The MacArthur Report," Current Hist;orl, XX (1951),
348.
8 3u.s., Congress, Senate Subcommittee to Investi
?
gate the Administration of the Internal Security Act
and Other Internal Security Laws, The Korean War and
Rela·ted Matters, 84th Cong., 1st Sess., January 2r;IZJ55� p. 8. At these hearings were General Mark Clark,
United nations Commander, 1952-1953; Lieutenant General
George E. Stratemeyer, United Nations Air Force Commander,
1950-1951; General James Van Fleet, Commander of the
American Eighth Army in Korea, 1952-1953; Lieutenant
General Edward M. Almond, Commander of the American
Tenth Corps in Korea, 1950-195lf and Admiral C. Turner
Joy, the senior United Nations delegate to the Korean
peace talks. These gentlemen all agreed with General
MacArthur'o theories on the Korean War, and in addition,
they advocated that the United States abandon the
United Nations, and sever all diplomatic relations
with every Communist country.
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position as Commander of the United Nations forceo.
In opposition to the. beliefs held by the Truman
Administration, MacArthur and his followers did not
think that the United States could provoke the Russians
into a world war, for as General Mark Clark explained:
I do not think you can drag the Soviets into
a world war except at a time and place of their
own choosing. - They have been doing too well in
the cold war. 84
But, it was the Truman Administration and not a
group of military officers and their sympathizers who
governed the United States, so that when a Security
Council resolution offered the possibility of dis
cussions with the Chinese, on how to end the Korean
conflict the American representative to the United
Nations voted for its adoption.

On November 10, 1950,

the Council with Russia's approval, decided "to invite,
• • • a representative of the Central People's Govern-

ment of the People's Republic of China to be present
during discussions by the Council of the Special Report
of the United Nations Command in Korea.11 8 5
84

ill£• t

But this

p. 6.

85u.N., Department of Public Information. Yearbook
of the United Nations 19 O, p. 239. This resolution

was passed be f ore there were any large military con
tacts made between the Chinese and United Nations forces.
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diplomatic move did not deter the Chinese from mounting
their first offensive of the conflict in which United

Nations forces were tragically mauled.

One consequence

of this military action was the adoption of a resolution
by the General Assembly calling for the establishment

of a committee to investigate the possibilities of
a cease-f.ire.86 Such efforts proved fruitless as the
Chinese were not inclined to think in terms of a

cease-fire while their .armies were advancing so
rapidly.

The almost frantic alarm of the West, empha

sized by President Truman•s mid-December declaration of
a state of national emergency, undoubtedly encouraged

Peking in its course.

Peking's stand hardened even

more when, just three weeks later, President Truman

delivered his State of the Union message in which he

appea:ed to the allies for additional military contribu
tions for the Korean effort.87
The Truman Administration, unlike MacArthur and his
followers, realized that the West•s plan to unify Korea

militarily had to·be abandoned, at. least temporarily,
in face of the Chines� onslaught.

Although the effort

to effect a cease-fire can be viewed, in part, as a plan
86rbid., p. 250. For Resolutipn of December 14,
1950, seeAppendix A, p. 20?.
8 7u.s.? Department of State, United States Policy
in the Korean Conflict, p. 32.
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for retaining whatever territory in North Korea that
United Nations forces still held�

~\

But the Chinese

advance, which continued for two months, soon removed
the territorial basis for such an approach.

When

United Nations forces finally checked the Communist
tide the new battle -line was some fifty miles south of
the 38th parallel •.
During the period of Chinese advances the United
Nations committee to investigate the possibility of a
cease-fire ? with Washington's blessings 9 stepped up its
work.

On January 11, the committee issued a supplementary

report which was to be the basis for future consul
tations concerning the armistice.

The report's

main suggestions called for immediate negotiations to
end the conflict, and the subsequent removal of all
foreign troo s from Korean soi1.88 Two days later
these suggestions. in the form of a resolution, were
forwarded to Peking.

From the.Chinese Communist capital

came the response that "the subject matter of the
negotiations must include the withdrawal of the United
States armed forces from Taiwan and the Taiwan Straits
and Far Eastern related problems; • • • • n89

Soon after,

88u .,�., Department of Public Information, Yearbook
of the United Nations, 1951 (New York: 1952), P• 209.
89Ibid., p. 212.

l?O
another condition was added:

"the definite affirmation

of the legitimate status of the People's Republic of

,,

,,

China in the United Nations must be insured.n90

The

high price the Chinese demanded for a cease-fire was
undoubtedly related to the military advantages the

Communists were enjoying in the field.

There are also

the possibi�ities that Peking believed the United

Nations offer to be insincere, and/or that the Chinese
wanted to unify Korea militarily under the Communist
banner.

But the United Nations forces eventually halted

the Chinese drive, and the Americans, in Korea and at

home, immediately launched a military and diplomatic
offensive.

In Korea United Nations forces slowly but

steadily pushed the Communists toward the 38th parallel

and in.some places into North Korea.

In New York� the

American representative to the United Nations, Warren
Austin, also expressed a more offensive line:

in late

January he informed the Peking officials, riyou can't
shoot your way into the United Nations! 11 91

His remarks

to the assembled delegates raised the question of the

90canada Depa�tment of External Affairs, Documents
0
on the Korean Crisis, p. 34. This new demand wa.s de
livered in a communique sent to the Indian Ambassador
in Pekine;.

9 1u.s., Department of State, The Record on Korean
Unification, p. 121.
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feasibility of cease-fire overtures:
It is clear to u� as I am sure it is to most
other members of the United Nations, that the
Peiping reply is another rejection ••••
Would a further appeal contribute to the
authority of the United �ations and the system
of collective security? 9
A few days later the General Assembly decided that
the answer to Austin's question was no; by adopting a
resolution·condemning Communist China as an aggressor
i� Korea.93 But some of the Asian delegations were
not enthusiastic about this action because they were not
wholly convinced that Peking's motives were simply those
of aggression, nor had they forgotten the rather
questionable sanction given to the crossing of the 38th
parallel by United Nations forces.

Unlike these unen

thusiastic delegates the nations contributing forces to
the United Nations effort. in Korea apparently had no
such reservations.

They formed the Committee of Sixteen

which was to serve in an advisory capacity to the American
Cor.m1ander of the United Nations Command.

Clearly one

of its chief functions was to minimize the Chinese
accuc�tions that the Korean War was one of American
impe�ialism, and it possibly also strengthened the unity
of tho United Nation? forces.

92�.

93u.N., Department of Public Information, Yearbook
of the United Nations, 1951, pp. 224-225. For excerpts
of Resolution of February 1, 1951, see Apprndix A, pp.
207-208.
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Th0 differences of opinion between President
Truman and General MacArthur became quite evident during
,\

March when the allies pressed Washington,to make a serious
attempt to end the fighting, now that the Chinese had
been driven from South Korea.

On March 20 9 JacArthur

was ordered by the Joint Chiefs-of-Staff to stabilize
his gains around the 38th parallel in order to be ready
ror
a cease- f.ire.94 With a possible end to the war in
sight Truman was about to tell the American people that
"the Unified Coomand is prepared to enter into arrange
ments which would conclude the fighting and ensure

against its resumption. 1195

But this address was never

broadcast to the American public because on the day
the speech was scheduled, ?acArthur announced that a
great United Nations offensive had been undertaken.96

Once again the General had ignored the orders of his
'
n+
sup C·X'J..OrS i n tr.>.�as h.l.ne,uOn.

By this time President Truman was convinced of
th

necessity for MacArthur's removal and only sought

an appropriate occasion.

The General proved obligins

when he addressed a letter to Republican Joseph W.

94Truman, p. 43�.

95Ibid., p. 4 .
39
96 rr the President had gone on with his speech it
we· �d have looked as if he did not want the United
K���o s to be victorious in Korea.
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Martin, Jr.? minority leader in the House.

In response

to Martin's proposal that Nationalist Chinese troops
be used in Korea 9 MacArthur's letter, which Martin read
to the House on April 5 7 informed the minority leader
that:
Your view with respect to the utilization
of the Chinese forces on Formosa is in conflict
with neither logic nor this [American military]
tradition.
It seecrs strongly difficult for some to
realize that here in Asia is where the Communist
conspirators have elected to make their play for
global conquest, and we have joined the issue
thus raised on the battlefield ? that here we fight
Europe's war with arms while the diplomats there
still fight it with words ? .that if we lose the
war to Communism in Asia the fall of Europe is
inevitable, win it and Europe most probabl�
would avoid war and yet perserve freedom. 9 '/
With this slur upon the Truman administration
MacArthur had once again flouted the President's orders
that American officials should:

"exercise extreme

caution in public statements, to clear all but routine
statements with their departments ., and to refrain from
direct communication on military or foreign policy
with net•rnpapers 9 magazines ') or other publicity media
in the United States."98 Less than a week after

r.1acArthur; s

letter became public ? the President dis

missed the General on the grounds

11

that military

97Rovere and Schlesinger, Po 170.

9�arks and Carosso, P• 375.
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commanders must be 6overned by the policies and directives
issued to them in the manner provided by our laws and

Constitutionv" 99

iacArthur's return to the United States was a

personal triumph.

From the time he landed in San

Francisco until he addressed a joint session of Congress
the American people paid its respects to one of its

great mi litary heroes in an emotional outburst of un

rivalled intensity.

He responded by informing Congress

and the American people that his plan for victory was
the on ly sure way to peace.

Later he told a Senate

Committee 9 inquiring into the reasons for his removal,
that

11

the mi l itary fortunes of America lay in the hands

of men who understood li�tle about the Pacific and

practically nothing about Korea." lOO

But as MacArthur

reitere.ted and elaborated his views to innumerable

aud·e�ccs the image of a great and unfallible general

began nfading away."

Perhaps it was a consequence of

the slow rea l ization by the American peop le that the

proper leader of the al lied forces in Korea was the

Presidc�t of the United States.

99wilcox and Kaiijarui, p. 446.

lO OJohn w. Spanier, The Truman-t:acArthur Controversy
and the K9rean War (Cambridge 9 Massachusetts: Harvard
University Press, 1959), p. 77.
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The Coming of Peace
The period from June 24, 1951 9 to the conclusion

of hostilities in Korea can be conveniently discussed
under five main headin5s:

the reasons for the initia

tion of the peace talks; the conversat·ions at Kaesone;;
the problems hampering an agreement and leading to the
cessation of talks at Kaesong; and the causes for the
re-opening of discussions at Pan�unjon.
After a year of chasing each other up and down
the Korean peninsula the belligerents be�an to think
seriously about finding a less costly way of ending
the Korean War.

By June, 1951, both sides had

accomplished their respective immediate goals; the
United Nations had repulsed the Communist invasion and
were even holding some North Kore a n territory� while
the Chinese 9 who had failed to dislodge the United
Nations forces just north of the 38th parallel, had
neve�theless been successful in stopping and subsequently
rout::..ng an

11

imperialistic" American army.

As the

status quo of June 24, 1950, had almost been restored 9

neither the United States and its allies ? nor the

Chinese government wanted to chance extending the war
in fear of precipitating a long and costly struggle.
This had no appeal to the .Truman Administration which
was subject to increasing attacks by the American
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people for its policy of limited war.

It was a

frustrating policy for a nation accustomed to fighting

gl0bal conflicts in confident anticipation of presenting
J.
its defeated enemy w'th
the terms of an unconditional

Correspondin�ly in Peking the young Communist

surrender.

Government was not inclined to continue extracting
needed money from its already depleted coffers.
While the United States and most of her allies did
attempt to find peaceful ways to end the fighting�
they were continuously pressured by Syngman Rhee who
wanted nothing less than the unconditional surrender
of all northern armies.

To all members of the United

Nations command� except Rhee 9 it was obvious that the
plans for forcibly unifying Korea were costing the
belligerents too much 9 in men, morale� and material.
But to Rhee who had been fighting for Korean independence
for ever thirty years and for unification for six
years ? an end to the conflict was not welcome 9
especially as he now had the military and economic
migct of the strongest nation in the world defending
is cause.
tinue� for

It was this attitude of Rhee's that con
he next two years, to hamper allied attempts.

G

to end the war.
Rhee notwithstanding the Americans were determined
to effect an armistice.

This much is abundantly clear

1?'7
in British Foreie;n Minir:rter Anthony Eden's report to

Churchill concerning his conversations with his American
,\

counterpart, Dean Acheson:

The Americans want an armistice and are pre
pared in order to get one to accept arrangements
for a supervision which they fear will be un
satisfactory. But they feel bound to take pre
cautions against infringements of the armistice
in the form of a major attack by the communists ?
which they might not be able to forsee owing to
inadequate supervision arrangements. Even so 9
like us, thoy doubt whether the communists will
break the armistice, since they believe that the
Chinese have had enough.
Finally, the Americans left me no doubt that
the United States would rise in its wrath if there
ms a major attacko '11 hey clearly feel that the
American Administration could not hold that
position against the clamour of public opinion. 101
While both the United Nations Command and the

Chinese wanted a truce� neither party offered a pro
gram for establishing peace talks.

The initial move

in bringing the co:rrun.on desire for a truce to the level
of negotiations came on Ju.fa-, 23, when the Russian

�epresentative to the United Nations, Jacob Malik,

reported to the General Assembly that lithe Soviet peo
ples

Q

•

o

believe that the most acute problem of

the present day--the problem of armed conflict in
Ko:. ea • • • could be settled.i: 102 Two days later,

whether by design o� not, the Soviet viewpoint was
lOlEden ? PPo 16-17.
102u•'-'•
0
� �
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While

as8 isted by Russia,

Command a peace over-

Ar::e:::-:.can c:::�:·. :::.. � �-s v::,:;re o.-:; first hesitant about

the proposal.

In ord�r to seek clarification on

v1alik j s statement, the American .Ar:1bassador in Moscow
approached the Soviet Deputy Foreign Minister, Andrei
Gromyko on June 28.

DurinG the ensuing conversation

the latter indicated th8.t Mulik had suggested that
possibly negotiations for a cease-fire could be carried

on by the four respective field commanders of the

United Nations Co:::G1and� the Republic of South Korea ?
the Chi:.1.ese, and the No::-th Koreans o l04

The Anerican response was immediate.

The follow-

ing dey t e State Depart�ent ordered tne new United

Nat.:.ons Co:11:::iander, Gc:::.eral I,!atthew E. Ridgway to contact thG e:iemy leade::c-s a:ad to take the appropriate

l.
ste,s fer establishins negot·ations
? but not to imperil

th

A ..2�ican position in any way o lO:;

After acknowledging

his orders� Ridg\'my, on June 30, rnade a r·adio broadcast

of State ., The Record on Korean
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directed at the North Korean and Chinese commanders in
which he st3.t1'?dt

"I am informed that you may wish a

meeting to discuss an armistice providing for the
cessation of hostilities and all acts of armed force
in Korea, with adequate guarantees for the maintenance
oi ouc'

.::.ccept;uucc by t e Co:crn.unist

was alno�t inst�utun�ous.

Tl e peo.c� nng u �ci.a'tions com.r:ienced on July 10� at
th C border town of Ka.e3ong
Seoul, in Nort� Kore .

'.·) miles north-west of

As s�ggested by the Soviets

t e "')d.r·cicip�nt s o:' t·w tc..:.:rn were from the United
orea, Chi�a, and North Koreae
over the world Jere in &ttendance,
·oi..:.t "t.i....er0 ue.-:::c :r�o o:.:ficia
o.:. th

representatives from any

::-e::s.ining f ou.rtcer... cou:::i.tries v1hich had contribute

orces to the ---v - -· t - '""'"'· f!a tio ... s Co:nr::a d.
ons

was the est&�.:.:::...:..sh�e:..'lt of a
dc�un�ed t· G use
were

e.1arcati.o

line� the Americans

f the batt 0 lines which in most cases ?

orth of t� G 3s�ch 1)aralle ; while the Chinese

wanted t· e divisi0n along t_e 58t
458.

o

In the end the

QrJ
- '•:.·:.1c Uni jced S·'.-;ates con';:;ingent .:..ncluded Vice
�i�c..m:..ra� C Tur�1.cr Joy, Rear A miral .Arleigh Burke ?
1-u�Jcx C-e:'leral ;_a C. Gra · 3ie (Ar:ny) and ., f. ajor Ge r:. eral
• I • �,. oo.e s (Army) •
1

Q

150
United States was to get its way on this point as the
remr.dnder o.f the war produced. no significant g<')ographical
.,

\

change despite much bloody fighting like the battle
of Porkchop Hill.
To talk is one thing, but to agree is another
pro ..... lem entirely, ancl the1:'e were �any differences of
opinion

,'
'Jhich
hampered fdgr1ificant agreements at Ka.esong.

Even afte:r:· the belligerents acknowledged. the bo.ttle1_ines

as the possible future demarcation line they

differed on \-Vhere subsequent talks should be held� and
what; should be done with the prisoners-of-war·.

Al

though the site of the negotiations was in North Korean
territory the American representatives were determined
to k C ep the area neu·:�0 2..::.. which meant the exclusion of
Communist troops.

:2ut -�1-�e c::::.nese had other ideas e

Consequently the American deleiation called for the
selection of a new site for the truce conversations.
Another problem. 1_:hich p1 agued the Kaesong talks
1
dealt wit:;h the post-war hand_ing

oz prisoners-of-war.

!.rb.e United Natio�.1.$ Co:::'l.Illand proposed that all captured
so:diera be given their choice on the question of
r0]atriation, w�ile the Chinese believed that their
Un· ted Nations captured troops were r..ot properly edu
cated to make the choj_ce between the promises of
immediate mater·ial wealth which America offered� and
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the promised f�ture pros)erity of the .new socialist
c-l.-r- -·- �
,_./, lJC....V\::c,

'

\

j
When t.w.e i::J.p2.::::.e reac.:.:cd. at :(acsong cou_d
not
t,..

be breache d t�8 f:rst t�uce talks were ter�inated on
August 23 ..
ting persiste·a. .throut-out the period of
the truce talks each side-seemed more concerned with
V b.ile

maintaining its position, than with intensifying its
efforts.

But when the Kaesong talks had ended the

fighting took on more serious preparations and the
J.
batt�e
of Bloody Ridge, which raged into October ? pre

cipitated e f �arts to reopen the peace talks.

Both

sic.es fe&::-ed that the fighting might mushroom into an
entirely new war if the belligerents did not return to
l
the conference tab_es.

Therefore contacts were made 9

and on Octo�er 10, t�e talks reconvened.

Althouµ)l they

r:.rera te:::po::-arily hal·:ed when the United Nations Air
Force m� c en over-zealous attack on a Chinese position 9
1
apo_og�es
were made and the negotiations were resumed.

Before the represC ntatives actually developed
co�crete plans for a� armistice they had to deal with
t:c.::,e;e r::.ain proble::.s:
..:--2: to e::;taolish a

where
to have the new talks;
•
C. eoarcation

line; and what to do

a00·..:.:c the prisoners-·of-war problem?

r,u:.::-ing the lat·ter

IT.O;'.}.t11s of 1951, the belligerents were able to solve
t

G

fi::-st tv.ro problems but rci:rinined st;aleniated on the
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.ast�

i
The ta_ks
were moved from Keaso:ig to Panmu.njon�

q
which· V'as just south of the ;,._,·;:;
h parallel l.· n the "no

mans lanu.·

\

19

bet;1.·.1 cc:1 the op90:��-r., ·: :::.:-o::.:.t lines.

.:rom a basis prov:. c
t_e negotiatio s reach

·-

\1 orking

by a. ""'·"'::c,1.\:..:...... Asseob::;.y r 0 solution
agre ement on a dew�rcation

line to be establis ed along the battlelines as of the
day of cease-fire.�08 But the prisoner-of-war question
again proved a sturc.bling block as the Chinese would not
agree to an exchange form'.l la that allowed the prisoners
�he cho ce of repat�iation.

As happe�ed before and

as it was to happen again, the peace talks stagnated
and collapsed ..
American atte�]ts to end t�c war throug..h negotia'cion suf .re:"Gd :c.c-::; 0-:1-y becc:.u.:::-e of the differing
opinions of t�2 oc :i3er0nts� but a_so because of p licy
disagreenents between the U�ite C. Sates and Korea.
108
- U.S., Depart�e�t of State 9 The Hecord on Korean

1'.._!li:t,t.92.tiC?!! ? pp. 127--28. The bell1.,�erents agreed that
Ii' os·cili ties were to continue until a military armistice
agreement was signed, and if it took �ore than 30 days
to co:a.clude the armistice a.:;::-scc.c:1.t <> the military dernar
catic� line for the duration o� he armistice was to
follo� the actual line of contact between the opposing
forcc.3 immediately prior to the sic;nature of the armis
ticeo A demilitarized zone b 0 t'also provided for.
"But the Oo!Ilille:.nists rejected" the principle of volun
tary repatriation ot prisoners of war, as well as ••
o the application of repatriation to prisoners held
by the U QN. Command whose residence l:..:.u. been in the
Ro:9ublic of' Korea." U.So, Department of State, A
�i. 3�c:. --�-c2.J.:__ _s1:.'.r.L'lar.Y .-:,f United Sta tes--Koreo.n Rela. t ions ?
-·p ,. i.V0� -_ 'v2.
IJ
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Rhee 0 s deterc!:.ination to continue the wa.r until victory
1}

.,

\

1as complete and Korea unified und0r his leadership

placed the A:m.e:::-:·_ ... ,.,".. spokesmen at Kaesong 2.n� P?.:. :nunjon
in a difficuL; ....,_., ..... tion; a solution a.ccept1:1:0_c -co
Rhee was u.naccep·cable to the 0ommunists ? and one which
satisfied the Comm,.ists would be rejected by Rhee.
Va:.-- ious overtures were made to t_ e truculent Korean
president in order to reduce his opposition to a nego
In spite of Washington's pledges for

tiated peace.

the post-·war period of safeguarding the republic• s
independence and of bolstering its economy Rhee refused
to alter his stand. 109 Conse uently because of disagx:eel;l.ents between friend and foe� an armistice was
still u..."1.realiz d by t.e end of 1952.

By now the fa -l .. U.:::8 to reach a settlement in Korea.

wei�1ed heavily upon -t::.-3 fr ,strat;ed .American public

which had expressed ·i::;heir disc,:pproval of the war in
ovember by giving the Republican pres�oential candidate,
Dwight D. Eise.hower� a landslide victory.

Fulfilling

a campaiv ]ronise president-elect Eisenhower visited

Ko_ea �
w

Dece�ber searching for a solution to end the

But he found no new or quick remedies and his

ro

aC:.min:.s-crc.tion r.ollc)'l."Jed nuch the same course as its

-

( l'�T r. ,.
J.�'v.
1·

-

..

l09�r;,:,-,...,� ;·• Ci a""',, r�os t�2 Dan �e to the Yalu
.."""'---�
..... .. ---,;,
::Zc.::'per and Brot: ers ?u·o-lishe:rs, 1954) �

-,; . .- -t"\ • ,;,- ,,
_..._JJ..�....
.......

P• -v·-J.,
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predecessor,

finding it equally difficult to resolve

the old problems.

One of the primary reasons for the failure of

the Eisenhower adminiatration to develop a new policy

was the disagreement between the President and his

Secretary of State, John Foster Dulles, over the proper
course to follow in Korea.

Dulles' predilection for

statements expressing an extremely "hard line" against
the Communists, such as:

"I don't think we can get

much out of a Korean settlement until we have shown

--before all Asia--our clear superiority by giving the
Chinese one hell of a licking, 11110 encouraged Rhee to

continue his adamant opposition to a negotiated peace.
Although Eisenhower might have been in sympathy with
the sentiment in Dulles' remarks, he was aware that
such an approach was highly impractical for achieving
a prompt settlement.

Furthermore it made the task of

pacifyin� Rhee and obtaining his acquiescence to the
American policy of a negotiated peace even more difficult.
One of the first attempts by the Eisenhower admin
istration to soften Rhee's unflexible opposition to
American policy was the appointment of a retired American
llOEmmet John Hughes, The Ordeal of Power ("Dell
Books 11; New York: Dell Publishing Co., Ltd., 1964)
PP• 91-92
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general and a long time friend of the Korean president,

,,

John B. Coulter, to head the United Nations Korean
Reconstruction Agency.111 But this action produced no
visible results; neither did Eisenhower's promise of

a mutual defense treaty between Washin3ton and Seoui.112
Rhee's response was hardly encou�aging:

first an

attempt was.made to delay.or destroy the peace nego

tiations by the dramatic release of twenty-seven thousand

North Korean prisoners-of-war from United Nations com

pounds guarded by South Korean troops; and then by Rhee's
condemnation of the proposed armistice terms.

In

response to President Eisenhower's plea for an end to
the fighting, Rhee replied:
The terms of the armistice being what they
are, the Communist buildup will go on unhampered
until it is capable of overwhelming South Korea
with one swoop of the Communist's own choosing.
What is to follow for the rest of the Far East?
And the rest of Asia1 And the rest of the free
world?ll3
Rhee eventually gave in to American pressures and
promises but he refused to sign the armistice agree
ment and technically the Republic of Korea is still at
111Lyons, p. 218.
112u.s., Depar�ment of State, The Record on Korean
Unification, p. 130.
113u.s., Congress, Senate, Committee on Foreign
Relations, The United States and the Korean Problem,
p. 8?.
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war with the Communist Chinese and North Korean govern
ments.

With the problem of Rhee resolved, the_delegates

at Panmunjon were now able to give their undivided
attention to the task of working out an agreement that
would produce a cease-fire.

Finally, after much hesi

tation, the Communists accepted a United Nations com
promise plan for dealing with the troublesome prisoners
of-war issue:

prisoners would be interrogated before

a committee of representatives from neutral and bellig
erent countries; then they could make their choice as
to where they wanted to go.

sanctioned by the Allies.

This plan was wholeheartedly
The Communists now had the

choice of either continuing the muderous battle or
allowing their captured soldiers the option of returning
to their respective homeland, or of going to another
country.

Thus, after three years, one month, and two

days 9 the Korean war was brought to a halt.

The

armistice called for a demarcation line and a demili
_tarized zone; a Military Armistice Commission consisting
of representatives from the one-time belligerents; and

a Neutral United Nations Supervisory Commission; 114 all
attempting to prevent any future wars in Korea.

114u.s., Department of State, Armistice in Korea,
Publication 5150, Far Eastern Series 61 (Washington,
D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1953), p. 5.
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Although peace had returned .and the soath Koreans

had gained a little land, the economic and political

instability of the immediate post-war period was quite
similar to that which existed before the war, except

in a larger sense, something had been accomplished,

For as was pointed out by Anthony Eden in his Memoirs:
"The fighting in Korea achieved a balance of power

reco�ized and respected as such." ll 5

This·"balance"

was further emphasized when the Allies reassured the
world that Korea would nmv, and forever, be well defended a�ainst acts of aggression.

Unlike the be

wildered League of Nations ., the United Nations had

acted and had demonstrated that collective security
could be effective.

President Eisenhower was quick to

emphasize this point with his remark that "in this struggle

we have seen the United Nations meet the challenge of
aggression--not with pathetic words of protest, but
with deeds of decisive purpose.11116 To put strength
into these words the sixteen countries who had con

tributed fore.es to the United Nations Command warned the

Commu..11ists that, "in the interest of world peace, that
115Eden, p. 28.
P• 1.

116u .o.
,... ' Department of State,
Armistice in Korea,
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if there is a renewal of the armed attack, challenging

again the principles of the United Nations, we should
again be united and prorupt to resist.11 11 7
\

But despite

the overtones of success in such remarks, western

officials knew that the supposedly untrained Chinese

Communist army had successfully stood up against the

mightiest of nations.

For the West the outcome of the

war seemed more a compromise than a victory.

Although

both sides had made gains, most of which were psycho

logical, the critical question was which side had most

impressed world opinion, particularly in the uncommitted

nations?

Although their latest attempt to unify Korea had

failed, American policy-makers looked to the future

for another chance, if such a possibility should again

present itself.

But it was abundantly clear that uni

fication along the lines envisaged by the United States

would have to be prefaced. by a strengthening of the
Re?ublic of Korea.

The first step -in this direction

came eleven days after the signing of the armistice when

Secretary Dulles and President Rhee jointly announced
that:

Our Governments will promptly negotiate
agreements to cover the status of such forces

11 7u.s., Department of State, The Record on Korean
Unification, p. 132,

189

.,

as the United. States may elect to :r.aintain in
Korea after the mutual defense treaty comes into
force and effect, and the ava.:i.labilit;y t;o them
of Korean facilities and services needed for the
dischar6e of our common task. 115

Washine5ton not only kept its military promises made to
Rhee prior to the latter's acceptance of the cease-fire
but also adhered to its promises of economic assL:;tance •
•mother approach to the problem of unification was

taken at the Geneva Conference in the spring of 1954.

The Geneva negotiators, consisting of representatives
from the Soviet Union and all the nations which had

military forces in the Korean War with the exception
of the Union of South Africa, sought to develop a

modus vivendi for unitins the peninsula, but their

efforts en<l0d. in utter failure.

T.h.e proposal offered

by each side had a familiar pre-wa:- rine; and, as befoi-- e,
they were uJ1acceptable to the othe:c cide.

Seemingly

the war had solved nothing, nor changed anyone's

attitude.

To the Comrnunists the U�ited. States a.nd its

allies were still ''imperia.lists," and to the West the
9
Com..--;-1ur1.ists were still "aggressors. 11 11

118 Ibid., p. 133. For exc�rpts from the mutual
defense treaty see Appendix A, p. 208-210.

ll9u.s., Department of State, The Korean Problem
at the Geneva Conference 2 April 26-Jtme 15, 1�9-f,
Publication 5609, International Organization and Con
ferences Series II (Far Eastern) (Washington, D.C.:
U.S. Government Printing Office, 1954), pp. 4-5, 80.
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So it becomes quite obvious that the United
States was once aGain sadd.led with the defense of
,\

south Kor:ea 9 but now 'vb.ere was no question of pulling
out as suggested in tho late forties.

South .Korea

now represented a concrete symbol of the success of
collective security, and to abandon it, would only
result in the loss. of face of the United States and
the United Nations.

Yet to continue defendin6 the
Republic of Kor:·ea against its internal 120 and external
eneruieG cos·t the Unit;cd S tc:ltes dearly.

The conseqt:.ences

of such an expensive policy were clearly deoc:r·ibed by
milit,ary strater�ist, S. L. �. Marshall when he wrote:
The cond::. tior.. s 0:f.' the truce keep a U. 3. arm::,
corps, with attendant air support, tied to ground
which is vo.lueles.s. l:orea is 'the sump pit in the
U.S. outpost line. The Allies we get by being
there nave little weii:-;h�., 'l:he troops vrn have
there are unavail�ble for use to stop a brush
.fire elsew:b.ere.l2.1.
Looking back to the days of Theodore Roosevelt it
becomes quite clear that Washington's a ttitua.e towur·ds
Korea has reversed !tcelf:
interests in Korea

GO

no longer were American

:.!1significant that Am-arican policy

120while American troops were not used to put down
internal disorders they did reliE:ve Korean security
forces from their military responsibilities in order
to allow the swift transfer of these forces to the
turbulent areas in question.
121S. L. A. Marshall, "Big Little War," Army X
(June i 1960), 25.
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makers could acquiesce in the domination of that area
by another natione

,\

\

Now Korea had become an advance

post of considerable significance in the American
attempt to contain commu.�ism.

Furthermore China's

explosion of an atomic bomb, and Peking's conviction
that social revolution can only be achieved through
war has only served- to strengthen the American view.
For not only has Korea strategic significance in a
possible, future Chinese Communist invasion on Japan,

but aloo if the "domino theory 11122 has any validity it
is essential that the first domino not be allowed to
.fall.

122The "domino theory" is that if one country in
Asia falls to the Communists the rest of Asia, like a
row of upri3ht dominoes, will do likewise.

CHAPTER VI
CONCLUSION
Looking back, American policy concerning Korea can
be divided into two periods; the era of the "Open Door" 9
1834-1943 9 and the era of American committment� 19431954.

Neither of the two periods produced a success

ful American policy--the United States was to be con
demned by both friends and foes.
The failures of the "Open Door� in Korea is clearly
evident by the negligible growth in trade between the
two countries 9 and Vlasbington's inability to comprehend
its responsibilities as a rising world leader.

In so

far as the policy came under challen�e the United States
was disinclined to take any action beyond moral suasion.
or verbal condemnation to maintain its policy.

As

George Kennan, an eminent American diplomat and scholar
has written:
We were at liberty to exhort, to plead, to
hamper, to embarrass. If others failed to heed
us, we would cause them to appear in ungraceful
postures before the eyes of the world opinion.
If ? on the other hand, they gave heed to our
ur 0 �ngs,. they would do so at their own risk; we
would not feel bound to help them with the 1
resulting problems--they were on their own.
-George F. Kennan, American PorE�ir;n Policy, 19001950 ( !{Mentor Book"; New York: The Te·N American
Library, 1960), p. 45.
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There were three reasons for the American ac
knowledgement of Japanese ascendancy in Korea in 1905:
,,

\

th e anticipated trade with Korea was never achieved;
the Americans assumed that the Japanese would safeguard
what little trade they had with the Koreans; and
President Roosevelt believed that the Japanese were
best suited to guide the Koreans toward a higher polit
ical and economic plane.
assumptions wrong.

But events proved these

By the Cairo Declaration of 1943,

Washington acknowledged that its earlier policy had
failed--American commercial interests had been pushed

out of Korea, and the Koreans were in no better polit
ical or economic state than they had been in 1905.
With the Cairo Declarat·on the United States
launched a new policy with regards to Korea--it now
committed itself to t h e establishment of the inde
pendence of Korea after a period of trusteeship.

The

Cairo Declaration clear1 y indicated, in its details
and by its implications, that both the United States
and the Soviet Union anticipated expanding their in
fluence in that part of Asia where the envisaged defeat
of Japan would create a power vacuum.

The Cairo state

ment may have implied a sense of partnership in this
understanding but events were to prove otherwise.
As the colonial powers had been drastically weakened
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by the wa.r it was not surprising that the two super
states became rivals in Asia; a rivalry that was

,\
'

\

<-•�centuated by the ideological differences between
the two nations.

Each believed that its political

and economic systems provided the best means for the
development of the terr:t tory in question.

Both sought

to enlist the revolutionary aspirations of Asians on
their side by promises of a bright future, exemplified
by Roosevelt's Four Freedoms Speech on one _hand, and
the Marxist doctrine concerning the future of the
working class on the other.
The post-war political chess game between Russia
and the United States was never static as the Americans
moved into world leadership and the Soviets sought to
displace, or ? at least, to rival them.

When dealing with

Korea� the Uni tea. Sta. tes found in the United Nations
't
and in Syngman Rhee� t·w
diverse but willing allies who

were sincere enemies of Communism; Rhee, because of his
conservatism� and his desire to head a unified and
independent Korea; and the United Nations because the
political beliefs of a majority of its members were

opposed to Communism.

But neither the United States

and its allies, nor-Russia, were able to induce the
other to leave Korea.

When the problem was passed

on to native nationalists in the respective zones

1 95
the results were no better.
The foundin� of the Rep�blic of South Korea and
.,

\

the concurrent use of the United Nations were moves
introduced into-the political game by the Washington
government.

Realizing the moral and diplomatic capabil

ities of the United Nations 9 Washington sought to
utilize the_ world organization.' s mae-hinery to implement
American foreign po1 icy. From 1947 to 1953 the United
States made good use of the facilities of the United

-ations, to enhance the moral stature of its policies
in Korea.
During th e Korean War, the United States was led
by two factions; those who feared possible Chinese or
even Russian intervention and a subsequent World War;
and those who believed that the United States was

,

capab_e of handling any military situatione

President

Truman ? his cabinet, o.nd the Joint Chiefs-of-Staff would
fie:;ht only if the future did not involve World War III,
while a group of military men and c i vilians, led by
General MacArthur 9 asserted that F·.xterican forces could

.

defeat the Communists in Asia without provoking Russian
'

intervention.

Although Truman entered the war without

the formal consent o-f Congress, he would not push the
A�erican people into a possible world holocauste

He

felt that Korea was a testing �round for the principle

,
of col_ective
security and the American policy of
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contain:nent; and. as shown by bis orders to MacArthur,
the President did n0t want to provoke Russia, or the

Chinese� into active particip&tion in Ko=ea.

\

Opponents of the T:-unan :::.d�-:-.::..r:.is-',��·ation, such as

Wisconsin's Sen::.tor Joseph r..:c�a:r·trL..r, attacked lts
Korean policies, and r..ot only saggested, but accused

the adminis�ra.tion-of harbouring Communist sympathizers.

To this charge was also added one that the President
was listenine; to advisors· who lr..new nothing of the
Korean situation, a!'.ld \as
stifling the freedom of
'
V

action of sue 1 pror2::.:1ent military le..:ders as MacArthur�
It is true tLa� TTashinBton was careful_y watching the

Korean situation 9 b�t �he cha:'c� of restricting the
military only magnifies the differences in opj,nion of
the two factions.

For even ,ith the election of

Eisenhower, the White House's attitude towards the war
did not change.
While officials differe d on methods, all ag�eed
that they were fighting a Co�munist attempt to pe�etrate
the "democratic" wor t d 1 which was a part of the
drive toward wor_d le e,dershipq
~

I

remembered

Nobody believed

�:.ave been the results of national

that the \vc.::
aspira·c::..c:.·_·:;,

C omcunist

..

"�:-�&

u -......

of tho Ror~~~ people.

No one

t \:he::1 Ko:::-ea.n r.B. tic:.1..:..list s asked for
ar:.d

19 7
~as~ington iz~ore~ their ple~c .

policy in Korea seems to be of a ne!:.\ative nature for
the peninsula only attRins import;ance when the possibility
\

arises that Korea might be used. as a s 1Y:.."'ingbon.rd� either
s'cr"tegically or symbolically, for a further extens:::.on
of Communist power.

In 1 950 the valuable area was

Japan, today it is- the whole of Asia.•

APPENDIX A
,,

PE..'itTINENT DOCUMBNTS ON KOREA� 1945-1953
Moscow Communiqu� of December 27, 1945 1
(Excerpts)

"1.

III
Korea:
With a view to the re-establishment of Korea:

as an independent state, the creation of conditions for
developing the country on democratic principles • • •
there shall be set up a provisional Korean democratic

.

.

government • •
"2. In order to assist the formation of a pro
visional Korean goverr...r:.ent and with a view to the pre
liminary elaboration of the approprj_• te measure,s, there
shall be established a Joint Commission consisting of
the representatives of the United States comm.and in
southern Korea and the Sov:i.et command in northern Korea.
In preparing their proposals the Commission shall con
sult with the Korean democratic parties and social
organizations ..

The recommendations worked out by the

1u.s.? Department of State The Record on Korean
9
U:-1.ification, pp. 4?-48. The fore:Lgn ministers who
attended the Moscow Conference were v. M. Molotov 9
Hussia; Ernest Bevin, ; England; and James F. Byrnes 9
�nited States.
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Commission shall be presented for the consideration
of the Governments of t�e Union of Soviet Socialist
,\

Republics, China, the Uni.terl.. Kin5d.om and the United
State1:; p:cior to final decision by the two governments
r
represented on t'1e
Joint Coimnission.

"3.

It shall.be the task of the Joint Commission,

with the participation of the provisional Korean demo
crutic government and of the Korean democratic organi
zations to work out measures also for helpi::-115 ancl
assisting (trusteeship) t e political� economic and
social progress of the Korean people

the development

of democratic self-governme_t and the establishment of
the national indepen.denc.:::· of :Korea.
•
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[A] conference of the representatives of the

"4o

Uni tee. States and Soviet corr.ina.nds in Korea shall be
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Gc���al Assembly Resol tion of November 14�
(Excerpts)
A
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nThe General Assembly
2u.N., Department of Public Information Yearbook
.,
o�� -·----- Unite6. Natior..;;:;, 19L�7-1948, :p. 87.
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"l.

Resolves that.the elected representatives of

the Korean people be invited to take part in the con

\

sideration of the question;
11 2.
Further resolves. ·that in order to facilitate
and. expedite such participation and to observe that the
Korean representatives are in fact duly elected by the
Korean people • • -. there be forthwith established a
United Nations Temporary Commission on Korea, to be
present in Korea, with right to travel, observe and
consult throughout Korea.
11

B

The General Assembly"

"Recog:µizing the urgent and rightful claims t.o
independence of the people of
•

•

•

•

•

•

•

•

•

•

•

e

K orea;
•

•

•

•

•

•

•

•

•

•

•

•

n1. Decides t'r.t.& t t h e Commission shall consist of
representatives of .Australia, Ga.nada, China, El Salvador.
France 9 India, Philippi.nes, Syria, Ukrs.nian Soviet
Scc:.o.:ist Republic;

,.·2.

Recorn..rnends tha·c the elections be held not later

than 31 ti:arch 1948 • • • The number of representatives
fro!l'l each voting a;:ea or zone should be :-'roportionate
to the population, and the €\lections should be under

the observation of the Commission;
•

•

•

•

•

•

•

•

•

$
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•

•

•

•

•

•

•

•

•

•

•

•

•

•
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United Natic�s Ch�rter
(:S'xcerpts)
"The Purposes of the United Nations are:
"l. To maintain international peace and security,

,,

and to that end:

to take effe tive collective measures

for the prevention and removal of threats to the peace,
and for the suppression of acts of aggression or other
breaches of the peace 9 and to bring about by peaceful
means ? and in conform·ty with the principles of justice
and international dispLtes or situat·ons which might
e -·oeace·�

lead to a bre ch oft

Security Counc·1 ?.esol�tion cf June,. 25, 1950 3
Excerpts)
11

T e Security Counci
•

•

•

•

nNoting

o

o

e

•

e

$

o

o

•

o

Q

•

•

•

•

•

•

•

a

•

•

wi .. ' grave c ncern t e armed. attack upon

the Republic of Kor a by forces from North Korea, • • •
"Determines that - is action constitutes a breach
of peace,

"I�

Calls for the immed·ate cessation of

hostilities; and cails upon the authorities of North
orea to withdraw forthwith their armed forces to the
3u .N., Depart!!f-ent 0f P1.1blic I.:;.for:n3.tior. Yearbook
9
of the United Nations, 19�, P• 222. On June 25 9 1950 9
'che Secu.ri ty Council members were China., Egypt, Ecuador 9
Norvmy ., Cuba, India, France, United Kingdom� �Jni ted
Stat_:-', u.goslavia, an Russia who wa.s absent.
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38th parallel;

• •

\

• • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • •

"III.

Calls upon all Membere to render every

assistance to the United Nations in the execution of
this resolution and to refrain from giving any aasistance
to the North Korean authorities."
Art1·c1e 41 of the United Nations Charter
"The Security Council may decide what measures not
involving the use of armed force are to be employed
to give effect to its decisions, and it may call upon
the Members of the United N_ations to apply such measures.

·These may include complete or partial interruption of

economic relations and of rail, sea, air, postal, tele
graphic, radio, and other means of communication, and
the severance of diplomatic relations.
Article 42 of the United Nations Charter
"Should the Security Council consider that measures
provided for in Article 41 would be inadequate or have
proved to be inadequate, it may take such action by
air, sea, or land forces as may be necessary to maintain

or restore international peace and security.

Such

action may include-demonstrations, blockade, and other
operations by air• sea, or land forces of Members of
the United Nations.

I•

:-- ...:..
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Article 2, Clause 5 of the United Nations Charter
"All Members- shall give the United-Nations every
assistance in any action it takos in accordance with
the present Charter, and shall refrain from giving
assistance to any state against which the United Nations
is taking preventive or enforcement action.
Security Council Resolution o! June 2?, 19504
(Excerpts)
"The Security Council,
• •

•

• • • • • •

•

• • • • • • •

•

• • • • • • •

"Having noted from the report of the United Nations
Commission in Korea that the authorities in North Korea
have neither ceased hostilities nor withdrawn their
armed forces to the 38th parallel and that urgent
military measures are required to restore international
peace and security; and
"Having noted the appeal from the Republic of Korea
' to the United Nations for immediate and effective steps
to secure peace and security,
"Recommends that the Members of the United Nations
furnish such assistance to the Republic of Korea as

may be necessary to repel the armed attack and to restore
international peace and security in that area."
4

�•, P• 224 • ..
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Security Uouncil Resolution of July?, 19505
(Excerpts).

"The Security Council,

• • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • •

."3•

Recommends that all Members providing· military

forces and other asoistance pursuant to the aforesaid

Security Council resolutions make such forces and other
assistance· available to a unified command under the

United States.
•

• • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • •

•

• • • • •

•

"5• Authorizes the unified command at its discretion

to use the United Nations flag in the course of operations
against North Korean forces concurrently with the flags
or the various nations participating;·
"6.

Requests the United States to provide the

Security Council with reports as appropriate on the

course of action taken under the unified command."

United States Resolution in the security Council,
July 31, 1950 6

"The Security Council

"Condemns the North Korean authorities for their

continued defiance of the Unived Nations;
5Ibid., P• 230.

.

6u.s., Department of State, United States Policy
in the Korean Conflict, p. 11. Thia resolution was
vetoed by the Soviet Union on September 6, 1950.
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"Calls upon all States to use their influence to
prevail upon the authorities of North Korea to cease
,,

this defiance;
"Calla upon all States to refrain from assisting

or encouraging the North Korean authorities and to

refrain from action which might lead to the spread

of the Korean conflict to other areas and thereby further
e
. ndanger international peace and security."
General Assembly Resolution of October
. (Excerpts)
"The General Assembly,

..

. . .

"l.

. .

. .

'

... ..

. . . .

Recommends that

7, 19507

.....

.

"(a)

All appropriate steps be taken to insure

"(b)

All constituent acts be taken, including the

conditions of stability throughout Korea;
holding of elections, under the auspices of the United
'Nations, for the establishment of a unified, independent
and democratic government in the sovereign State of
Korea;

•

• • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • •

• •

All necessary measures be taken to accomplish

"(e)

the economic rehabilitation of Korea;

. . .

•

'

...

. . .

....

. .

.........

"

7u.N., Department of Public Information, Yearbook
of the United Nations, 1950, p. 265.
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General Assembly Resolution of December 1, 19508
(Excerpts)
A

,

1

"The General Assembly 1
• • • • • • •

"l.

•

•

•

• • •

•

•

•

• •

•

• • • •

•

Establishes the United Nations Korean Recon

struction Agency (UNKHA) under the direction of a United
Nations Agent-General, • • •

•

• • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • •

"4.
"(a)

• •

•

•

•

Directs the Agent-General:
To co-o�inate his programme with measures

taken by the United Nations Commission for the Unifi
cation and Rehabilitation of Korea to carry out the
recommendations of the General Assembly relating to

the establishment of a unified� independent and demo
cratic government in Korea, and support the Commission

in fulfilling the task:
• • • • • • • • • • • • • • •

"[5] (b)

•

• • • • • • • •

To provide for the procurement and ship-

ment of supplies and services and !or their effective
distribution and utilization within Korea;

•

• • • • • •

"14.

•

• • • • • • • • • •

• •

• •

•

•

Calls u�on all government, specialized

agencies and non-governmental organizations, pending the
beginning of operations by the United Nations Korean
8Ibid.

, p. 280.

20?
Reconstruction Agency, to continue to furnish through

the Secretary-General such assistance for the Korean
people as may be requested by the Unified Command.
• • • • • • • •

•

•

•

• • • • • • • • • • •

•

•

II

General Assembly Resolution of December 14• 19509

"The General Assembly

"Viewing with great concern the situation in the

Far East, anxious that immediate steps should be taken
to prevent the conflict in Korea spreading to other

areas and to put an end to the fighting in Korea • • •

"Request the President of the General Assembly to

constitute a group of three persons, including himself•
to determine the basis on which a satisfactory cease

fire in Korea can be arranged and to make recommenda
tions to

the

General Assembly as soon as possible. 0

General Assembly Resolution of February,l, 195110
...
(Excerpts)

"The General Assembly,
•

•

• • • •

•

• • • • • • • • • • • •

•

• • •

•

9Ibid., p. 250. By this resolution a committee,
composed of Lester B. Pearson·(Canada) 9 Sir Bengal .
Ru (India), and N. Entezam (Iran), was established.

u .ii. t

10

Department of Public Information, Yearbook
of the United Nations, 1921 9 pp. 224-225. The members
of this committee were N. Entezam (Iran), Sven Grofstrom
(Sweden), and Luis Padillo Nerve (Mexico).
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11

1.

Jl'inds that the Central People's Government

of the People's Republic of China, by giving direct
,\

aid and assistance to those who were already committing
aggression in Korea and by engaging in-hostilities
against United Nations forces there has itself engaged
in aggression in Korea;
"2. Calls upon the Central People's Government

.or

the People's Republic of China to cause its forces

and nationals in Korea to cease hostilities against the

United Nations forces and to withdraw from Korea;
•

•

"5•

•

•

• • •

•

• • • • • • • • • • • • • • • •

Calla upon all States and authorities to

refrain from giving any assistance to the aggressors
in Korea;
11 6
. Requests a Committee composed of the ::nembers

of the Collective Measures Committee as a matter of

urgency to consider additional measux·ea to be employed
to meet this aggression and report thereon to the
Geileral Assembly, • .._ • "
American-Korean Mutual Defe�se Treaty
October l,, 195;1J.
(Excerpts·)
• • • • •• • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • •

11U.S., Department of State, �he Record on Korean
Unification, pp. 150-152.
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Article II
"The parties will consult together whenever, in

\

the opinion of either of them, the political independence
or security of either of the Parties is threatened by
external armed attack••••
Article III
"Each party recognizes that an armed attack in
.the Pacific area on either of the Parties ••• would
be dangerous to its own peace and safety and declares
that it would act to meet the common danger in accor
dance with its constitutional processes.
• • •• • • • •

•

• •

•

•

•

•

• • • • • • •

•

•

Article VI
"This Treaty shall remain in force indefinitely.
Either Party may terminate it one year after the notice
has been given to the other Party.
[Amended by the United States' Senate]
"It is the understand.ing of the United States
that neither party is obligated� under Article III of
the a'C ove Treaty, to come to the aid of the other

except in case of an external attack a3ainst such
party; nor shall anything in the present Treaty be
construed a.s requiring th.e United States to give
assistance to Korea except in the event of an armed
attack against territory which has been recognized by
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the United States as lawfully brought under the admin

istrative control.of the Republic of Korea.

r

APPE DIX B

Cabinet

Major United States Official� During
the Korean Conflict l�

President - Harry

s.

Truman

Secretary of State - Dean G. Acheson
Secretary of Defense - Louis Johnson (to September, 1950)
General George O. Marshall
(September 9 1950 to September,

1951)

Robert A. Lovett
Secretary of the Army - Frank

c.

Pace, Jr.

Secretary of the Air Force - T omas K. Finletter

Secretary of the Navy - Francis Matlews (to July, 1951)
Dan A. Kimball
Joint Chiefs-of-Staff

Chairman - General Omar N. Bradley

Chief of Naval Operations - Admiral Forrest Sherman
(died 1951)
Admiral William M. Fechteler
Air Force Chief-of-Staff - General Hoyt

s.

Vandenberg·

Army Chief-of-Staff - General J. Lawton Collins

Gene::- l of the Army - General Douglas MacArthur

eommanding General of u.s. Eighth Arm::,
and Field Commander in Korea·- Lieutenant General
Walton H. Walker

12Marshall, 38.
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i�hth Ar-y CoJ'llJ.�anders
Lieutenant General Walton H. Walker - June 25 to December,

1950

Lieutenant General Matthew B. Ridgway - December, 1950 to
April, 1951

Lieutenant General James Vaµ Fleet - April, 1951 to March,

1953

Lieutenant General Maxwell B. Taylor - March, 1953 • • •

United Nations Commanders

·General Douglas MacArthur - June, 1950 to April, 1951

General Matthew B. Ridgeway - April, 1951 to April, 1952
General Mark W. Clark - April, 1952 • • •
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